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0. Introduction: why psychodynamic explanation?1 
 
0.1. The poverty of cognition alone 
0.2. How does cognition interact with emotion and motivation? 
0.3. The project of psychodynamic neuroscience 
0.4. The thesis 
0.5. The argument 
 
0.1. The poverty of cognition alone 
 
 In some patients who suffer damage to a particular region of their right 
cerebral hemisphere, they suffer a peculiar malady that seems to have two 
components. The first component is a paralysis on the left side of the body, 
which often co-occurs with a neglect on that side – an inability to attend to and 
engage with objects in the affected part of the visual field.2 The second 
component is an inability to recognize these impairments, as well as a tendency 
to go to great lengths in order to deny them – sometimes to the point of 
denying ownership of the affected part of the body, or trying again and again to 
walk unassisted when their paralysis makes this impossible. This inability to 
recognize one’s symptoms does tend to subside after the acute phase of this 
condition, and is often replaced by a curious emotional attitude towards the 
affected part of the body which ranges from benign disinterest to intense 
hatred. The condition is sometimes called right parietal lobe syndrome, but 
most often all of these symptoms are assimilated to the label of “anosognosia 
for hemiplegia.” (AHP)3 
                                                     
1 I will be using both “psychoanalytic” and “psychodynamic” to denote the style of explanation 
which is at issue in this dissertation. The difference between these has been thought to come 
down to the specificity of the former in comparison to the latter; psychoanalysis involves 
clinical treatment five days a week along lines close to what Freud originally practiced, but 
psychodynamic therapies cover a wider range of different theories and methods (Cf., Shedler 
2006: 9-10). The relatively small differences between psychodynamic treatments will not be 
relevant here, since I establish a specific view on the general structure of psychodynamic 
explanation in chapter two (and I am not primarily concerned with the clinical efficacy of 
psychodynamic treatment). 
2 However, there is no necessary connection between anosognosia and neglect, and there are 
cases in the literature for which these are dissociated (Jekhonen et al. 2000). 
3 The nosology is in fact slightly more complicated than this, since the condition is comprised 
of a number of symptoms that do not always occur together. The denial of paralysis itself is 
anosognosia for hemiplegia, the delusion that the damaged limb does not belong to the patient 
is somatoparaphrenia, and the existence of distorted emotional attitudes towards the deficit is 
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 The impetus behind this thesis is a related set of questions about how to 
explain conditions like these. For example, what roles are emotion and 
cognition each playing in this illness, and how can we distinguish between 
them? In order to elucidate this query a provisional definition is in order. I am 
referring to the emotions both in their neuropsychological and 
phenomenological aspects. That means I am referring to the way that the 
emotion feels as well as to the physical structure (in the brain, at least) that is a 
necessary condition for its existence. I will, however, sometimes explicitly 
distinguish between these physical and phenomenological aspects. 
Furthermore, I include the behavioural, perceptual, and cognitive aspects that 
are often also taken to be constitutive of the emotion. By cognition, I mean all 
thought that is evaluable in terms of truth-conditions; what that means is that 
cognitive tokens have conceptual content – they represent the world in the 
same way that language represents the world.4 These initial definitions are not 
perfect and will become clearer over the course of the thesis, but they will do at 
this point. 
 
 Back to the initial question: what roles are affect and cognition playing 
in AHP, and can we make them conceptually distinct in explanations of that 
illness? For example, can we eschew emotion entirely in the aetiology of the 
illness by understanding it as being solely caused by cognitive deficit? That 
kind of explanation would seek to elucidate the illness in terms of mechanisms 
that can no longer perform their proper function and so produce the 
pathological phenomena though their breakdown. One example of this 
explanatory strategy is that of Cutting (1978), who suggests that for many 
anosognosics it is in virtue of a failure to integrate information about the body 
into judgments about impairment – this failure being caused by the neglect – 
that the patient cannot recognize their deficit. 
                                                                                                                                            
anosodiaphoria if the attitude is indifference and misoplegia if the attitude is hatred. See Orfei 
et al. (2007) for a relatively recent review that elucidates this clinical variability in more detail. 
4 This might seem like a non-standard definition of what cognition is, whereas what might 
seem more appropriate is mental activity that can be understood in terms of information-
processing. The reason I opt for this one is that I wish to include personal-level states like 
delusional beliefs attributed by the clinician that may be the result of information processing 
but which are not themselves information-processing states in the sense meant by cognitive 
scientists. 
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 The theory proposed by Cutting is what philosophers call a “one-factor 
theory” of the anosognosia. The distinction between one-factor theories and 
two-factor theories is one that originates in the study of delusions (e.g., Davies 
et al. 2001). A one-factor theory of delusion is one that explains it to be a 
normal cognitive response to an unusual experience brought on by some kind 
of sensory or cognitive deficit. In the case of AHP, a simple one-factor theory 
of the condition would posit that the denial of paralysis is a normal cognitive 
response for somebody who lacks proprioceptive information about or who 
cannot attend to the paralysed limb. The deficit causes an unusual experience, 
which causes the agent to form a false belief about the state of the body. It is, 
on the theory, a reasonable belief to form under the circumstances of the 
deficit. The only pathogenic cause that is present according to this one-factor 
theory of anosognosia is the deficit (for example, in the mechanisms of 
attention), and it is thought that this deficit alone is enough to explain the 
subsequent delusion in conjunction with ordinary processes of belief fixation. 
 
 The flaw in single factor theories of the condition is that the 
neuropsychological deficit is not a sufficient condition for the illness, either 
descriptively or normatively. It is not descriptively sufficient because there are 
people who have the same cognitive deficit that do not have the anosognosia. 
For example, and with reference to Cutting, it has been found that neglect and 
anosognosia for paralysis “double-dissociate”; we can find each symptom in a 
patient along with an absence of the other. (e.g., Jehkonen et al. 2000) The 
single factor is not normatively sufficient for the delusion either. What that 
means is that although an unusual experience caused by deficit might give rise 
to a candidate belief that seems particularly salient or plausible due to that 
experience, it does not explain why this belief is accepted despite other 
evidence to the contrary; some examples of contrary evidence might be 
testimony from the examining doctor or nurses, or visual evidence that one’s 
paralysed arm is not moving. And it does not explain why the delusional belief 
persists as this evidence accumulates. 
 
 By contrast, the “two-factor theory” of anosognosia posits a second 
pathological factor in the genesis and persistence of the condition. One theory 
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of this type is that of Davies, Aimola Davies and Coltheart (2005). The first 
factor in their theory is the neuropsychological deficit that leads to an unusual 
experience eliciting a false belief about the state of the body. They suggest that 
the second factor in the right theory of anosognosia will be a deficit in belief-
evaluation processes, and that this will account for the persistence of the 
anosognosia. This is a theory of anosognosia that continues to explain it in 
terms of cognitive deficit, but that explains it in terms of two cognitive deficits 
(or maybe two types of deficit, since each factor may well include more than 
one functional deficit) that together produce the anosognosia. 
 
 Now, there is a further debate about the nature of the second factor in 
anosognosia. More specifically, it is a debate over the nature of the second 
factor with respect to the distinctions between cognitive, affective, and 
motivational states. For example, is the anosognosic patient’s failure to update 
his delusional beliefs in response to contrary evidence the result of a deficit in 
the cognitive mechanisms that govern evaluation of belief, or does he maintain 
these beliefs because (say) the motivation to hold these beliefs is 
overpowering? Early theories of anosognosia gave a central explanatory role to 
motivational factors. Weinstein and Kahn (1950), for instance, hypothesized 
that denial of illness was a generalized defensive reaction against the negative 
emotion that acknowledgment of illness would cause. But theories of this kind 
have seriously fallen out of favour since the uptake of theories that purport to 
fully explain the illness in terms of cognitive deficit. 
 
One-factor or two-factor, a theory of anosognosia that relies exclusively 
on cognitive deficit for its explanation will just not do.5 This view will be 
defended more substantially against various objections in chapter five of the 
thesis, and I introduce it only in order to discuss the problems that 
motivationally-based explanations of pathology must face. But here are some 
                                                     
5 My claim here is not, however, that all cases of anosognosia for hemiplegia must be 
explained in terms of motivation and emotion. That seems pretty clearly untrue, and I suspect 
that there are many subsets of the clinical population with anosognosia whose illness could be 
explained without drawing on these factors (e.g., along lines suggested by Aimola Davies & 
Davies (2009)). The claim is rather that these factors (emotion and motivation) are needed to 
explain some cases, and therefore that we need a more general account of how it is that these 
factors could come to play a role in such illnesses. I am claiming that cognitive deficit accounts 
are insufficient to account for all cases of anosognosia on their own. 
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reasons to establish initial plausibility. First, there are a number of symptoms in 
the more holistically individuated right parietal lobe syndrome (as opposed to 
the anosognosia alone) that resist explanation solely in terms of cognitive 
deficit; for example, it is hard to see how a deficit theory could account for the 
emotional distortion that accompanies the anosognosia itself (for example, the 
tendency of some anosognosic patients to become inappropriately upset at 
minor health complaints). Secondly, it commits the deficit-theorist to the view 
that all the emotional aspects of the illness need to be explained in terms of the 
cognitive aspects; this view is implausible, given that the emotional distortions 
associated with the illness (e.g., anosodiaphoria and misoplegia) resist analysis 
in terms of the subtraction of function through the failure of mechanism – it 
rather seems like the addition of something that is not present in healthy 
patients. For example, Turnbull, Evans & Owen (2005) have found that 
anosodiaphoric patients seem to exhibit higher levels of negative affect than 
controls, though this affect is not explicitly associated with their deficit. That 
motivates both against the thesis that anosodiaphoria is a generalized emotional 
deficit, and for the (psychodynamic) thesis that there is some positive distortion 
of normal emotionality going on. Thirdly, anosognosia lends itself very 
strongly to interpretation in terms of motivated self-deception (Levy 2009), and 
self-deception of this kind receives its best explanation in terms of 
psychodynamic processes (Cf., Lockie 2003; Billon 2011). 
 
0.2. How does cognition interact with emotion and motivation? 
 
Now, if it is the case that one or both of the explanatory factors in 
anosognosia (and in other pathologies where two-factor theories apply) has a 
significant affective or motivational element, then this raises a slew of 
problems about the conceptualization of the explanatorily relevant affective or 
motivational states and the way in which these interact with ordinary cognitive 
processes. That is to say that the proponent of motivationally-based 
explanations of mental illness faces a number of conceptual challenges that the 
deficit-theorist does not. One of these is to provide the outlines of a global 
model of mental function that can explain how it is that emotion and 
motivation can distort or otherwise influence normal cognitive processes. It 
may well be the lack of any such model that has contributed to the relative 
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scarcity of motivational theories in psychopathology; as Peter Ditto points out 
in a review of motivation-based explanations of perceptual error in the 1970s, 
“the core of the argument [against perceptual defense] focused on the lack of 
any specific and plausible theoretical account of how perceptual defense effects 
might occur.” (Ditto 2009: 26) 
 
Another of the issues that is specific to motivation-based theories of 
AHP is the objection that any such theory is necessarily “psychogenic,” and 
that it is in virtue of this psychogenicity that it cannot account for features of 
anosognosia which seem to be associated with specific anatomical features of 
the pathogenesis; most famously, the fact that anosognosia most often occurs 
after lesion to the right cerebral hemisphere but not to the left (Bisiach & 
Geminiani 1991). The putative necessity that psychodynamic theories be 
psychogenic in a way that ignores anatomical facts about anosognosia is on 
display in claims like that of Bortolotti (2013) that “[a]ccording to 
psychodynamic accounts, there needs to be no neurobiological deficits and 
delusions are caused by motivational factors alone.” 
 
These two are the most pressing of the problems at hand, but they are 
not all there is. There are other – more traditionally philosophical – issues 
which demand resolution before a satisfactory motivation-based account of 
anosognosia could be pitched. For example, if motivation is to play a central 
role in explaining psychopathologies that involve delusion or false belief then 
it would seem that they must deal with the paradox of self-deception, in which 
an agent seems to need to simultaneously hold and not hold the belief that they 
are motivated to deny. An influential critique of psychodynamic modes of 
explanation is based upon this paradox (Sartre 1982 [1956]), but the paradox is 
not intractable and there are a number of replies to it which are available (e.g., 
Pears 1984; Gardner 1993; Lockie 2003; Billon 2011) 
 
These kinds of problems seem increasingly urgent in light of a growing 
realization that emotion and motivation do indeed seem to play a significant 
role in the functioning of the mind, and that there is no current consensus on 
how the theorize this role. McKay, Langdon and Coltheart (2009: 178), for 
instance, suggest that “psychoanalytic ideas contain a key notion that models of 
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belief formation may ignore at their peril: the insight that motives are important 
doxastic forces…” and that there is a “need for a synthesis of [the two-factor 
theory of delusions] and a motivational perspective…” Clearly, it would be 
exceedingly helpful to the theorization of emotion and motivation in 
neuropsychopathology to have a basic theoretical framework available within 
which these issues could discussed. 
 
0.3. The project of psychodynamic neuroscience 
 
 “Psychodynamic neuroscience” (Fotopoulou 2012a) can be understood 
as an interdisciplinary attempt to come to grips with this challenge, although it 
might not be conceptualized as such by all of its practitioners. Researchers in 
this relatively new interdisciplinary area seek to understand the interaction 
between cognition and emotion on a roughly psychodynamic model; this is the 
way of understanding mental function that has its most obvious origins in 
Freud6 but which has continued to develop through object-relations, attachment 
theory, and various other psychodynamic “schools.” Despite the variety of 
theoretical perspectives within the psychodynamic framework, however, there 
is an underlying unity in the approach that it takes to explaining 
psychopathology. The basic commonality is the centrality of wish-fulfilment; 
this is a putative process in which mental states with fictive content are 
generated whose role is to minimize anxiety and regulate affect. 
 
Turnbull and Solms (2007: 1085), for example, claim that “emotion 
systems (and the drives that govern them)…distort cognitive representations of 
reality, by hijacking executive resources (through so-called defences)…[and] 
the consequences of such beliefs are subjectively advantageous.” They hope 
that the adoption of the psychodynamic model within neuropsychology will 
make emotion- and motivation-based explanations of psychopathology more 
viable against the contemporary scene: 
 
The neuropsychological community has traditionally defaulted to 
cognitive-based accounts of [false belief], at least in part because the 
                                                     
6 Though there are important antecedents in the philosophy of previous centuries, and the 
sciences of the 19th century. Cf., Ellenberger (1970); Sulloway (1979); and Gardner (2012). 
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training of the scientists concerned has been primarily cognitive…we 
anticipate that the next decade will see growing numbers of emotion-
related accounts of psychological disorders, as neuropsychologists 
come to recognize the role of the newly-acknowledged emotion systems 
in explaining such phenomena. (Turnbull & Solms 2007: 1087) 
 
As it stands, however, psychodynamic neuroscience (or 
“neuropsychoanalysis”) is a disunified field. That is to say that there are (not 
always explicit) disagreements over what the research project constitutes, as 
well as how to proceed within it. Those disagreements bifurcate into 
disagreements about aims and disagreements about content.  
 
 Disagreement about the aims of neuropsychoanalysis often centres 
around what it is that the integration of psychodynamic models with 
neuropsychology is supposed to achieve. There are at least three possible 
answers to the question: the unification answer; the metaphysical answer; and 
the empirical answer. On the unification answer, the role of the psychodynamic 
model (or “metapsychology”) is to unify a range of lower level empirical 
theories in order to show how the (cognitive and emotional) systems of the 
mind fit together within the same organism (e.g., Solms & Panksepp 2012). On 
the metaphysical answer, the role of the model is to bestow neuropsychology 
with a theory of the subject (or mind, or personhood, or whatever) that allows it 
to escape reduction or elimination, or the assimilation to a kind of pseudo-
evolutionary adaptationism (e.g., Johnston 2013).7 On the empirical answer, 
the claim is that it is just the case that some psychodynamic theories of mental 
function are exceedingly plausible on the clinical level, and the aim is to make 
those theories empirically tractable so that they can be subjected to 
experimental verification and given a robust sub-personal underpinning (e.g., 
Carhart-Harris & Friston 2010). 
 
 Questions about the right kind of content of neuropsychoanalysis are 
tricker and less immediately tractable, partly due to the variety of 
psychodynamic theories. There are two issues here. The first is that there are 
                                                     
7 Presumably in this case we are also owed an explanation of why such an exceptionalist 
account is necessary. 
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competing accounts of what the best theory in psychodynamic neuroscience 
will have as its theoretical content. Take as an example the disagreement 
between Mark Solms and Heather Berlin over whether or not the concept of id 
needs to be significantly revised in light of recent evidence from affective 
neuroscience,8 or the disagreements pointed out by Johnston (2013) between 
Lacanian and “Anglo-American” researchers. The second issue is that there are 
a range of results to do with different psychological phenomena that have not 
been placed into a single overarching picture; that is to say, that have not (yet) 
been unified within a larger framework and remain disconnected research 
projects. For example, it is generally assumed that Panksepp’s (1998) work on 
the emotion systems is compatible with the free-energetic interpretation of the 
Freudian distinction between ego and id (Carhart-Harris & Friston 2010), but 
there is a lack of material in which these two frameworks are discussed 
together in depth.9 These disunified aspects of the burgeoning psychodynamic 
neuroscience make it clear that there is a need for the disagreements I have 
glossed to be made explicit, so that even if there is no obvious consensus that 
immediately emerges the conceptual stakes of these questions can nonetheless 
be clear for those engaged in answering them. 
  
0.4. The thesis 
 
 The thesis which I intend to defend in this dissertation has two logical 
parts. In the first I argue for a relatively specific picture of the way 
psychodynamic neuroscience ought to proceed, and argue for the content 
which is best suited to giving an underlying account of the clinical phenomena 
in which psychodynamic explanation finds its natural object. Those are 
irrational behaviours that lend themselves to interpretation in terms of self-
deception, or wish-fulfilment. The sub-personal theoretical model which I 
suggest can best play the role of making sense of these distinctively 
psychodynamic patterns of explanation must be one that has two idiosyncratic 
features: first, that it includes a mode of cognition which involves the 
                                                     
8 See Solms (2013) along with commentary by Berlin and others in the same volume. 
9 Though there are some good moves in this direction. See Hopkins (2012) as well as Mark 
Solms’s (2014) presentation at the Frankfurt am Main Joseph Sandler conference, the 
recording of which is available on YouTube. 
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generation of fictive experiences or doxastic states which has the effect of 
regulating affect and motivation; and second, that this mode of cognition can 
sometimes cause motivational states to be regulated in non-straightforward 
ways. I will be showing that there are resources in cognitive and affective 
neuroscience to instantiate both of these general features: first, in the predictive 
processing theory  of cognition that has recently been gaining traction in 
cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Hohwy 2013); and secondly, Jaak Panksepp’s 
(1998; cf., Panksepp & Biven 2012) theory of the mammalian emotion systems 
in affective neuroscience. 
 
 The second logical part of the dissertation involves the application of 
this model to the syndrome of AHP, in order to show the way in which the 
neuropsychodynamic view is able to account for the emotional features of the 
condition without excluding cognitive and neuroanatomical factors. This is 
important because past theories of anosognosia which tried to include 
motivational factors in the explanation of anosognosia have been judged 
insufficient on the basis that they leave physiological features of the illness 
unexplained (e.g., Bisiach & Geminiani 1991: 24-26). My contention is that 
not only does a subset of the clinical population with anosognosia show 
symptoms that motivate for explanation in terms of wish-fulfilment, but that 
the models afforded by psychodynamic neuroscience allow us to provide such 
explanations in a way that lacks the mechanistic vagueness of earlier accounts. 
 
0.5. The argument 
 
1. Psychodynamic explanation and the unity of science 
 
In chapter one I lay the groundwork for the very idea of psychodynamic 
neuroscience. This entails a defense against two types of objections that posit 
incompatibility between psychodynamic and neurocognitive approaches: first, 
against the objection that they are incompatible because the former do not meet 
the minimum epistemic standards for scientific investigation; and second, that 
they are incompatible because they deal with radically different subject 
matters. The way in which I address the first objection is by arguing that 
psychodynamic explanation is to be understood as an extension of 
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commonsense psychology. What this means is that some causal inferences in 
psychoanalysis are warranted in the manner of inference to the best 
explanation, though as I go on to explain this warrant has important limits.  
 
With respect to the second objection, there are two variants. The first of 
these attempts to establish the disciplinary autonomy of psychoanalysis on the 
basis of the putative autonomy of personal level explanation. This particular 
objection can be addressed through a twofold strategy: first, demonstrate that 
there is no cogent theory of mental events strong enough to rule out the 
existence of stochastic relationships between mental and physical empirical 
generalizations; and second, demonstrate that there is a plausible theory of 
representation which is available for use in sub-personal level theories. The 
second variant of the objection attempts to establish psychoanalytic autonomy 
on the basis of a radical anti-representationalism. I address this objection 
through an argument to the effect that mental representation is a necessary 
condition for the intelligibility of psychodynamic phenomena. 
 
2. Psychodynamic explanation and its metapsychological commitments 
 
 This all precipitates a discussion of psychodynamic explanation proper. 
Psychodynamic models of mental function have their origin in a clinical 
practice where explanation proceeds “horizontally” – in terms of causal 
antecedents rather than mechanisms – and in a way that is to be construed as an 
extension of commonsense-psychological practices. The role of this part of the 
argument is to examine the form of that explanatory practice in psychoanalysis. 
That leads to two further tasks: first, to show (against “intentionalist” critics 
like Pataki (2014)) that this style of explanation can cogently proceed with a 
wide enough scope without appealing to centres of agency within the person; 
and second, to argue that the resulting “sub-intentionalist” form of explanation 
can be coherently applied to some cases of AHP (the ones in which I am 
interested, and from which I want to infer some basic constraints on the way 
the mind must be). I then argue for a more general set of “vertical” (i.e., sub-
personal) constraints on any theory of mental function that should follow from 
the “horizontal” explanatory practice. 
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 I suggest that there are three constraints that need to be met by any such 
sub-personal theory: first, we need to be able to show how motivational states 
directly cause doxastic states, as is entailed by the sub-intentional analysis of 
wish-fulfilment; second, we need to specify the circumstances under which 
motivational states generate wish-fulfilments rather than playing their ordinary 
role in the generation of action; and third, we need to account for the 
indirectness or opacity of pacification that is sometimes evinced in wish-
fulfilment – the way in which the emotion which is being regulated comes to 
be directed onto inappropriate objects. Furthermore, the mechanisms which 
meet these three constraints also need to be plausible against the background of 
the contemporary cognitive sciences. 
 
3. Wish-fulfilment and the reduction of quantity 
 
In the third chapter of this thesis I address the first and second of these 
metapsychological commitments. In Freud’s (1895) Project for a Scientific 
Psychology, he specifies wish-fulfilment as a strategy for the reduction of 
energy that is employed when reduction through goal-directed action is not 
possible; for example, in sleep or under circumstances of frustration. Although 
many of the underlying assumptions that inform Freud’s model in the Project 
are false, I will be arguing that there are conceptual insights in that model 
which we would do well to return to in understanding how motivational states 
can influence belief formation. The understanding of action and perception in 
terms of the reduction of quantity is one such insight, and there is an analogue 
for this process in contemporary cognitive science in the form of predictive 
processing models of cognition. I show in this chapter that these models give 
us the resources to explain both how motivational states can influence beliefs 
and also the circumstances under which this process is likely to occur in 
preference to ordinary action. 
 
These models show how motivational states can influence beliefs 
because within contemporary predictive processing accounts of cognition there 
is a functional continuity between desire and belief – what that means is that 
both of these kinds of state interact with each other by means of the Bayesian 
inference that is the engine of the cognitive architecture, and desires are 
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construed as a kind of “prior belief” that lead to action through the selective 
sampling of sensory states. The circumstances under which motivational states 
are likely to lead to false belief rather than action can be specified through 
discussion of the work of Hopkins (2012) and Mathys (2013). Roughly, the 
notion is that motivational states are more likely to lead to wish-fulfilling 
symptoms under circumstances of repression, where repression is glossed as 
the Bayesian inhibition of a hypothesis which conflicts with the agent’s overall 
model of his world. Similarly, this inhibition is more likely to occur in an 
overall model which is less complex. Complexity reduction is thought to occur 
in various psychopathologies, and is linked to dopamine dysregulation. 
 
4. Drives, priors, and conflict resolution 
 
 In the fourth chapter of the thesis I am concerned with the third 
metapsychological commitment, which is to explain how it is that sometimes 
desires which play a role in wish-fulfilment are pacified indirectly or in an 
opaque manner – that is to say that the emotions which are expressed in wish-
fulfilment come to find new objects where their original objects are frustrated. 
In some cases of AHP, for instance, the patient will remain indifferent to the 
fact of their impairment (where patients with the same damage on the opposite 
hemisphere exhibit great distress) but will display a great intensity of negative 
affect over minor complains like a sore back, or a difficulty in sleeping. The 
psychodynamic inference in this case is that the emotion which their 
impairment elicits is redirected onto other objects in their environment. There 
are many other cases of such phenomena in the psychoanalytic literature, and 
in other places besides. 
  
I argue that we cannot account for the opacity of wish-fulfilment by 
appeal to some sort of “censor mechanism,” as has often been done in classical 
psychoanalysis and in some previous accounts. That is because such 
mechanisms are irreducibly anthropomorphic, and contradict the sub-
intentional analysis of wish-fulfilment in chapter two. Rather, I appeal to the 
idea of drives, which when inhibited seek out substitute objects through 
cognition. I suggest that Panksepp’s (1998) theory of the emotions can serve as 
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the mechanism of this process when paired with the predictive processing 
mechanisms that are explicated in chapter three. 
 
5. A neuropsychodynamic theory of AHP 
 
 The final chapter of this dissertation involves the application of the 
preceding theoretical considerations in the context of AHP. I therefore begin 
with a comprehensive overview of the condition, taking care to stress those 
features which I think motivate for a psychodynamic approach in the cases 
where they are present. These features are the peculiar pathologies of emotion 
that occur alongside the more-discussed pathologies of belief; specifically, the 
emotional fragility of some patients, the way in which their existing attitudes 
towards affairs are emotionally distorted, and the anosodiaphoria and 
misoplegia that often occur after the acute stage of the condition has passed. By 
way of illustration I then present two extant psychodynamic theories of the 
condition: that of Weinstein & Kahn (1950), and that of Kaplan-Solms and 
Solms (2002). 
 
 There are three interrelated objections that any psychodynamic 
treatment of AHP must face. The first of these is that psychodynamic 
inferences are unavoidably psychogenic; i.e. that they are incompatible with 
deficit approaches and that they use personal level vocabulary where a sub-
personal level vocabulary is appropriate. The second consists in a list of 
neuroanatomical facts about the condition that the putatively psychogenic 
nature of the psychodynamic theory renders it impotent to explain. The last is 
that there is no plausible mechanism of action within the dominant theoretical 
framework in psychiatry today that could give a sub-personal account of the 
process of wish-fulfilment. My contention in this final chapter is that we 
should sometimes understand the delusions characteristic of AHP as being 
wish-fulfilling, and that the canonical objections against this mode of 
explanation can be removed once the sub-personal theory elaborated in 
previous chapters is put into place. The introduction of motivational states into 
the explanation of anosognosia faces problems no more serious than the 
introduction of doxastic states does, and it sheds light on a number of features 
of the condition that cognitive-deficit theories leave obscure. 
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1. Psychodynamic explanation and the unity of science 
 
1.1. Is psychoanalysis autonomous, and what would that mean for  
neuropsychoanalysis? 
1.2. Internal meta-theory: psychoanalysis is an extension of commonsense 
psychology 
 1.2.1. The basic view 
 1.2.2. The limits of inference to the best explanation 
1.3. External meta-theory: the relationship of psychoanalysis to other 
disciplines 
 1.3.1. Two kinds of external meta-theoretic arguments for strong 
autonomy 
 1.3.2. Davidson’s “non-reductive” physicalism and what it doesn’t give 
us 
 1.3.3. Millikan’s sub-personal theory of representation 
 1.3.4. Claims for the special status of the subject in psychoanalytic 
theory 
1.4. Concluding remarks 
 
 The purpose of this first chapter is to convince the reader that the very 
idea of psychodynamic neuroscience is a coherent one. More specifically, it is 
to establish that psychodynamic metapsychology is the kind of theory that can 
be taken out of its immediate explanatory context in order to inform the 
construction of general models which describe and explain mental function. 
The immediate explanatory context in question is a very specific kind of 
clinical activity. This chapter therefore confronts the task of describing the way 
in which that theory emerges from the practice and defends the thesis that it 
meets the criteria for interrogation using less controversially scientific – that is, 
“extra-clinical” – methods. This is an exercise that is intended to remove 
criticism from two origins: first, from critics who argue that psychodynamic 
clinical practice is epistemically deficient to the point that we ought not to put 
credence in psychodynamic conjectures about the mind; and second, from 
critics that argue that psychoanalytic theory is autonomous in a way that rules 
out the kind of project that neuropsychoanalysis instantiates. 
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1.1. Is psychoanalysis autonomous, and what would that mean for 
neuropsychoanalysis? 
 
 “Psychoanalysis” is an ambiguous term. Freud (1923: 235), in his 
encyclopaedia entry on psychoanalysis, distinguishes between a research 
method, a therapeutic technique for the alleviation of neurotic disorder, and a 
theory of mental phenomena. According to Freud, the psychoanalytic method 
is a method of psychological investigation “of mental processes which are 
almost inaccessible in any other way.”10 This method is at the same time drawn 
upon in order to alleviate psychogenic illnesses (“neurotic disorders”) that the 
patient may suffer from, as well as generalize from a collection of particular 
cases to more general theoretical statements about the nature of mental activity: 
“a collection of psychological information…which is gradually being 
accumulated into a new scientific discipline.” 
 
 Given this tripartite nature of the classical psychoanalysis it is perhaps 
not so surprising that there has been a great deal of (both descriptive and 
prescriptive) reflection upon these disciplinary components and the 
relationships between them. This kind of reflection might be called 
“psychoanalytic meta-theory,” and it is a consistent theme in the 
psychoanalytic literature (e.g., Rapaport 1960; Schafer 1976; Gill & Holzman 
1976; Sandler 1983) and its satellites, like the philosophy of psychoanalysis 
(e.g., Nagel 1959; Hopkins 1982; Grünbaum 1984; Lacewing 2012). 
Psychoanalytic meta-theory enquires into the way the three components of 
psychoanalysis are related to one another, and into the relationship that the 
resulting constellation has to other disciplines. 
 
 Owing to the historically wide application of psychoanalytic concepts 
and theories – in, say, experimental psychology, literary criticism, political 
theory, philosophy, and various other disciplines – reflection upon the 
relationship between those theories and their practical ground (psychoanalytic 
                                                     
10 It would be a mistake to interpret this in terms of psychoanalytic autonomy because it refers 
to the difficulty of bringing “repressed” mental states to light in a clinical setting, rather than a 
more general feature of the mechanism of repression. That is to say that this comment of 
Freud’s does not entail that the mechanisms in virtue of which mental states are made 
inaccessible is empirically intractable by non-psychoanalytic methods. 
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activity proper) takes on an importance that it might not have for other 
disciplines. That is because one’s meta-theoretical commitments determine the 
scope and type of interdisciplinary project that will seem cogent from that point 
of view. For example, if one takes psychodynamic explanation to trade in 
exclusively hermeneutic rather than causal reasoning, then one might see the 
testing of psychodynamic theories in an experimental setting to be premised on 
a mistake. That is because experimental settings test putative causal 
relationships, and psychoanalysis (according to that view) does not infer causal 
relationships but exclusively meaningful ones.  
 
 The very idea of neuropsychoanalysis requires its own meta-theory. It 
requires it because the proposition that theory originating in psychoanalytic 
investigation is appropriate for application in neuropsychological research is 
most often objected to on broadly meta-theoretical grounds. This is a fact that 
is understood and articulated succinctly by Blass and Carmeli (2007: 20) in 
their “case against neuropsychoanalysis”: 
 
[N]europsychoanalysis does not merely offer a perspective on the 
relationship between two separate fields, neuroscience and 
psychoanalysis (as maintained by its proponents), but rather leads  to a 
new perspective on the nature of psychoanalysis – a biologistic one. 
Thus, the debate over neuropsychoanalysis is in fact a debate over the 
very aims and essence of psychoanalysis. 
 
Blass and Carmeli may be putting their case a bit too emphatically here, but it 
is difficult to disagree with the basic point that they are making. We should 
nuance it in light of Freud’s distinction between psychoanalytic method, 
psychoanalytic therapy, and psychoanalytic theory. Neuropsychoanalysis, 
construed as the attempt to use psychodynamic theory in service of the 
construction of compelling models of human mental phenomena, certainly 
must make particular assumptions about the nature of psychoanalytic theory. 
However, the assumptions that it must make about the nature of psychoanalytic 
practice (that is, method and therapy) are much less clear. That opens up to us 
the apparent task to probe those assumptions and determine precisely the kind 
of meta-theory that neuropsychoanalysis requires. That task is prescriptive 
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rather than descriptive. That is to say that it does not require that 
neuropsychoanalytic researchers actually hold these views antecedently; 
instead, it legislates them as the best possible psychoanalytic meta-theory given 
the goals of neuropsychoanalysis. 
 
 I have said that psychoanalytic meta-theory is concerned with two kinds 
of relations. The first kind of relation is an inter-disciplinary relation, that 
between psychoanalysis and cognate disciplines which apparently explain the 
same objects (human mental function) from different theoretical perspectives. 
This kind of meta-theory is directed at questions like “how are we to construe 
the relationship between psychoanalytic theory and theory that arises in other 
scientific contexts?” For example, what about psychodynamic theories of 
development (e.g., Klein 1997) and theories of cognitive development (e.g., 
Piaget 1977)? Is there a theoretical continuity between these two kinds of 
theory? To the extent that they bear out empirical confirmation, can they be 
unified within a single theory of development?11 
 
 Perhaps more pertinently in the context of this dissertation, how are we 
to regard the idea – expressed by Freud in his well-known essay on narcissism 
and in other places – that “all our provisional ideas in psychology will 
presumably someday be based on an organic substructure…”? (Freud 1914: 
78) This question runs parallel to similar debates in philosophy concerning the 
relationship between mental events and physical events. With respect to 
neuropsychoanalysis, it is this question in particular that exercises Blass and 
Carmeli; they maintain that an understanding of the neurocognitive basis of 
mental life is not theoretically relevant to psychoanalytic theory, and vice 
versa. 
 
 There are ways to argue for a similar conclusion of mutual irrelevance 
on the basis of claims about the second kind of meta-theoretic relation, which 
is a kind of intra-disciplinary relation. This second kind consists of the internal 
relations between the theoretical, therapeutic, and methodological components 
of psychoanalysis; these are the three components that are specified in Freud’s 
                                                     
11 For example, as is pitched in Hopkins (1987). 
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original encyclopaedia entry and which continue to be an accurate analysis of 
the discipline.12 Questions concerning these relations will include the 
following: “how does psychoanalytic methodology generate theoretical 
claims?”; “to what extent can psychoanalytic methodology justify these 
theoretical claims?”; “what is the relationship between psychological 
explanation of the patient and therapeutic change in the patient?”; and “to what 
extent are the explanatory and therapeutic practices in psychoanalysis 
dependent upon background theoretical commitments?” 
 
 Certain answers to these questions yield positions similar to the 
scepticism towards neuropsychoanalysis demonstrated by Blass and Carmeli. 
That is because if one believes (say) that psychoanalytic methodology rests on 
no theoretical commitments beyond the exigencies of clinical experience, then 
one will also see no reason to believe that this methodology will change in 
relation to any change in psychoanalytic theory – whether that change issues 
from another discipline or from psychoanalytic experience itself. One takes it 
to be, as it were, “theory neutral.” This position is stronger than that of Blass 
and Carmeli, because it not only denies the relevance of biological theory to 
psychoanalytic practice but also the relevance of any theory where the 
methodological grounds of that theory are external to psychoanalytic practice. 
In any case, what they have in common is their commitment to the idea that 
there is a line that should be drawn between psychoanalysis and other 
disciplines, such that there is some (partial or complete) barrier to inter-
theoretic revision across this line. Let’s call this broad position “psychoanalytic 
autonomy.” 
 
 But as must be apparent now, this is really the name for  a cluster of 
related positions rather than a single unified one. We can divide it twice, 
according to two distinctions. First there is the distinction between strong 
autonomy and weak autonomy. A claim for weak autonomy is the claim that 
                                                     
12 It might be objected that many analysts no longer to take psychoanalysis to be therapeutic in 
quite the same way it was thought to be in classical psychoanalysis, and in the way that other 
psychotherapies are usually thought to be therapeutic. This is a case that has been prosecuted 
by some schismatic schools, and particularly by Lacan (Cf., Lacan 2006 [1948]: 87; Lacan 
2006 [1956]: 208-209 for some passages which suggest this). But “therapeutic effect” can be 
substituted for the less determinate “practical aim” without this making any relevant difference 
to the basic argument of the chapter. 
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psychoanalytic theory is not such that it makes sense to revise it on the basis of 
result in other disciplines. A claim for strong autonomy is the claim that 
psychoanalytic theory is autonomous not only in the sense that there can be no 
revision of psychoanalytic theory on the basis of results in other disciplines, 
but also that the opposite is true – that the application of psychoanalytic theory 
in other disciplines will yield incoherent and conceptually confused results. 
 
 The other way to tease apart the cluster of positions here is with the 
distinction between practical autonomy and theoretical autonomy. We could 
imagine that if psychoanalysis was autonomous in a practical sense then its 
theoretical background would be subject to change but the methodology 
employed in the clinical setting would not. To see this, imagine on analogy a 
scientist who is trying to ascertain the truth of a theory regarding the 
relationship between the recognition of faces and the recognition of numbers. 
His theory is that agents draw upon the same information in recognizing 
numbers that they do in recognizing faces. In order to test the theory he 
employs the standard methodology associated with fMRI. Now, imagine it 
turns out that cognitive psychologists using different methods entirely acquire 
evidence for the hypothesis that there is no link between facial recognition and 
numerical recognition. This will mean that the neuroscientist should reconsider 
his theory, but it does not have any consequences for his methodology. That is 
what I mean by practical autonomy. Alternatively, if psychoanalysis was 
theoretically autonomous then the whole thing would be immune to inter-
theoretic revision. To extend our analogy: the neuroscientist in that case would 
not only be able to keep his methodology, but would not be obliged to 
reconsider the theory (that, to the cognitive psychologist, appears false) either. 
 
FIGURE 1.1: VARIETIES OF PSYCHOANALYTIC AUTONOMY 
Psychoanalytic 
autonomy 
Strong Weak 
Theoretical Attempts to integrate 
psychoanalytic theory in 
other disciplines 
generates conceptual 
Psychoanalytic theory 
and methodology 
immune to revision on 
the basis of results in 
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confusion; 
Psychoanalytic theory 
and methodology 
immune to revision on 
the basis of results in 
other disciplines. 
other disciplines; may 
be applied in other 
disciplines without 
necessarily generating 
conceptual confusion. 
Practical As above. Psychoanalytic 
methodology immune to 
revision on the basis of 
results in other 
disciplines; theory may 
be subject to revision. 
 
 The two ways in which the “psychoanalytic autonomy” cluster comes 
apart overlap to some extent. We can have both weak and strong autonomy 
with respect to psychoanalytic theory, but when it comes to practical autonomy 
it doesn’t seem cogent to say that psychoanalytic practice can be autonomous 
in the strong sense. That is because it seems odd to say that psychoanalytic 
method should be employed in sciences which already have their own 
distinctive methods – that we should employ the psychoanalytic methodology 
of free association and interpretation in experimental psychology, for example; 
or at least, such a suggestion is pretty far from what this thesis is all about. So 
it doesn’t seem necessary to argue against it.13 
 
 So what kinds of psychoanalytic autonomy are incompatible with what 
this thesis is all about? As we saw in the introduction, what is at stake is the 
extent to which psychoanalytic theory can be called upon in the construction of 
general models of mental function. That immediately makes practical 
psychoanalytic autonomy compatible with neuropsychoanalysis construed in 
this fashion. It is so compatible because the relevant component here is theory 
                                                     
13 With this said, I wouldn’t want to rule out the possibility that some kind of methodological 
overlap might be an interesting thing to attempt. Or at least, I think there might be interesting 
opportunities for increased traffic between the two. What I have in mind is the work of 
Luborsky (e.g., Luborsky & Crits-Christoph 1988), who recorded large numbers of 
psychoanalytic sessions in order to subject them to quantitative analysis. It does seem that we 
can capture something interesting and novel about what goes on in psychoanalysis with 
quantitative methods, and this is a methodological (not merely theoretical) exchange. 
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rather than practice, so we can co-opt the theory without having to make any 
claims about the role that it plays with respect to the practice. It might be nice 
to be able to argue against practical autonomy, because I think it would be nice 
to be able to revise psychoanalytic practice in light of our best theories about 
the way the mind is. But this is more than we need, and I’m happy to let it go 
in order to avail ourselves of the theory. 
 
 We should also notice that weak autonomy is perfectly compatible with 
neuropsychoanalysis. Recall that weak autonomy implies that psychoanalytic 
theory is autonomous in the sense that it needs no justification outside of that 
which it receives in virtue of its employment in psychoanalytic practice. But 
note that this is not incompatible with its application as a general theory in 
other disciplinary contexts, and we can have psychoanalytic theory inform 
experimentally-tractable models that are then independently amenable to 
confirmation or disconfirmation without insisting that we take that subsequent 
confirmation or disconfirmation to bear on the theory as it is employed in the 
clinical context. Again, it would be nice to be able to reject weak autonomy. 
That is because weak autonomy removes one peripheral motivation for 
neuropsychoanalysis, which is that extra-clinical testing may help resolve 
theoretical disputes within psychoanalysis itself.14 But it is not necessary for 
the purposes of the thesis I am arguing for here. 
 
 Here is the bad news: what is incompatible with neuropsychoanalysis is 
the strong autonomy of psychoanalytic theory. That is the view that 
psychoanalytic theory is not the appropriate kind of thing for application in 
other disciplines, and certainly not cognitive neuroscience! If this is true, then 
it blocks the basic move that I want to make in this thesis, which is to infer 
basic properties of the mind on the basis of psychodynamic patterns of 
explanation, where those patterns of explanation illuminate features of human 
behaviour that are otherwise left obscure. If psychodynamic explanation loses 
                                                     
14 What I have in mind here are the Controversial Discussions between the followers of Anna 
Freud and Melanie Klein (King & Steiner 1991). One of the points of contentions between 
them  was the stage at which the child develops a sense of self. It seems to me that results in 
developmental psychology can help decide issues like these one way or the other. Jim Hopkins 
has drawn my attention to this particular example. 
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its significance or is irrevocably distorted in some way when it is taken out of 
its practical context, then this kind of strategy is incoherent. 
 
 The overriding concern in this chapter is therefore to block these kinds 
of arguments. This can be done by explicating in detail the meta-theoretic 
position conducive to my project, and then defending it against all the 
objections that might be offered from the perspective of strong theoretical 
autonomy. In line with the classification of psychoanalytic meta-theory into 
internal and external components, the argument will begin with an account of 
the relationship between psychoanalytic practice and psychoanalytic theory 
that builds upon the view that the former is an extension of our quotidian 
capacity for understanding other people’s behaviour on the basis of the 
ascription of mental states, dispositions, and processes. In taking this line, we 
find ourselves within a tradition that holds that psychoanalysis is the 
“extension of commonsense psychology” (e.g., Wollheim 1971; Hopkins 1982; 
Gardner 1993; Pataki 2014). That tradition seeks to make psychoanalytic 
explanation philosophically intelligible through the analysis of what it is to 
ascribe unconscious mental states, and what it is that justifies such ascriptions. 
That is, it links the ascriptions of unconscious states in psychoanalysis to the 
ascription of mental states in our everyday psychological practices (as analysed 
in the philosophical theory of action), and looks to understand “wish-
fulfilment,” “phantasy,” “projection,” and other psychodynamic concepts on 
this basis. 
 
 An important distinction to be made with respect to this basic view is 
between higher-order (and more contentious) theoretical inferences in 
psychoanalysis and lower-order inferences – like “patient A is projecting a 
hatred towards his father onto his analyst” – that lie closer to the clinical 
interaction. For example, there is a clear difference between theoretical 
statements that involve the defense mechanisms and the theory of the pleasure 
principle. That is because the former involves states of affairs that can be 
directly inferred in the clinical context – like when a patient projects something 
he is uncomfortable about onto the analyst – while the latter is what we might 
call a “metapsychological” concept, which is to say it is a more general concept 
inferred on the basis of very many of these lower-order clinical inferences.  
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 All this can be provisionally expressed in the following three 
statements. 
 
i. Psychoanalytic explanation of the kind that occurs in the clinical setting 
commits the explainer to general theses regarding the structure and 
content of the processes which are being explained. 
 
ii. These theses that both emerge from and are drawn upon in the clinical 
setting comprise a general theory that is capable of confirmation and 
disconfirmation in other contexts. 
 
iii. It is not necessary that the confirmation or disconfirmation of 
psychoanalytic theory has substantive implications for psychoanalytic 
practice, because nothing has been said about the role that this theory 
plays in that practice. 
 
This last statement iii might seem strange. The reason I have included it is that 
it leaves open the possibility that psychoanalytic theory plays a uniquely 
pragmatic or otherwise idiosyncratic role in clinical practice (Cf., Caws 2003). 
It also means that we do not have to argue against weak autonomism, which I 
feel would hinder rather than advance the discussion here. 
 
 The next step is to understand the way that this constellation of 
psychoanalytic theory and psychoanalytic practice is related to other 
disciplines – in our case, cognitive and affective neuroscience. This is at the 
crux of the issue, since what I am proposing in this thesis is a kind of inter-
theoretic exchange between theories of both types. Keeping in mind the idea 
that psychoanalysis is a theoretical extension of our ordinary capacity for 
psychological inference (i.e., “commonsense psychology”), I offer a roughly 
Davidsonian (2006 [1970]) model of the relationship between mental events 
and physical events.15 On this model: 
                                                     
15 Many neuropsychoanalytic researchers have at various points argued that a dual-aspect or 
neutral monism is a more appropriate ontology of mental events for one to endorse in the 
context of psychodynamic neuroscience (e.g.,  Solms & Turnbull 2002: 56-58; Panksepp & 
Biven 2012b: 148). I would like to demur on this point, because there are philosophical 
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i. Every mental event is identical to a physical event; 
 
ii. Mental events are irreducible to physical events by means of strict 
deterministic laws; but16 
 
iii. That irreducibility does not rule out the possibility of local or limited 
ceteris paribus generalizations that hold between theories containing 
either kind of concept. 
 
In the course of arguing for this Davidsonian theory of the relationship 
between mental and physical events I will address an objection which states 
that the strong autonomy of psychoanalytic theory can be argued for on the 
basis of the putative strong autonomy of the theoretical vocabulary in which we 
describe and explain mental events – what is sometimes called “personal level” 
vocabulary. This argument has two prongs. The first is that the Davidsonian 
theory of mental events rules out any inference between personal and sub-
personal levels of description, such that there can be no informative 
relationship between psychodynamic explanation and theories that explain 
behaviour in terms of function and mechanism (e.g., cognitive neuroscience). 
The second prong is that the use of psychodynamic concepts in a sub-personal 
context necessitates the use of illicitly personal level concepts in that context. 
These kinds of arguments run parallel to the more general critique of sub-
personal psychology which is exemplified in McDowell (2002) and Bennett & 
Hacker (2003). 
 
There is a second argument against the cogency of psychodynamic 
neuroscience which relies upon a strong anti-representationalism. That 
argument states that since the nature of the object of interest in psychoanalysis 
                                                                                                                                            
problems with dual-aspect monism when it comes to talking about causal interaction between 
mental and physical events; for example, that the sunshine outside caused my belief that it is 
currently daytime. That is because mental and physical events are conceived as the result of 
two perspectives on an in-itself-inaccessible substance, rather than being identical. Since it is 
only substances that can causally interact, that has the result of making mental events causally 
inert (Cf., Karlsson 2010, chapter three). It’s for this reason that I think a version of Davidson’s 
token-identity is preferable in this case. 
16 (i) and (ii) may seem incompatible, but as I will shortly argue they are not once we make the 
relevant type-token distinction for mental events. 
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is the irreducible product of a relationship between the agent and the socio-
linguistic environment, the biological accounts of mindedness that underpin 
this object of interest will be uninformative. This is a point of view that comes 
out quite strongly in critiques like those of Laurent (2008), and originates in the 
French theoretical tradition of psychoanalysis. Assuming that all of these 
objections are dealt with satisfactorily, that will be enough to establish that the 
complaints against the “very idea” of neuropsychoanalysis – although 
intelligible in their concern either that the richness of psychoanalytic 
phenomena become reductively distorted, or that psychoanalytic theory is too 
vague or metaphysical to be of any help in a traditional empirical setting – are 
ultimately unconvincing. 
 
1.2. Internal meta-theory: psychoanalysis is an extension of commonsense 
psychology 
 
1.2.1. The basic view 
 
 Psychoanalytic explanation ought to be understood as an extension of 
our ordinary interpretive practices, in which the behaviour of other people is 
explained (and often predicted) with reference to Intentional17 mental states, 
dispositions, and processes. The argument for this view begins by pointing out 
that causal inferences drawn during the analytic session – for example, the 
inference that a certain symptom is caused by a desire of which the agent is 
unaware – are drawn on the basis of the “inference to the best explanation” 
(IBE) that is implicit in our quotidian ascription of motive and intention. The 
proponents of this reading state that IBE is independent of the inductive 
inference that is the traditional hallmark of experimental science, and so can 
serve as an independent basis for the justification of causal inference in 
psychoanalysis.18 
                                                     
17 Let me rehearse the requisite distinction here: “intentional” is to have the ordinary meaning, 
used to designate a behaviour as being an action that was authored by the person performing 
the behaviour; “Intentional” with the capital letter is used to mean that the state is about 
something, and that it has satisfaction and/or felicity conditions. 
18 These proponents are also typically aware that there are live debates in the philosophy of 
science over whether or not experimental science is genuinely inductive (or perhaps whether it 
should be inductive), but the context of this view is in a response to Adolf Grünbaum’s (1984) 
inductivist critique of psychoanalysis, so that is why inductive inference plays a central role in 
the specification of the view. Cf., Lacewing (2012).  
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There are two general objections that could be raised against the 
strategy that I am pursuing here. The first might be raised by the eliminativist, 
who believes that commonsense psychology is a theory whose key terms (e.g., 
“belief”) do not successfully refer. That means that the theory is false, and 
ought to be replaced by an appropriately developed neuroscience. If that is true 
then psychoanalysis – insofar as it is an extension of commonsense psychology 
– is similarly false and apt for replacement. My reply to this first concern is to 
suggest that eliminativism itself is false when it is pitched in such a stark form. 
Even one of the most famous original proponents of this view – Patricia 
Churchland – no longer endorses it (in recent interviews she claims that she 
never really endorsed it, and was misrepresented (cf., Marshall 2012)); this 
stark eliminativism has been replaced by what Bermúdez (2005) calls the “co-
evolutionary research program.” What this means is that there is to be a 
theoretical traffic between personal and sub-personal theoretical vocabularies 
in much the same way that I describe later on in this chapter. Indeed, it seems 
to me that much of what goes on in psychodynamic theorizing could be 
described as a revision of commonsense psychology on the grounds of other 
levels of description. For example, psychoanalysts believe that analysis 
demonstrates that the first person authority which is usually attached to the 
self-ascription of belief is much less reliable than has generally been assumed. 
Eliminativism should not therefore be construed as a challenge to the argument 
which follows, unless it is pitched in a strong form that is nowadays quite 
unpopular. 
 
The second concern about that argument is grounded upon debates over 
the nature of commonsense psychology. That is to say, there is a debate over 
whether commonsense psychology is better construed along the lines of an 
implicit theory about others (theory theory) or along the lines of the 
imaginative simulation of others (simulation theory). On the former, the 
concepts of commonsense psychology are construed as theoretical terms that 
allow the interpreter to make generalizations about certain sorts of behaviour. 
These theoretical terms allow us to generalize over instances of behaviour 
types, so that (say) we can infer from the fact that John often visits the doctor 
that he believes he is in poor health, and infer further behaviours from this 
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belief (e.g., he might not come into work). On the latter view, that of the 
simulation theorist, commonsense psychology proceeds not on the model of the 
theorist but by way of an internal simulation of what the interpreting agent 
would do if he were in similar circumstances to the target of his explanation. 
For example, I might anticipate what John will do if he thinks he is sick by 
imagining what I would do were I sick myself. The concern that shows up 
against the background of this debate is that psychoanalysis is only plausibly 
conceived as an extension of commonsense psychology if we accept a 
controversial theory-theory analysis of commonsense psychology on which it 
turns on IBE. 
 
But why would this be the case? In order to better understand the 
criticism, we need to articulate somewhat more precisely exactly what we 
mean by “extension”. The first sense in which commonsense psychology is 
“extended” by psychoanalytic theory is that the kinds of mental states and 
processes that the analyst infers to be at work in the agent are greatly expanded 
beyond that which allows us to interpret rational action. That expansion allows 
us to see the mental causes of irrational action, as well. It seems to me that this 
revision of commonsense psychology does not depend at all on debates over 
the nature of commonsense psychology; if that was the case, then no such 
revision would be possible for cognitive science at all, and almost nobody 
thinks that this is the case. 
 
The second sense in which psychoanalysis comprises an extension of 
commonsense psychology is that the warrant for its claims is grounded upon 
the warrant for the claims of ordinary commonsense psychology. We can see 
how this claim might turn upon deeper debates about the nature of 
commonsense psychology. That is, if commonsense psychology does not 
proceed through a kind of general inference, but through a hard-coded 
simulation of one’s own states, then it is difficult to see how one could expand 
our knowledge of these processes through the interpretation of others. And that 
is what the “psychoanalysis as extension of commonsense psychology” 
hypothesis asserts. The most effective reply to this concern is to suggest that 
the IBE which I (following Lacewing (2012)) suggest underwrites causal 
inference in psychoanalysis is not necessarily tied to commonsense 
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psychology. We use IBE to infer the causes of all kinds of phenomena in the 
world. It is therefore plausible that we can infer facts about commonsense 
psychology from the behaviour of others that we are not privy to in 
ourselves.That is to say that the idea of psychoanalytic inference as IBE does 
not require us to be “extended” putatively immutable processes within 
ourselves. 
 
 The idea that psychoanalysis should be seen as an extension of our 
commonsense-psychological capacities is a by-product of the debates over the 
scientific status of psychoanalysis. Of course, the use of the word “science” in 
this context is a red-herring; what is really at stake in that discussion was 
whether or not psychoanalysis is epistemically well-grounded. Ought we 
believe what the psychoanalysts tell us about mental function, and to what 
extent? This debate has roots in the behaviourist’s aversion to the mental (e.g., 
Skinner 1954), but it later became a more exclusively epistemic disagreement 
over the nature of evidence and justification in the clinical context. Karl Popper 
(1965), for example, stated that it is not possible to falsify conjectures or causal 
inference that are made in psychoanalysis because there are no observable 
states of affairs that will count as being incompatible with those inferences. 
This inability to satisfy the principle of falsification, claimed Popper, bars 
psychoanalysis from scientific status; which is to say that its standards of 
justification are not high enough for it to count as an empirical theory. Adolf 
Grünbaum (1984: 104ff) later demonstrated that psychoanalytic conjectures are 
indeed falsifiable, but maintained that extra-clinical testing is required for their 
justification, as the clinical setting is insufficient as an autonomous ground of 
justification for those conjectures. It is in the philosophical response to 
Grünbaum that the commonsense-psychological view of psychoanalytic 
explanation finds its strongest formulation, and so it is through a basic 
rehearsal of Grünbaum’s argument that I will introduce that view. 
 
 Grünbaum’s (1984; cf., Lacewing 2012; Lacewing unpublished) 
argument proceeds through an examination of what he takes to be an 
epistemology implicit in Freud’s own writings, and his argument can be 
explicated in two parts. The first part is negative; it identifies a significant 
problem for the claim that causal inference in the clinical setting can be 
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justified in independence from external sources of evidence. This problem for 
the idea that justified causal inference could issue from the clinical setting is 
that there seems to be no way that all of the canons of inductive inference 
could be satisfied in the clinical setting alone. That would mean that those 
inferences are not justified by the lights of inductive inference. So, for 
example, the Method of Difference (from the identification of one antecedent 
difference in two cases, where the proposed effect only occurs in one of the 
cases, to the suggestion that this antecedent difference is a cause of the 
proposed effect) cannot be satisfied in the clinical setting; that is because all 
patients have symptoms to work through – there is no non-symptomatic class 
(“control group,” in the cant of experimentalism) with which they can be 
compared. Therefore, if one holds inductive inference to be the only legitimate 
way in which causal inferences can be justified, then one will also hold that the 
clinical setting is an inappropriate context in which to justify any such 
inferences. 
 
 Grünbaum (1984) claims that Freud was aware of this epistemic 
problem, and points out two argumentative strategies that aim to counter it; 
these are the Tally argument and the Convergence argument. The Tally 
argument runs like this: the objection against the psychoanalytic method can be 
met if we know that some particular psychoanalytic interpretation tallies with 
something real in the patient (that is, the therapeutic effect is not merely a 
placebo). We would know that the interpretation is veridical in this way if it 
dissolves the symptoms related to the interpretation in a way that other 
methods cannot. So if the psychoanalytic method can be shown to be a 
necessary condition for the dissolution of neurotic symptoms – if 
psychoanalysis alone can achieve dissolution of the symptom – then these two 
objections will be met. 
 
 The Tally argument fails on the requirement that psychoanalysis be a 
necessary condition for the successful treatment of neurotic symptoms. For 
there is no evidence to suggest that psychoanalytic psychotherapy is effective 
where other therapeutic approaches (for example, cognitive-behavioural 
therapy) are not, and the fact of spontaneous remission means that it may even 
be the case that amelioration of neurosis can occur without any treatment. So it 
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would seem that the first Freudian strategy to ensure the epistemic 
independence of the clinic does not go through. Michael Lacewing 
(unpublished) has noted that a weaker version of this argument may be more 
successful. The weaker version would not require that psychoanalysis be a 
necessary condition for successful treatment, but just that it be more successful 
than both rival treatments and lack of treatment (i.e. spontaneous remission). 
But as he quickly adds, there is not yet the kind of empirical data that would be 
required to underwrite this argument.19 
 
 The second strategy is an argument from the convergence of data from 
difference sources. More precisely, the proposal is that causal inference in 
psychoanalysis is justified from its corroboration in a wide variety of different 
domains. The argument from convergence has a weak and a strong version. 
The weak version states that causal inference in psychoanalysis is not only 
drawn on the basis of data from within the clinic but also from observations 
with respect to cultural phenomena, the development of the infant, the 
vicissitudes of humour, universal features of mythology and folklore, and so 
on. The problem with this weak argument from convergence is that it really 
just concedes Grünbaum’s point, that is, that psychoanalysis requires extra-
clinical evidence in order to underwrite its theoretical claims. So that is no 
good in this context, because we want to continue to claim that some of the 
lower-order causal inferences made in the clinical context are warranted on 
their own terms – for example, the interpretation of some clinical phenomena 
as wish-fulfilments.  
 
The strong argument from convergence appeals to the fact that 
psychoanalytic claims about the patient are the product of a series of sessions 
with them that take place over a very long period, often several years. And it 
states that many such analyses converge on the same basic results; for example, 
the centrality of infantile sexuality. But the strong argument is unlikely to 
succeed, seeing as that all the data which the strong argument relies on issue 
from the same source (the clinical setting), and – as Grünbaum has argued, in 
                                                     
19 But there are promising moves in this direction. See Fonagy (2005), De Maat et al. (2009), 
and Shedler (2010) for some examples. 
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my view successfully – convergence is only a legitimate source of inductive 
warrant if the convergent results come from independent sources. 
 
 Lacewing (2012: 199) has shown that Grünbaum’s twofold critique of 
psychoanalytic epistemology offers at least four classes of response. The first 
of these is to reject Grünbaum’s premise that the practice of psychoanalysis 
involves causal inference; that would be to endorse a hermeneutic view of what 
psychoanalysis does (e.g., Schafer 1976, Habermas 1987). But to adopt a 
hermeneutic view like this would be to make the states that feature in 
psychoanalytic inferences causally inert, and that is incompatible with taking 
psychoanalytic theory to be genuinely explanatory. That assumes, of course, 
that commonsense-psychological explanation is genuinely explanatory in 
virtue of its positing causes of behaviour, But that is relatively uncontroversial. 
 
The second class of response is to argue that Grünbaum has 
mischaracterized psychoanalytic practice, and to argue directly against 
Grünbaum that psychoanalytic inference can be and indeed is based on 
induction. The third class is to undermine Grünbaum’s argument by showing 
that he holds a mistaken view of causal inference, and that inductivism is false. 
That necessitates arguing for that thesis more generally; it means holding that 
causal inference is not best specified in inductivist terms. The fourth kind of 
response is to show that there is indeed a source of epistemic warrant in clinical 
practice that is distinct from inductive inference, and which underwrites causal 
inference in psychoanalysis. 
 
 The paradigm case for this last kind of response is that made by Jim 
Hopkins (e.g., 1982; 1988; most recently 2013). Hopkins’s basic argument 
goes something like the following: i) IBE is ubiquitous in our ordinary 
reasoning about the world; ii) more specifically, IBE is present in our ordinary 
interpretive practices with respect to human behaviour; iii) IBE allows for 
weak prediction, confirmation, and disconfirmation of current best explanation; 
iv) psychoanalysis is an extension of our ordinary interpretive practices with 
respect to human behaviour (an extension, because it covers a wider range of 
phenomena and also because it employs novel concepts in explaining these 
phenomena); so v) psychoanalysis allows for weak prediction, confirmation 
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and disconfirmation of current best explanation that it employs, and that this 
warrant is sufficient to independently support causal inference in 
psychoanalysis. Here is how he puts it in an early formulation: 
 
In commonsense psychological practice we already establish causal 
connections (in particular concerning the role of motives) interpretively, 
in ways that are autonomous, cogent, and prior to [the canons of 
inductive inference]. So it seems wrong to hold generally that cogency 
in a psychology of motive must satisfy them; indeed, for motives, it is 
unclear how such canons could be used, or how inductive methods 
could replicate commonsense interpretation. Further, psychoanalytic 
theory seems an extension of commonsense understanding of motives, 
by interpretive means internal to it. So psychoanalytic theory may also 
be cogent, but related to inductive methods no more closely than 
commonsense psychology itself. (Hopkins 1988: 37) 
 
A minimal account of “commonsense psychology” that is adequate to 
Hopkins’s argument can now be given. We start with the observation that in 
ordinary interaction with others we have access only to their behaviour; in 
order to explain and predict this behaviour, we ascribe to them mental states 
which stand in relations to the behaviour that are both causal and rationally 
intelligible. They are rationally intelligible because there is a coincidence of 
meaning between the mental state and our description of the behaviour under 
which it is an action, and this coincidence of meaning justifies or rationalizes 
the action in a way that a merely causal explanation would not. For example, 
we might say that Herr Lorenz is opening the cupboard because he desires to 
eat a pastry and believes that there might be pastries in the cupboard. This 
explanation rationalizes the action because it makes the action a sensible thing 
to do from Herr Lorenz’s point of view. Exclusively causal explanations do no 
such thing – for example, the explanation that Herr Lorenz is opening the 
cupboard as a result of him being mind-controlled by the CIA  does not make it 
a rationally intelligible action from Herr Lorenz’s point of view. It just makes 
the cause of that behaviour apparent. 
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 This inference can be appropriately described as causal because we take 
the desire to be causally relevant to the behaviour. In other words, we would 
not have expected Herr Lorenz to be looking for a pastry in the first place 
unless he had that desire to eat a pastry. His behaviour would have been 
different in the absence of that mental state. We can also infer desires more 
distant from immediate behaviour by linking them with beliefs. From Herr 
Lorenz’s behaviour, for example, we might attribute to him the desire that he 
satisfy his hunger by way of the belief that if he eats a pastry then his hunger 
will be satisfied. That is to say, the desire that he satisfy his hunger, and the 
belief that if he eats a pastry then his hunger will be satisfied, jointly generate 
the further desire that he eat a pastry. This is why the old view (for example, in 
Wittgenstein (1953) and as applied to the critique of psychoanalysis in 
MacIntyre (1958)) that rationalizing inferences cannot also be causal 
inferences is mistaken; we infer causal connections on the basis of meaning 
whenever we make an inference about the motives of others on the basis of 
their behaviour. 
 
 Now, IBE is a kind of reasoning wherein we take some effect as given 
and posit a cause that would best explain that effect. The given effect might be 
a trail of footprints in the snow. (This is a tired example, but it is illustrative.) 
The “best explanation” that we infer from this effect might be that someone has 
walked past quite recently, before the footprints have been covered up by fresh 
snow. This explanation will be in competition with others that are perhaps not 
as likely – for example, that somebody has faked the footprints or that they 
have been caused by freak weather phenomena. The following principles 
underwrite IBE (Lipton 1991, cf., Hopkins 2013 for a discussion of IBE in the 
context of psychoanalytic practice). First, it needs to be possible for a piece of 
data to be capable of confirming or disconfirming  the current best hypothesis 
(the lack of other footprints seems to be a datum that disconfirms the “fake 
footprints” hypothesis). To confirm the hypothesis is to increase our degree of 
belief in the hypothesis, and to disconfirm it is to decrease that degree of belief. 
Expressed in terms of probabilities, this means that a datum is confirming if the 
probability of the hypothesis given the datum is higher than just the probability 
of that hypothesis alone. Likewise, a datum is disconfirming if the probability 
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of the negation of the hypothesis given the datum is higher than the probability 
of just the negation of the hypothesis. 
 
 We can now see how commonsense-psychological reasoning confirms 
to the basic logic of IBE. Taking as our explanandum the fact that the agent has 
performed some action ɸ, we attribute to the agent the desire that p, and the 
belief that if he ɸ then p, if this belief-desire pair is the best explanation of that 
agent’s ɸing. Davidson (2006 [1963]) calls this belief-desire pair a primary 
reason. It is the reason for that agent’s behaviour, and it is also the proximate 
cause of that behaviour. From the data that we have – that data comprising the 
agent’s past and present behaviour and our explanations for that behaviour, as 
well as any other relevant information – we choose the mental states, 
dispositions, and processes that best explain the behaviour in question. 
 
 And how does psychoanalytic explanation draw upon and extend the 
commonsense-psychological variety of IBE? Hopkins (1988: 40-44) uses two 
examples in sequence to illustrate this, both of them from Freud’s (1900) 
Interpretation of Dreams. The first is a passage in which Freud is trying to 
establish some initial plausibility for the claim that there is a basic connection 
between motivational states and the content of dreams. This passage 
demonstrates well the extension of commonsense-psychological explanation to 
new phenomena – in this case, dreaming: 
 
It is easy to prove that dreams often reveal themselves without any 
disguise as fulfilments of wishes…For instance, there is a dream that I 
can produce in myself as often as I like – experimentally, as it were. If I 
eat anchovies or olives or any other highly salted food in the evening, I 
develop thirst during the night which wakes me up. But my waking is 
preceded by a dream; and this always has the same content, namely, 
that I am drinking. I dream I am swallowing down water in great gulps, 
and it has the delicious taste that nothing can equal but a cool drink 
when one is parched with thirst. Then I wake up and have to have a real 
drink. (Freud 1900: 123) 
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Here is an example of commonsense-psychological inference applied to a 
domain which is commonly thought to be outside its jurisdiction. The dream is 
shown to be intelligible in terms of the agent’s motivational states (in this case, 
a desire to quench one’s thirst), and it can be interpreted accordingly. In this 
case, of course, the analogy from the explanation of action only goes so far; it 
seems wrong to say that a dream is intentional, though we would want to say 
that it is authored by the dreamer in the sense that it flows from his 
motivational states. I return to this puzzle in the following chapter. But for 
now, it suffices to see how the interpretation of the dream fits in to the 
commonsense-psychological framework. 
 
 Psychoanalysis does not only apply commonsense-psychological 
inference to novel domains, but also introduces novel concepts in order to give 
better explanations in these domains. Hopkins’ demonstration of this aspect of 
extension is based on Freud’s (1900: 106-121) dream of Irma’s injection; this 
is a dream which is far more complex and opaque than the dream of drinking, 
which is relatively transparent. Prior to this dream, Freud had heard from a 
colleague (“Otto”) who had been in touch with one of Freud’s former patients 
(“Irma”). Freud had been treating Irma for what was apparently a 
psychosomatic complaint. Otto had recently made a comment to Freud about 
Irma’s current health in which Freud had detected a reproach and perhaps a 
subtle accusation that he had not treated her as well as he was able. (“She’s 
better, but not quite well.”) On the night of the dream Freud began writing up 
the case in order to exonerate himself of these perceived accusations. The 
dream itself is as follows. 
 
A large hall—numerous guests, whom we were receiving.—Among 
them was Irma. I at once took her on one side, as though to answer her 
letter and to reproach her for not having accepted my ‘solution’ yet. I 
said to her: ‘If you still get pains, it’s really only your fault.’ She 
replied: ‘If you only knew what pains I’ve got now in my throat and 
stomach and abdomen—it’s choking me’—I was alarmed and looked at 
her. She looked pale and puffy. I thought to myself that after all I must 
be missing some organic trouble. I took her to the window and looked 
down her throat, and she showed signs of recalcitrance, like women 
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with artificial dentures. I thought to myself that there was really no need 
for her to do that.—She then opened her mouth properly and on the 
right I found a big white patch; at another place I saw extensive whitish 
grey scabs upon some remarkable curly structures which were evidently 
modelled on the turbinal bones of the nose.—I at once called in Dr. M., 
and he repeated the examination and confirmed it…Dr. M. looked quite 
different from usual; he was very pale, he walked with a limp and his 
chin was clean-shaven…My friend Otto was now standing beside her as 
well, and my friend Leopold was percussing her through her bodice  
and saying: ‘She has a dull area low down on the left.’ He also 
indicated that a portion of the skin on the left shoulder was infiltrated. (I 
noticed this, just as he did, in spite of her dress.) […] M. said: ‘There’s 
no doubt  it’s an infection, but no matter; dysentery will supervene and 
the toxin will be eliminated.’ […] We were directly aware, too, of the 
origin of the infection. Not long before, when she was feeling unwell, 
my friend Otto had given her an injection of a preparation of propyl, 
propyls … propionic acid … trimethylamin (and I saw before me the 
formula for this printed in heavy type) … Injections of that sort ought 
not to be made so thoughtlessly … And probably the syringe had not 
been clean. (Freud 1900: 107) 
 
This dream, unlike the dream of drinking, is not transparent with respect to its 
psychological causes; the content is much more complex. But after Freud “free 
associated” on the content of the dream – following his train of thought with 
respect to the dream’s content without conscious self-censorship to the greatest 
possible extent – he was able to make meaningful links between some of the 
elements that appear in his account, and which show the dream to be likewise 
determined by motivational states. Roughly, he infers that what the dream is 
doing is assuaging his guilt in the face of Otto’s reproach. In other words, the 
way Irma is portrayed as suffering from an organic illness in the dream means 
that he is not to be blamed for the lack of improvement, given that he was 
treating her for an a psychogenic illness. That is to say that she is represented 
as suffering from an organic illness so that Freud need not feel responsible for 
the failure of treatment. Furthermore, the dream clearly represents Otto as 
being the one responsible for Irma’s illness, due to the unsafe injection he has 
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given her with an unclean syringe. So it is the very person who has elicited the 
guilt in Freud who is made out to be the guilty one. In other words, Freud 
projects the guilt he feels about Irma’s treatment onto Otto, so that he may be 
free of it: 
 
The conclusion of the dream, that is to say, was that I was not 
responsible for the persistence of Irma’s pains, but that Otto was. Otto 
had in fact annoyed me by his remarks about Irma’s incomplete cure, 
and the dream gave me my revenge by throwing the reproach back on 
to him. (Freud 1900: 118) 
 
Projection is a good example of a distinctively psychoanalytic concept 
introduced in order to better explain the phenomenon of interest. Its 
introduction in the theory of dreaming (but not only the theory of dreaming; 
projection is a concept which can be applied to most domains in which 
commonsense-psychological reasoning applies) allows us to clear up a certain 
opacity in the dream: why is it that Otto is represented as guilty of making Irma 
sick? When we see that Freud is “avenging himself” upon Otto for the 
perceived slight, then this opacity becomes explanatorily transparent, at least 
while the hypothesis of projection is the best explanation of that dream content. 
 
 The psychoanalytic data produced in dreams and in clinically manifest 
symptoms demands explanation, and the psychoanalytic method affords a way 
in which an explanation can be given for this data. It does so by the ascription 
of unconscious mental states, dispositions, and processes. This is one way in 
which psychoanalysis can be seen as an extension of commonsense 
psychology. But there are some qualifications that need to be made with 
respect to this basic view. 
 
1.2.2. The limits of IBE 
 
 So far, not much attention has been paid to the sheer variety of 
psychoanalytic inference. It is certainly a mistake to treat all such inferences as 
of a piece. The two dreams which have been examined are each of a particular 
kind: applications of psychoanalytic inference in an idiosyncratic case. 
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However, there are more general theoretical posits in psychoanalysis (for 
example, the hypothesis that all dreams are wish-fulfilments, as opposed to the 
inference that one particular dream is) and it does seem clear that there are 
different “tiers” of generality in psychoanalytic explanation. These tiers can be 
distinguished by their generality of scope – how widely they are supposed to 
apply. 
 
 One broad example is the difference between claims made about 
individual patients (for example, Freud’s inference of the wish which he 
thought was being represented as fulfilled in the dream of Irma’s injection), 
and the more general claims: that there is a mental agency called the superego 
which is the mechanism of conscience, that resolution of the Oedipus complex 
is a necessary condition for mental health, and so on. Lacewing (2012: 209-
210) suggests the following hierarchy of “inferences regarding x.” I present 
them here ad verbatim: 
 
1. Regarding the specific motives for specific behaviours of an individual 
within an analysis; 
 
2. Regarding the typical structures of motivation, and their typical effects, 
that apply across many cases, for example, the existence and nature of 
defense mechanisms, such as repression, projection, and so on, and 
their clinical manifestations. 
 
3. Regarding the causal role of these mental structures in the manifestation 
of neurosis and character traits; 
 
4. Regarding the causal origins of these structures, especially in relation to 
childhood experience; 
 
5. Regarding larger scale structures within the mind, for example, the 
superego in Freud, the depressive position in Klein, and their typical 
development in early childhood. 
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It does seem implausible that inferences at the higher end of this hierarchy will 
have the same level of empirical warrant by the lights of intra-clinical IBE as 
inferences do at the lower end of the hierarchy. For example, it is unlikely that 
Freud’s structural topology (the tripartite ego/id/superego model of mental 
structure), to the extent that it is justified through intra-clinical IBE, is going to 
be evidentially robust to the extent that we desire and to the extent to which the 
more basic and immediate clinical inferences are. There are two reasons why 
this should be so. 
 
 The first is that as psychoanalytic hypotheses become less specific to 
the phenomena that are observed within the clinic – as they become more 
general – the more those hypotheses will come into competition for best 
explanation with those in cognate disciplines (“[…] such as neuroscience, 
developmental psychology, and attachment theory […] (Lacewing 2012: 210)). 
For inferences at the first tier, the environment for competition for best 
explanation is limited to the particular analysis within which the inference is 
made. For inferences regarding the development of the infant, the candidates 
for best explanation will not only come from psychoanalysis but also from 
developmental psychology and attachment theory, and perhaps others. If 
psychoanalytic explanation is truly a kind of IBE, then it is incumbent upon 
analysts who are engaging in novel theoretical work to be willing to entertain 
competitor hypotheses from outside the discipline when theorizing at higher 
levels of generality. That is the cost of IBE.20 
 
 Second, and relatedly, as the hypotheses in question increase in 
generality so does the phenomena which they purport to explain. As Lacewing 
(2012) explains, this makes more likely a particular species of bias that is 
widespread in ordinary (non-analytic) commonsense-psychological reasoning. 
That bias is called the “fundamental attribution error.” The fundamental 
                                                     
20 It might be objected that there is just as much theoretical competition at the lower tiers in this 
scheme. The counter-example would be the interpretation of a specific patient’s neurosis: while 
the analyst might interpret it as a pattern of wish-fulfilment, the behaviourist might just see it 
as a set of acquired responses or habits. There is competition here, despite the fact that we are 
at the level of the individual. But this objection takes the illness as a whole as its counter-
example, which is general. The fact remains that when it comes to the interpretation of 
particular actions and utterances in terms of discrete mental states, the clinician is not in an 
environment of theory-competition. 
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attribution error is the tendency of reasoners to explain a behaviour in terms of 
mental dispositions rather than in terms of external situational factors. For 
example, there are classic studies (e.g., Jones & Harris 1967) purporting to find 
that  people are more likely to explain the content of a political essay with 
reference to the writer’s political beliefs, even if the real cause of that content 
is external to the writer (for example, he was made to write it under duress). 
Certainly, the analyst is likely better than the lay reasoner at correcting for 
these biases, but inferences at higher levels of generality will be subject to 
causally relevant factors which the analyst is not in direct contact with. So 
those biases cannot easily be corrected in such cases. Lacewing (2012: 210) 
puts it like this: 
 
[…] patterns [of behaviour] within the clinical setting are the 
foundation for the claim that similar patterns of behaviour outside the 
clinical setting (as reported by the analysand) manifest the same 
conflicts and are caused by the same constellations of psychological 
states. However, there may also be situational factors involved that 
neither analysand nor analyst are aware of, so the explanation may be 
incomplete and may overemphasize the causal role of dispositions. For 
example, unconscious motives may be overemphasized while non-
motivated unconscious cognitive processes of the kind established by 
cognitive social psychology may be overlooked. 
 
There’s something a little bit odd about this qualification, given that 
psychodynamic explanation is typically thought to consist in an extension of 
explanation in terms of mental dispositions to phenomena that tend not to be 
explained this way. I think the point we need to take away here is that we 
should be careful not to stretch such extension too far or to think that those 
explanations are always sufficient, when non-dispositional explanations will do 
the job alone or when a psychoanalytic explanation needs to be supplemented 
by a non-dispositional explanation. But in the cases that serve as the focus of 
this dissertation (certain cases of AHP), I will argue, non-dispositional 
explanations (whether these be situational, or parsed in terms of cognitive-
deficit) cannot alone do the explanatory job. 
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 These are helpful qualifications to the basic commonsense-
psychological view of psychoanalytic inference, which flattens out all such 
inferences and does not take into account substantial differences in the level of 
generality. It also gives us a glimpse into the way that causal inferences in 
diverse disciplines can be related to one another in order to support a single 
model or hypothesis. Here is the lesson I would like to take away from this 
discussion. It is true that there are causal inferences made in psychodynamic 
practice which are sufficiently warranted without the need for extra-clinical 
testing. These are inferences that come in towards the lower levels of 
Lacewing’s hierarchy of “inferences regarding x.” It is for this reason that 
critics of psychodynamic explanation are obliged to admit that such inferences 
may be informative when it comes to understanding mental function in general. 
For example, the fact that wish-fulfilment occurs at all must be informative for 
a general model of the way the mind is. By the same token, however, this 
warrant does not extend to the higher levels of Lacewing’s hierarchy. That 
means that, to the extent that the higher levels of inference represent interesting 
theoretical suggestions regarding mental function, they must come into 
competition with hypotheses from other disciplines. It is to the relationship 
between psychoanalysis and cognate disciplines that I now turn. 
 
1.3. External meta-theory: the relationship of psychoanalysis to other 
disciplines 
 
 An argument about the subject matter of psychoanalysis that blocks the 
neuropsychoanalytic project might be pitched in one of two ways. The first 
way would be to define psychoanalytic theory as being a theory which explains 
behaviour exclusively in terms of personal level psychological concepts, and 
then to show that such concepts are not appropriately applied in the context of 
subpersonal psychology. That would mean insisting on a strict distinction 
between personal and subpersonal explanation to the extent that personal level 
explanations or any part of them are not permissible in subpersonal contexts. 
Bennett and Hacker (2003) represent an exemplary case of this kind of 
strategy. They claim that the introduction of psychological concepts into 
neuroscience is an example of the mereological fallacy because it involves 
attributing properties of persons (like the property of being in some belief 
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state) to parts of persons (some brain region, for instance). But this is a critical 
strategy that is also available in our more specific context: that is, it is a 
strategy that could be employed to argue against the very idea of 
psychodynamic neuroscience. 
 
 The other strategy is to claim that the object of psychoanalysis (the 
human “subject”) has some exceptional status such that theorizations of that 
object are irrevocably disjunct from scientific theories. That is to say that the 
human subject partakes of some kind of special confounding property or is of a 
substantially different kind than the kinds investigated in the natural sciences. 
The tenor of this objection is exhibited – though its clarity leaves something to 
be desired – in Éric Laurent’s (2008: 14) Lost in Cognition: 
 
The principles of…psychoanalytic practice base interpretation on the 
experience of a real that is specific to psychoanalysis, and not on its 
conformity with the objects produced by any scientific discourse. 
 
This is about as strong as psychoanalytic autonomy can get; not only is it 
wrong to judge psychoanalysis by the standards of scientificity, but it is also 
wrong to consider psychoanalytic theories in a foreign practical context. It is a 
kind of object that is radically different from those “produced by any scientific 
discourse.” This argument does not necessarily rely on a substance dualism, 
because one may hold that the human subject has this exceptional status for 
other reasons, for example, that it is the product of a vast number of ephemeral 
interacting causes that is subject to change as those causes change. That is a 
view that seems to come out in some of the criticisms of this kind. I consider 
and reject both of these critical strategies in turn. 
 
1.3.2. Davidson’s “non-reductive” physicalism and what it doesn’t give us 
 
 The way to deal with the first kind of argument for strong 
psychoanalytic autonomy is to argue for a theory of the mental in which 
personal level explanation is not radically disjunct from subpersonal level 
explanation in the way that – for example – Bennett and Hacker (2003) argue, 
and that is implicit in critiques like that of Blass and Carmeli (2007: 21). If we 
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take the commonsense-psychological interpretation to be even partially correct, 
then one obvious place to start in this endeavour is the relationship that 
commonsense psychology has to sub-personal psychological theories and 
theories of brain function. The question of this relationship is something that 
José Luis Bermúdez (2005: 35) has called “the interface problem.” 
 
How does commonsense-psychological explanation interface with the 
explanations of cognition and mental operations given by scientific 
psychology, cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience and the other 
levels in the explanatory hierarchy? 
 
Davidson’s (2006 [1970]) theory of non-reductive physicalism is a particular 
answer to the interface problem which has as one interesting consequence the 
claim that commonsense psychology cannot be reduced to lower levels of 
explanation; or at least, this is how Davidson’s position is sometimes 
interpreted (e.g., McDowell 2002). If that is right, then a roughly Davidsonian 
argument might be made against the idea of neuropsychoanalysis. However, I 
will be arguing that the Davidsonian view on the relationship between mental 
and physical events is, on the contrary, congenial to the neuropsychoanalytic 
project. 
 
 Davidson’s argument for non-reductive physicalism runs as follows. 
First, we notice that there is a seeming inconsistency between the following 
three principles: i) the principle that some mental events causally interact with 
some physical events, for example in the ways that desire can cause behaviour 
in a human agent (the principle of causal interaction); ii) the principle that 
events which are causally related are related in virtue of their falling under 
strict deterministic laws (the principle of the nomological character of 
causality); and iii) the principle that mental events do not fall under strict 
deterministic laws (the anomalism of the mental).  
 
(i) follows pretty neatly from a counterfactual analysis of causation: we 
take Lorenz’s desire for a pastry to be causally relevant to his reaching for a 
pastry because in the possible world that Lorenz lacks this desire he does not 
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reach for the pastry.21 Physical events seem to cause mental events during 
perception, and mental events seem to cause physical events during action. (ii) 
is not obviously true, but it is one of the strongest views when it comes to 
causation and so accepting this premise will make Davidson’s argument all the 
stronger. (iii) seems to us to be true after a cursory reflection upon the holistic 
nature of commonsense-psychological explanation; we cannot say that a desire 
for a pastry will always, without exception, cause the agent to find and eat a 
pastry. There are other beliefs and desires that may interfere with that causal 
chain (the agent might desire that they lose weight, or believe that they should 
avoid gluten). Commonsense-psychological explanation is ideographic and 
cannot be subsumed under strict and exceptionless laws. (Further justification 
of this claim is forthcoming.) 
 
 Davidson proposes to explain away the appearance of contradiction 
between these three statements by making a type-token distinction for mental 
events. That is to say that we can distinguish between types of mental events – 
for example, the perception of pain in one’s left ear – and particular tokens of 
mental events – for example, A’s belief that P at time T (with the variables in 
this open sentence filled out in order to yield a particular event). The variable 
of time in this open sentence demonstrates that mental tokens do not only differ 
between agents but also within agents; one can have the same type of mental 
event twice, and these will be individuated as distinct token events. In 
Davidson’s (2006 [1970]: 107) words, mental event tokens are “unrepeatable, 
dated individuals”. 
 
 Davidson’s type-token distinction allows us to reconcile the three 
incompatible statements as follows. First we accept physicalism, which is the 
hypothesis that all events are physical events. That means that all mental events 
(like beliefs and desires) are also physical events (like patterns of neural 
activation, say). That is to say that there is an identity between the mental and 
the physical. That does not yet entail that we reject the anomalism of the 
                                                     
21 It may be, however, that there is some other mental state which causes the behaviour under a 
similar description; for example he may be trying to shoo away a wasp that is buzzing around 
the pastry. But if we individuate events finely enough the behaviour that is caused will be 
different: he will be shooing a wasp away, not reaching for a pastry. (cf. Davidson 2006 
[1969]) 
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mental, because it does not entail reduction (the possibility of strict and 
exceptionless “bridging laws” that link the mental and the physical); it only 
entails supervenience. That is the view that there can be no change in the 
mental properties of some object without a corresponding change in its 
physical properties. But what then does this identity between mental and 
physical events consist in? According to Davidson, it consists in token identity 
rather than type identity. That means that although any particular mental event 
will be identical to some particular physical event, we cannot make statements 
of identity between mental types. That means that reduction of the mental to 
the physical is impossible, because reduction can only occur between general 
terms that are apt for inclusion in strict and exceptionless laws. Thus we see 
that all three of the putatively incompatible statements can be simultaneously 
true. 
 
 What entitles us to hold that type identity is impossible? This is the 
same as asking why the mental is truly anomalous, and Davidson has two 
answers to this question. The first reason that Davidson thinks the mental is 
anomalous is because of the role that rationality constraints play in 
commonsense-psychological interpretation. That is to say that we cannot 
straightforwardly assign propositional attitudes to an agent on the basis of his 
behaviour alone; we can only do so against the background of other assumed 
states, dispositions, and processes, while assuming that these all cohere in a 
roughly rational fashion:  
 
[…] we make sense of particular beliefs only as they cohere with other 
beliefs, with preferences, with intentions, hopes, fears, expectations, 
and the rest. It is not merely […] that each case tests a theory and 
depends on it, but that the content of a propositional attitude derives 
from its place in the pattern. (Davidson 2006 [1970]: 116) 
 
The second reason that Davidson holds mental anomalism has to do with his 
semantic externalism, which is the view that semantic content supervenes not 
only on facts to do with the agent but also facts to do with the history of the 
agent’s causal relationship to his environment (for example, how he learned the 
meaning of his words). These are extrinsic properties of the agent, and it is 
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only intrinsic properties (for Davidson) that are apt for inclusion in strict 
deterministic laws. He moots this idea with analogy to, of all things, sunburn: 
 
No completed physics would make use of the concept of sunburn, not 
only because part of the explanation is already built into the 
characterization of the state, but also because two states of the skin 
could be in every intrinsic way identical, and yet one be a case of 
sunburn and the other not. The propositional attitudes, the semantics of 
spoken words, and behaviour as we normally understand it, are all like 
this. The reason, both in the case of the attitudes and in the case of 
semantics, is the same: what our words mean, and what our thoughts are 
about, is partly determined by the history of their acquisition. (Davidson 
1995: 4-5) 
 
The two reasons Davidson gives for anomalism are therefore closely related to 
one another: the reason that the meaning of what our words mean is dependent 
upon the history of their acquisition is because interpretation demands that we 
allow for the possibility that our interlocutor uses his words quite differently 
from the way in which we do; we make use of this possibility in light of the 
basic principle that the other is largely rational.22 
 
Now, the quasi-Davidsonian argument against neuropsychoanalysis 
would begin by accepting the notion that psychoanalysis, to the extent that it is 
theoretical, purports to use theoretical concepts (i.e., concepts with non-
observable referents) to explain phenomena which are correctly described 
using a personal-level vocabulary. That is to say that they are basically 
commonsense-psychological in nature. A good example might be the Freudian 
neurotic who obsesses over the (false) thought that his dead father is being 
tortured: this mental event is reportable by the patient, hence commonsense-
                                                     
22 Cf., Davidson’s (2006 [1968]: 177) illustrative story about the “hippopotamus” in the 
refrigerator: “Let someone say (and now discourse is direct), ‘There’s a hippopotamus in the 
refrigerator’; am I necessarily right in reporting him as having said that there is a hippopotamus 
in the refrigerator? Perhaps; but under questioning he goes on, ‘It’s roundish, has wrinkled 
skin, does not mind being touched. It has a pleasant taste, at least the juice, and it costs a dime. 
I squeeze two or three for breakfast.’ After some finite amount of such talk we slip over the 
line where it is plausible or even possible to say correctly that he said there was a 
hippopotamus in the refrigerator, for it becomes clear he means something else by at least some 
of his words than I do.”  
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psychological. Insofar as these kinds of explananda are elucidated in terms of 
their meaning for the patient, then, the critical argument I am considering 
would demonstrate that the explanatory apparatus required to do so is similarly 
personal level in its conceptual resources. 
 
 Sometimes this will involve reinterpreting what seems to some extent 
functional or subpersonal vocabulary in classical psychoanalysis, and even 
sometimes choosing to reject those aspects of psychoanalytic explanation 
entirely. George Klein (1976), for instance – and taking the psychoanalytic 
theory of sexuality as his primary example – claims that there are not one but 
two theories in classical psychoanalysis, where one of these is a pseudo-
scientific relic of Freud’s background in now-defunct physiological 
psychology, and where the other is a sophisticated personal level theory that is 
of great use in the clinic for making sense of patients’ symptoms. 
 
 If this reduction of psychoanalytic theory to the personal level goes 
through, then one might push the argument further by adopting Davidson’s 
non-reductive physicalism as one’s position vis-à-vis the relationship between 
the personal and the sub-personal. This would allow us to claim the autonomy 
of psychoanalytic theory on the basis of the autonomy of the personal level. 
Since psychoanalytic theory requires no resources outside of what is given to 
us on the personal level of explanation, and since there are no reductive 
relations between the personal and subpersonal levels, that means that 
neuroscience will have nothing interesting to tell us about the phenomena in 
which psychoanalysis is interested. That is because theories in neuroscience 
operate at the subpersonal level. 
 
 My claim now is that this argument is unsound. Or at least, it does not 
yield the strong autonomy of psychoanalytic theory. I reject the premise that 
there can be no reductive relations between the personal and subpersonal 
levels. That is because non-reductive physicalism only rules out inter-
theoretical revision of a nomological and eliminative sort (Shea 2003), and we 
can continue to claim the existence of stochastic generalizations that hold 
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between statements at either level of description.23 What that means is this: 
firstly, that there are no strict lawful connections that can be made between 
facts at each level. This implies, for instance, that there is no way to establish 
that a person has a particular belief given a hypothetically complete knowledge 
of the brain states that the person is in. Secondly, and as a corollary of the first 
point, it means that there cannot be elimination of description at the personal 
level in favour of subpersonal explanation. For example, there is no way that 
we are going to be able to replace talk of the propositional attitude with talk of 
brain states, as the Churchlands (1981; 1986) seemed to be claiming in their 
earlier work on this issue. That is to say that theories pitched at the personal 
level are indispensable to the explanation of behaviour. I do not dispute that 
Davidson can take us this far. 
 
 However, Davidson’s non-reductive physicalism does not rule out the 
possibility of weaker and stochastic relationships between the two levels. There 
are in fact empirical examples of such exchange in cognitive neuroscience, and 
in which discoveries at the subpersonal level have been genuinely informative 
to our understanding of what is going on at the personal level. One of the most 
illustrative of these examples is discussed in a paper by Nick Shea (2012). The 
example is that of decision making, and its hypothetical subpersonal basis. 
Decision making is a process which we initially specify and describe using a 
commonsense-psychological vocabulary; it is almost paradigmatic in this way. 
So if the strong reading of Davidson’s token-identity theory is right, and there 
is a strong autonomy of the personal level, then it should be impossible to say 
anything meaningful about decision making in a subpersonal theoretical 
vocabulary. But as we shall see, there is a sophisticated neurocognitive theory 
of decision making in the offing. Examining the relationship between this 
theory and our personal level understanding of decision making will shed some 
light on the theory of personal/subpersonal interaction which is congenial to 
neuropsychoanalysis. 
 
                                                     
23 Davidson himself alludes to this: “[…] perhaps the ultimate theory is probabilistic, and the 
asymptote is less than perfection; but in that case there will be no better to be had.” (Davidson 
2006 [1970]: 115) 
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 The subpersonal theory in question is a Bayesian theory of decision 
making called the “actor-critic model.” This model is meant to be a general 
model of decision making on straightforward tasks. One such a task can be set 
up in an experimental setting and is as follows. The participant is repeatedly 
given a choice between two options, option A and option B. Option A is 
typically more likely to yield a reward than is option B (say 70% of the time as 
opposed to 30% of the time), but there are periods during the experiment where 
this trend is reversed and for a number of repetitions of the task option B is 
more likely to yield a reward. What the participant has to do is earn as much 
reward as possible when the choice is offered in rapid repetition – there is no 
time for the participant to reflect, so the choice is made more or less “on the 
fly” without serious deliberation.24 The participant therefore needs to keep 
track of which choice is offering the most reward in a situation where this is 
prone to change and where there is noise (random variation in the level of 
reward) that confounds attempts to infer which choice is the best one (cf., Shea 
2012: 1071ff and references therein). It has been found that participants tend to 
choose close to optimally in these kinds of experiments, which opens up the 
task of giving a model which demonstrates how that close-to-optimal 
performance is possible. 
 
A particular species of reinforcement learning model25 states that the 
mechanisms which are exercised during this task work by making predictions 
about the expected reward and update these predictions where they encounter 
error. The error is calculated from the expected reward subtracted from the 
actual reward. The expected reward is thereafter updated on the basis of that 
“reward prediction error” to give a more accurate prediction of future reward. 
Furthermore, the rate at which updating of expected reward occurs is 
                                                     
24 Shea notes that the objection might be made that the lack of deliberation implies that the task 
does not properly fall under our personal-level concept of “decision making.” As he points out, 
however, the subjects are conscious of the stimuli, react to them consciously, and do so against 
a background in which they are participating in order to earn reward: “Subjects are motivated 
by the rewards available in the experiment and their behaviour shows sensitivity to the 
structure of those rewards.” (Shea 2012: 1071) 
25 I would like to make clear that this is not meant to be an endorsement of this account of 
reinforcement learning – in fact, it is sometimes thought to be in tension with the free energy 
account of action that I go on to endorse in chapter three (e.g., Friston et al. 2012). I am just 
using the account as an example of how sub-personal theories (rather, whatever turns out to be 
the right theory) can inform the explanation of phenomena traditionally described exclusively 
on the level of the personal. 
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determined by a specific learning rate which can cause updating to be more or 
less drastic. It has been proposed by researchers working on this task that a 
model of this kind is realized within identifiable brain structures. More 
specifically, “dopamine neurons in vental tegmental area…and substantia nigra 
pars compacta have been shown to have the response profile expected of a 
prediction error signal.” (Shea 2012: 1072)  
 
This is an example of a subpersonal explanation of a personal level 
phenomenon, and it has two parts. First we require a theory of subpersonal 
representation which explains how it can be the case that patterns of neural 
activation (or some other such vehicle) can comprise representations of states 
of affairs (for example, that of expected reward). This part of the theory has not 
yet been given, but it is vital, because it licenses the extension of certain 
personal-level concepts (for example belief) into subpersonal contexts. Second 
is the theory which explains how networks of such representations can decide 
between options on the basis of prediction of reward. All this is of course 
preliminary and subject to revision, but part of the benefit in explaining a 
personal level phenomenon in this way is – much like psychoanalysis as 
traditionally construed – it can give us an explanatory purchase on the way in 
which the mechanisms can break down, and the personal-level phenomenon go 
awry. 
 
 One example of this is in the study of addiction to drugs of abuse. As 
already mentioned, dopamine is thought to affect the rate at which expectations 
of future reward are updated in response to reward prediction error. That is to 
say that it affects the rate of learning in these cases. Drugs of abuse like 
cocaine operate on the metabolism of dopamine in the brain, and in a way 
which produces a feeling of euphoria in the user. In normal cases, sudden and 
massive amounts of reward caused by an identifiable stimulus will be 
attenuated as that stimulus is repeated. What that means is that the predictions 
of reward will change in order that the reward comes to be associated with that 
stimulus, and it will no longer be surprising to the agent. In cocaine addiction, 
one hypothesis is that the prediction error signal is not attenuated – the rate of 
learning is not slowed – when it is used to update the expectations of future 
reward, and so the expected pleasure continues to be revised upwards. That 
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gives us a way into understanding what is going awry with the normal 
functioning of the brain, and allows us to understand what is going on for the 
agent in a way that does not reduce him to his brain functioning. Here’s how 
Shea (2012: 1078) puts it: 
 
[…] the dopamine system gives us a useful subpersonal explanation of 
the personal level phenomenon of abnormal voluntary action. Exactly 
how that explanation will go, and what it means for treatment, will 
depend on the details of the story, which are still being worked 
out…This body of work suggests that it would be wrong to treat those 
suffering from drug addiction as automata deprived of the capacity for 
rational agency. But nor are they ordinary people with selfishly 
hedonistic values. The cognitive neuroscience gives us good reason to 
think that the values that go into their rational decision making are 
produced in a non-standard, pathological way. 
 
All of this is pitched within a very specific framework, and I would not 
necessarily want to endorse this precise way of understanding addiction, at 
least not as a sufficient account. The reason I am outlining it here is in the 
service of a demonstration how there can be informative traffic between 
personal and subpersonal accounts of the same phenomenon. Recent work in 
the philosophy of mind abounds with such informative traffic (e.g., Hohwy, 
Roepstoff & Friston 2008; Levy 2014). This position on the relationship 
between mental and physical vocabulary – or something similarly contrary to 
strong psychoanalytic autonomy – needs to serve as a core premise for the 
central argument of this dissertation. This is a plausible premise insofar as the 
arguments I have presented for it are valid, and insofar as it is a legitimate and 
widespread position within the literature. 
 
1.3.3. Millikan’s subpersonal theory of representation 
 
 One of the things that would be needed in order for us to legitimately 
employ the concept of representation in a subpersonal theory of mental 
function – like the theory of addiction considered above – is an account of how 
representation might work at the subpersonal level. This is tricky because 
54 
 
representations are Intentional; they are capable of truth and falsity, and this is 
a property that is distinct from the causal and functional properties that are 
admissible in the natural sciences. To see this, consider the difference between 
a relational fact like “the sentence ‘the moon orbits around the Earth’ 
represents the state of affairs in which the moon orbits around the Earth” and a 
relational fact like “the moon orbits around the Earth.” If there was no such 
object as our moon, then it could not be true that the moon orbits around the 
Earth. But the relational fact about representation could still be true, because 
representations can intend fictitious states of affairs. It would just mean that the 
representation was false – that it represented a state of affairs which did not 
obtain. This peculiar property – being capable of truth or falsity – is 
Intentionality, and showing how this property can be reduced26 to properties 
extant in the natural sciences (that is, causal and functional properties) is a 
problem in the philosophy of mind. Any robust subpersonal theory of mental 
function will need to assume an answer to this problem if it includes use of the 
concept of representation. 
 
 One of the most impressive projects whose goal is to give a naturalized 
account of Intentionality is that of biosemantics, and in particular the 
biosemantic theory of Ruth Millikan (1984). Millikan’s biosemantics aims to 
show that the Intentionality of representation can be described in terms that are 
already used in evolutionary biology. Thus explicated, it seems that 
subpersonal theorists of mental function can help themselves to this 
biosemantic notion of representation without needing to postpone any fuller 
account of what it is for something to represent.27 This part of the argument 
consists in an explication of Millikan’s account, and this should establish 
plausibility for the thesis that it is legitimate to employ the putatively personal 
level concept of representation in a subpersonal theory of mental function. The 
                                                     
26 But maybe reduction is too strong a word here. The goal is not a wholesale reduction of 
personal-level psychology to the subpersonal, but just a theory which demonstrates that 
cognitive scientists are entitled to the use of “representation” – an otherwise personal-level 
concept – in the construction of their subpersonal-level theories. 
27 It might be, of course, that there are other accounts of representation that are just as 
legitimate, and which could be put to work in other contexts. This is to say that the biosemantic 
theory is just meant to be a sufficient condition on representation and not a necessary one. It 
may be that representational content is heterogeneous. This is what Shea (2013: 502ff) seems 
to think. 
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way I characterize Millikan’s theory in what follows owes a great deal to 
Shea’s (2006) exceptionally clear elucidation. 
 
 One of the inspirations for the biosemantic theory comes from animal 
ethology. In animal ethology there have been recorded certain behaviours 
which seem to hold an intermediate status between being non-Intentional and 
having the kind of Intentionality that we see exhibited in fully-fledged 
linguistic behaviours like those that we ourselves engage in. The most 
prominent example of such a case is the “waggle-dance” that is performed by 
honey bees, and by which the location of nectar is signalled by one bee to the 
rest of the hive. The ethologist Karl von Frisch (1967) found that the waggle-
dance of the bees indicates the location of the nectar in a way that is 
isomorphic; that is to say that the dance corresponds systematically to the 
direction in which nectar is located and how far away it is from the hive; this is 
isomorphism in the same way that an algebraic statement is isomorphic to a 
line plotted on Cartesian coordinates, or in the way that the cartographer’s map 
is isomorphic to the terrain. The direction of the line along which the bee 
“dances” corresponds to the direction, and the number of movements along this 
line corresponds to distance. 
 
 The waggle-dance can be seen as Intentional insofar as it exemplifies a 
representational mapping of specific features of the world by means of 
behaviours that seem arbitrary with respect to the features that are mapped. 
Conceivably, the semantic mappings from bee movements to nectar location 
could have been different without there being any deficiency in the function 
that this mapping plays. It’s this arbitrariness – lack of direct causal relation 
between representation and what is represented – that allows the dance to 
exhibit the thinly normative dimensions of representation; it is possible for a 
bee dance to indicate nectar in a place where there is none, and this means that 
it is possible for a bee dance to be false. Since presumably these kinds of cases 
can also be understood in non-Intentional terms (as behaviours that have been 
selected for under environmental pressures), it seems plausible that the same 
treatment that is appropriate to understanding the waggle-dance could be 
extended to the way that (in cognitive neuroscience) patterns of neural 
activation putatively represent states of affairs. 
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 According to Millikan’s theory, a representation is a physical particular 
that plays a specific function with respect to the system that consumes it. There 
are three systems involved in an instance of successful representation: the 
representation-producer, the representation-consumer, and the representation 
itself. In the case of the waggle-dance, for example, the representation-
producer is the bee that is dancing, the representation-consumer is the bee that 
flies to the location which the dance indicates, and the representation is the 
waggle-dance itself. The job of the representation is to get the consuming 
system to do what it does successfully: in the case of the waggle-dance, its job 
is to get the bees to where the nectar is. 
 
 But what makes it the case that some natural representation (like the 
waggle-dance) has a particular content? Millikan’s answer to this question is an 
evolutionary one: the facts that make it the case that some representation has a 
particular content are facts about the history of the producer-representation-
consumer set. That is to say that they are facts about what states of affairs have 
obtained on the occasions when the representation enabled the representation-
consumer to perform its proper function; for a representation to be false is for 
these states of affairs to fail to obtain. Spelling this out requires a bit of 
clarification with respect to what function is the proper function, as well as 
which states of affairs are the privileged ones in this case. 
 
 The proper function of the representation-consumer is whatever has 
allowed the consumer mechanism to be part of a reproductive kind. To give a 
non-Intentional example, the human heart does a lot of things: it makes a 
beating sound, it pumps blood, and it produces a cardiograph reading. But only 
one of these functions (pumping blood) is that in virtue of which the total 
system of which the heart is a part was able to survive and reproduce, thus 
ensuring that the heart itself is reproduced. Therefore it is the function of 
pumping blood which is the proper function of the heart. Now there will be 
some background conditions that are necessary in order for this proper function 
to be performed. Continuing with the same example, in order to pump blood 
the heart must be attached to the vagus nerve, some of the blood it is pumping 
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must be oxygenated, and so on. These are the “normal conditions” that must be 
present in order for the proper function to be successfully performed.28 
 
Now we are ready to explain in more concrete detail what the facts are 
that fix the content of a representation. The content of a representation is fixed 
by those normal conditions that were present on those occasions when the 
representation-consumer successfully performed its proper function. It will 
have been noticed at this point, however, that there are very many normal 
conditions that are required for some mechanism to perform its proper 
function; consider the example of the heart, just canvassed. The way in which 
we determine which normal conditions are the relevant ones is by determining 
which are necessary for that function to be performed. That is to say, they are 
the ones without which the proper function could not be performed, and so 
which would prevent the reproduction of the producer-representation-consumer 
set. 
 
In the service of illustrating the theory we can apply it to the earlier 
example of the bee’s dance. The representation-producing mechanism in the 
dancing bee will have done its job if it produces a representation (the dance) 
which accurately represents the location of the nectar. The representation itself 
will have done its job if it gets the other bee (representation-consumer) to the 
nectar. The normal conditions under which the representation-consumer can 
perform its proper function are those in which the nectar was at the location 
indicated. Note that there can be genuine falsity here that is distinguished from 
mere malfunction. If the bee dances to indicate nectar at a location where there 
is none, then the dance is false and not just malfunctioning. 
 
 These two theoretical contributions – first, a theory of mental events 
which demonstrates that there can be informative exchange between theory at 
the personal and at the sub-personal levels; and second, a biosemantic theory of 
representation which licenses the use of that notion in sub-personal level 
theories – is as much as we need in order to address the objection that 
                                                     
28 We should be careful to note that the term “normal” here does not imply that the conditions 
in question are statistically normal, in the sense that they must occur most of the time. For 
example, the normal conditions that are required for a spermatozoa to perform its proper 
function (it gets to the ovum) are very rare indeed (Cf., Millikan 1984: 34; Shea 2012: 11-12). 
58 
 
psychoanalysis is autonomous on the basis of the putative autonomy of the 
personal level. I now move on to more radical views that seek to establish 
psychoanalytic autonomy on the basis of the putatively exceptional status of 
the subject matter of psychoanalysis. 
 
1.3.4. Claims for the special status of the subject in psychoanalytic theory 
 
 One commentator has pointed out that the anomalism of the mental is 
entailed by Davidson’s semantic externalism (Shea 2003). Semantic 
externalism is the view that content-bearing states (like a belief, or in the 
psychoanalytic context, a wish or phantasy) supervene not only upon physical 
facts intrinsic to the agent – for example, her brain states – but also upon facts 
that are extrinsic to the agent, and maybe even the causal history of those facts. 
One consequence of this is that it is possible in principle for two agents to be in 
identical physical states but to be (for example) entertaining different beliefs: 
agent X might be thinking of the number 9, while agent Y might be thinking of 
the number 7. This is because the content of those beliefs will be at least 
partially determined by facts extrinsic to those agents. It is not implausible that 
in some cases these extrinsic facts will be relational facts that are specific to 
that agent’s context, and not generalizable. It is this thought that makes a crude 
type-type reduction of mental events to physical events implausible. 
 
 But Davidson’s non-reductive view, as I have already argued, needs to 
be taken much further in order to yield the absolute division between brain and 
agent that would be required for the strong autonomy that I am claiming is 
false. More specifically, it would need to be taken to the point where the 
question of whether or not the agent is in some content-bearing state does not 
just rely partially on extrinsic facts, but entirely on extrinsic facts. That is 
because there would no longer be any internal mechanisms to be specified. We 
might follow Andy Clark  in dubbing the subject of this radical externalism a 
“post-Cartesian agent.” Clark (1998: 37) gives the following rough 
specification: 
 
The post-Cartesian is a locus of knowledge, acts for reasons and has 
beliefs and desires. Yet she harbours no internal representations and 
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resists analysis in terms of any cognitively important distinctions 
between “inner” and “outer” processes, between perception, cognition 
and action, or between mind, body, world. 
 
The post-Cartesian agent cannot be analysed in terms of stable inner processes 
because it is a holistic system that comprises not only the body, but also a 
persistently changing environment. 
 
 That last clause is the most important in the argument for strong 
autonomism that I am introducing here. Given that the nature of the post-
Cartesian agent is determined by relational properties that are subject to change 
(we will not only want to consider “bare” physical and biological properties 
here, but also socio-cultural properties that supervene on those bare properties), 
we will be licensed in going on to say that the nature of the agent itself is also 
subject to change. Now if the nature of the agent is persistently changing based 
on what is going on in its environment, then it will not be possible to formulate 
a theoretical description of the agent that remains fixed across all such 
environments, or some such set of them. But in all those environments the 
theoretical description of our physical makeup will in each case remain the 
same. Thus, given this putatively dynamic nature of the agent – and 
consequently, the dynamic understanding that it would require to grasp it 
theoretically – we are going to need a context of theory generation that allows 
that understanding to change  as the external determinants of the agent change. 
The advocate for strong autonomy might claim that the psychoanalytic clinic is 
one such context. Integration with outside theories will forbid theoretical 
flexibility of the kind required in order to allow a theory of the agent (or 
“subject”) to keep up with changes in its object’s external milieu. So this would 
make psychoanalysis autonomous in the strong sense. That is to say, the 
employment of that theory outside of the clinic would miss the point; by the 
time it was employed as a theory elsewhere it would already be out of date. 
 
 It kind looks like we might be able to get a view like this out of Jacques 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic writings, and we can certainly extract it from some 
Lacanians writing today. Take for example Lacan’s laudatory comments 
regarding game theory’s proscription of the “psychologization of the subject” 
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(by which he means the ascription of psychological states) in “Science and 
Truth,” (Lacan 2006 [1966]: 730) as well as his comments on the need for the 
analyst to embrace “nonknowledge” when dealing with the particular case:  
 
[…] psychoanalysis is…a practice subordinated by its purpose to what 
is most particular about the subject. And when Freud emphasizes 
this…he quite clearly indicates to the analysand the path his training 
should follow…The positive fruit of the revelation of ignorance is 
nonknowledge, which is not a negation of knowledge but rather its most 
elaborate form. The candidate’s training cannot be completed without 
some action on the part of the master or masters who train him in this 
nonknowledge […] (Lacan 2006 [1955]: 296-297) 
 
Indeed, some of the opposition to neuropsychoanalysis which comes from 
contemporary Lacanian circles seems to run along these lines; take for example 
Éric Laurent’s (2008) quote from Lost in Cognition which I cited earlier on in 
this chapter. Now this can’t be the whole story, since there are self-identified 
Lacanian authors who are broadly sympathetic to neuropsychoanalysis and 
what it is supposed to achieve (e.g., Bazan 2011). But it suffices to notice that 
this view is attributable to a significant psychoanalytic orientation, and is 
therefore worth addressing here. 
 
 We can find an objection to the plausibility of the above view in the 
work of Clark himself. Clark’s objection is based upon the existence of cases in 
which the agent is in some sort of psychological state where the content of that 
state is either “distal…modal…[or] non-existent.” (Clark 1998: 44) Examples 
of this kind of state are: planning a holiday, dreaming, counting to ten, and so 
on. In these cases, there is no obvious direct relation between the agent and 
some proximal thing in the world; in fact, these cases often constitute a kind of 
mismatch between agent and world. So it would seem false to say that for all 
cases the agent can resist analysis in terms of “inner” processes, given that 
inner processes are needed in order to account for agent-world mismatch. This 
objection against post-Cartesian subjectivity is even more serious when it is 
rehearsed in the psychoanalytic context. That is because cases of mismatch 
between agent and world are essential psychoanalytic phenomena. Why is it 
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that one patient believes that his co-workers are conspiring against him, even if 
all the evidence points to the conjecture that they are quite fond of him? Why is 
it that another patient has recurring dreams that have as their subject the theme 
of betrayal? Idiosyncratic comportments towards the world are unintelligible if 
there is no room for at least a “minimal Cartesianism” that is present in the 
weaker Davidsonian position that I endorse. And so the psychoanalytic agent 
cannot be a post-Cartesian one. 
 
 There is a radicalization of this first view on the putative dynamism of 
the human agent which we have left to consider. This second view has an 
ethical edge to it that the first one lacks. It relies on similar premises about the 
post-Cartesian agent, but further particularizes that agent. Roughly, the idea is 
that psychoanalysis is a discipline that is radically idiographic – it seeks to 
understand each analysand in the context of their particular circumstances, to 
the point where each psychoanalytic case will have an irreducibly singular 
character. The singular character of the psychoanalytic case will be obscured 
by any fixity of theory – we need some way to avoid such a thing. The clinical 
setting, when properly exploited, is a way to avoid fixity of theory. The 
similarity to the previous view must be apparent now. Just like that view, it 
gives a dynamic specification of the object of psychoanalysis that explains why 
fixity of theory would be a hindrance to the study of that object, and makes the 
inference from the dynamism of that object to the conclusion that 
psychoanalytic theory is inappropriate to scientific contexts. As one 
commentator has put it: “Every patient is a new world, whose laws it is the task 
of the analyst to establish and apply.” (Caws 2003: 618) 
 
 The ethical aspect to this argument depends on a particular answer to 
the question: “What does psychoanalysis aim to achieve?” The answer to that 
question which is relevant to this argument is “self-knowledge.” The aim with 
psychoanalysis is for the agent to realize a kind of truth about the self – what it 
is that drives them, the meaning of these motivations where such meaning 
exists, and possibly even the personal meaning of important events that have 
connections with these motivations. Given the radically particular nature of 
these features of the patient’s life, the employment of generally applicable 
theory in the self-understanding of that patient will obscure the truth that the 
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analyst attempts to make apparent to her over the course of the analysis. 
Integration with other theories is not only a category mistake, but it leads to a 
fixity of theory that prevents the goals at which the practice of psychoanalysis 
aims in the first place. On this view, any such integration is a terrible mistake. 
 
 The appropriate thing to say here by way of reply – quite apart from 
pointing out that this ethical critique assumes a radical particularity of the 
subject which has already been debunked – is that emphasis upon the particular 
circumstances of the patient is not something that psychoanalysis can claim as 
unique to itself. As Fotopoulou notes with reference to new fields like 
personalized medicine, the focus on the particular is not at all unique to 
psychoanalysis. Personalized medicine uses the individual profile of the patient 
to determine what kinds of treatments will work best for them. They take into 
account “an individual’s genetic constitution…their personal and family 
medical history, their ethnicity and ancestry, and…their patterns of 
accumulated environmental exposures.” (Fotopoulou 2012a: 22) These kinds 
of treatments continue to respect the particularity of the individual case without 
rejecting fixity of theory. And so cases like these make it clear that “such 
opposition is not synonymous with opposing a biologically-constrained 
metapsychology.”  
 
 Now, the objection might be made that personalized medicine is 
disanalogous to psychoanalysis. That would mean that Fotopoulou’s reply to 
the ethical criticism is misguided. But in order to assert this disanalogy we 
would need to assume that there is a substantive difference of kind between the 
object of psychoanalysis and the object of personalised medicine. But it is 
precisely this hypothetical difference which is at issue. So the accusation that 
this is a disanalogy assumes what it sets out to demonstrate; it is a petitio 
principii. Could not the same point be made with respect to Fotopoulou’s 
assumption that there is no substantive difference of kind between the 
respective objects of these two disciplines? That might be the case if the 
analogy was an argument for the lack of a difference of kind, but it is not; the 
continuity between the objects of psychoanalysis and the objects of the other 
mind sciences has already been argued for on independent grounds. 
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1.4. Concluding remarks 
 
 What I hope to have accomplished in this first chapter of the 
dissertation is to demonstrate a theoretical continuity between psychodynamic 
explanation and explanation in general. What that means is that there is no a 
priori reason that claims about mental function which have their origins in 
psychoanalytic practice should be incompatible with claims about mental 
function in cognate disciplines. (There may, however, be empirical 
incompatibilities.) There are at least two broad kinds of position that are 
sceptical of theoretical continuity. On the first, there is no continuity between 
psychoanalytic explanation and explanation in general because there is a strong 
autonomy that holds for psychoanalytic theory. What that means is that the 
integration of psychoanalytic claims about the mind into cognate disciplines 
will only result in conceptual confusion. On the second kind of sceptical 
position, there is no continuity because the clinic is an insufficient source of 
epistemic warrant; what is given in psychodynamic explanation should not be 
considered explanation at all. 
 
 I hope to have shown that there is no good reason to hold the first kind 
of view. I have surveyed a number of different kinds of argument to hold it: 
first, that there is an autonomy of the personal level with respect to the sub-
personal level; second, that the object of psychoanalysis is dynamic to the 
extent that it shouldn’t be integrated with fixed scientific theory; and third, that 
the ethics of psychoanalysis dictate that it shouldn’t be integrated with fixed 
scientific theory. None of these arguments are successful. There is no good 
reason to hold the second kind of view, either. The most influential proponent 
of this view is Grünbaum (1984), who holds that causal inference in the clinical 
setting is insufficiently warranted; it can only serve a heuristic purpose. But I 
hope to have shown (following Lacewing (2012)) that lower-order causal 
inference in the clinic is warranted in independence from its confirmation in 
extra-clinical contexts. It is just as such inference becomes more general that it 
comes into competition with hypotheses from other disciplines. 
 
 All this precipitates a philosophical analysis of psychodynamic 
explanation itself. In the next chapter I expand on my discussion of the 
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tradition which takes psychoanalysis to be an extension of commonsense 
psychology. Thinkers in this tradition have sometimes taken the notion of wish-
fulfilment to be paradigmatic of psychodynamic explanation, and I follow them 
in attempting to provide a satisfactory analysis of this notion. There is a debate 
in the philosophy of psychoanalysis over whether wish-fulfilment is to be 
construed as intentional (like rational action) or sub-intentional (roughly, like a 
visual illusion). This is an issue with important consequences, because an 
intentionalist analysis of wish-fulfilment requires us to make sense of semi-
autonomous centres of agency within the person which bring about the wish-
fulfilling symptoms. I will be arguing for the sub-intentional analysis of wish-
fulfilment, and defending it against recent criticisms from the intentionalist’s 
point of view. I then show that the success of the sub-intentionalist analysis 
obliges us to provide a sub-personal account of the mechanisms which could 
account for wish-fulfilment. That will put us in a position to discuss recent 
work in psychodynamic neuroscience. 
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2. Psychodynamic explanation and its metapsychological commitments 
 
2.1. A classic example of psychodynamic explanation, and its philosophical 
interpretation 
 2.1.1. The example itself: Freud’s Ratman 
 2.1.2. Wish-fulfilment: intentional or sub-intentional? 
 2.1.3. The sub-intentional analysis of wish-fulfilment 
 2.1.4. The fragility of wish-fulfilment 
 2.1.5. A reluctant concession on enactment and explanatory scope 
2.2. How might AHP be psychodynamically explained? 
2.3. Metapsychology and the role of mechanism 
 2.3.1. The objection from “mechanistic vagueness” 
 2.3.2. What is metapsychology, and what does it do? 
2.4. Metapsychological commitments of psychodynamic explanation 
 2.4.1. Motivations as doxastic forces 
 2.4.2. The circumstances under which wish-fulfilment occurs 
 2.4.3. The opacity of wish-fulfilment 
2.5. Concluding remarks 
 
In the previous chapter I addressed arguments to the effect that 
psychoanalysis has a kind of disciplinary autonomy that rules out the 
integration of psychoanalytic styles of theorizing with those which are typical 
of contemporary cognitive science. That scepticism towards integration is on 
display in comments like those of Carmeli and Blass (2013: 391), who claim 
that “the neuropsychoanalytic trend modifies the basic aims of the analytic 
process, shifting away from the unique psychoanalytic concern with the 
understanding of meanings and the role of interpersonal discourse in discerning 
and justifying these meanings,” as well as Laurent’s (2008: 14) claim that “the 
principles of…psychoanalytic practice base [psychoanalytic] interpretation on 
the experience of a real that is specific to psychoanalysis, and not on its 
conformity with the objects produced by any scientific discourse.” I hope to 
have convinced the reader that there are no good arguments for these claims – 
at least, for interpretations of these claims strong enough to challenge 
neuropsychoanalysis. 
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The role of this chapter is somewhat different. Macmillan (1991: 576) 
has argued that the form and results of psychodynamic explanation are 
massively overdetermined by prior theoretical commitments. If he is right 
about this, then it would be a mistake to say that there is a distinct and coherent 
kind that comes under the concept “psychodynamic explanation.” Here’s how 
he puts it: 
 
There is no evidence to show that only the patient’s unconscious ideas 
guide the trains of associations in the psycho-analytic treatment 
situation. There is also no evidence that the analyst’s conscious 
purposive ideas, supposedly abandoned, play no role. Everything is 
consistent with the method of free association creating its own data and 
nothing is consistent with those data being obtained by means of an 
objective method and then interpreted in a partial or biased way. 
 
That way of looking at the psychoanalytic method is a far cry from the view I 
have of it, and for which I argued in the previous chapter. However, the 
putative disunity of psychodynamic explanation might be taken as the key 
premise in an argument which undermines the project which this dissertation in 
meant to inform; more specifically, it may undermine the idea that 
psychodynamic mechanisms could be cogently inferred to be at work in the 
case of AHP. The argument would state that since there is no such thing as 
genuine psychodynamic explanation per se, that it is nonsense to suppose that 
there are convergent results of psychodynamic explanation that could be put to 
work in cognate disciplines. 
 
Against Macmillan, I intend to demonstrate in this chapter that 
psychodynamic explanation does indeed comprise a specific mode of 
psychological explanation which comes with a distinct set of general 
commitments vis-à-vis the way the mind must be. I will be calling these 
metapsychological commitments. I follow Gardner (1993: 175) in considering 
metapsychological commitments to be “concerned with the conditions of 
possibility of psychoanalytic explanation.” What this means is that they are 
inferences about the mechanisms that would best explain the form and success 
of psychodynamic explanation (assuming it is cogent). They are inferences 
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about the way the mind must be, given our ability to explain in the 
psychodynamic mode. In specifying the form of psychodynamic explanation I 
continue to work on the basis of the tradition in analytic philosophy which 
construes it as an extension of commonsense psychology. 
 
Building upon some of the discussion in the previous chapter, I here 
engage controversies about just how to spell out the insight that 
psychodynamic explanation is an extension of commonsense psychology. That 
is to say that not everyone who agrees that psychodynamic explanation is best 
construed in this way also agrees on precisely what parts of commonsense 
psychology are being extended. For example, although theorists like Gardner 
(1993) and Hopkins (2012) suggest that we should not think of the objects of 
psychoanalytic explanation as being produced on the model of intentional 
action (on pain of falling into the homuncular fallacy), Tamas Pataki (2014) 
has recently argued that not only can we take psychoanalytic symptoms to be 
intentionally produced without falling prey to that fallacy, but that we must do 
so if we are to adequately explain the full scope of clinical phenomena in 
which psychodynamic explanation finds its natural object. Similarly, Cavell 
(1993) argues against the cogency of the idea that wish-fulfilment implies pre-
propositional mental states, whereas Gardner (1993) argues that these are 
necessary to make sense of psychoanalytic phenomena. These issues bear 
consideration, because they will have consequences for the metapsychological 
commitments of psychodynamic explanation. 
 
What I hope to have established by the end of the chapter runs as 
follows. First, that it makes sense to speak of psychodynamic explanation as a 
distinct mode of psychological explanation, and which is best construed as an 
extension of commonsense psychology; second, that it is cogent to apply 
psychodynamic explanation for illnesses such as AHP, which in this thesis 
serves as the exemplar case for the object of explanation in psychodynamic 
neuroscience; third, that such explanation, if cogent, leads us to endorse 
particular metapsychological commitments; and last, that if we are sub-
intentionalists about wish-fulfilment then we are obliged to find sub-personal 
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candidates for the instantiation of these metapsychological commitments.29 The 
two subsequent chapters go on to give a mechanistic specification of those 
metapsychological commitments that are plausible within the confines of 
contemporary cognitive science, before the last spells out the way in which 
they shed light on what it means to give a neuropsychodynamic theory of AHP. 
But I will start out this chapter with the presentation of a canonical – and 
unsurprisingly so, given its clarity – example of psychodynamic explanation in 
its clinical manifestation. 
 
2.1. A classic example of psychodynamic explanation, and its philosophical 
interpretation 
 
2.1.1. The example itself: Freud’s Ratman 
 
 The treatment of the Ratman (henceforth Mr R30), the patient in Freud’s 
(1909) “Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis” is the gold standard for 
an explication of the ways in which psychoanalysis goes about explaining 
seemingly inscrutable behaviours in terms of the states, processes, and 
dispositions that cause them. That is to say that it is used as the primary 
example in many of the arguments for the commonsense-psychological 
interpretation of psychodynamic explanation.31 Mr R presents with what we 
might today call obsessive-compulsive disorder, a condition in which the 
patient’s consciousness is dominated by recurring obsessions, and which 
compel the patient to perform repetitive acts in order to ameliorate those 
obsessions. The case of Mr R is rich for discussion because the central 
obsession of his illness instantiates a clear case of wish-fulfilment, and his 
                                                     
29 There are widely recognized arguments to the effect that the sub-intentional does not require 
appeal to the sub-personal. For instance, Rosalind Hursthouse (1991) has shown that it makes 
sense to speak of “arational action,” that is to say, behaviours which are authored by the person 
but which are not intentional. This middle ground between the intentional and the sub-personal 
has been put to work in the philosophy of psychoanalysis to great effect by Gardner (1993).  
One examiner of this dissertation has objected that I unfairly assume that sub-intentional 
requires the sub-personal. But I disagree that this is what I have done. Rather, what I hope to 
have shown in this chapter is that a sub-intentional analysis of psychoanalytic explanation 
requires sub-personal underpinnings; this conceptual feature of those analyses is brought out in 
Pataki’s (2014) critique of them. I have explicitly argued for the existence of that conceptual 
feature, and not merely assumed it. 
30 I adopt this convention from Lear (2005: 12). 
31 Mr R appears as one of the primary examples in all of Wollheim (1971), Hopkins (1982), 
Gardner (1993), and Lear (2005). 
69 
 
carrying out of compulsive actions demonstrates how psychodynamic 
explanation might be extended to enactments as well as delusional and quasi-
delusional thought. I describe the case in detail before going on to show how 
philosophers have interpreted the patterns of explanation that are present in 
Freud’s account of it. 
 
 Mr R was a well-educated junior officer in the Austro-Hungarian army 
who came to Freud complaining of obsessive fears, compulsions to action, and 
self-imposed prohibitions. He had suffered from all of these obsessive 
symptoms with much less seriousness since he could remember, but in the past 
four years they had worsened, and during recent events they had become so 
bad that he had been moved to seek professional help. The recent flare-up had 
been precipitated by a particular interaction he recently had with a Czech 
captain in his brigade, while on manoeuvres.  Mr R had previously had an 
argument with this captain on the topic of corporal punishment, which had 
caused him to form an impression of the captain as “obviously fond of cruelty.” 
(Freud 1909: 166) Later, during a halt between manoeuvres, he got into a 
discussion with the same “cruel” captain, who was recounting a particular kind 
of torture involving the use of rats. The rats would be placed in a pot which 
was then upended on the victim’s backside, and the rats would tunnel their way 
into the anus of the victim. At the moment the captain was describing this 
torture, Mr R began to suffer from the central symptom of his illness: the 
“great obsessive fear.” 
 
 The great obsessive fear was that this punishment was being applied to 
two people who he was very fond of: first, a woman with whom he had a 
romantic relationship; and second, his father. The latter must have seemed 
especially peculiar since his father had been deceased for some time by the 
stage that he was afflicted with the great obsessive fear. This fear would 
continually recur after its first appearance on that occasion, and would always 
be accompanied by a specific kind of reaction to it on the part of Mr R. The 
reaction would be one of a sanction – that is, it would either be a prohibition he 
must observe or a ritualistic action he must carry out that would prevent the 
feared-for state of affairs from coming about. Freud described it like this: 
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When the captain had spoken of this ghastly punishment…and these 
ideas had come into his head, by employing his usual formulas (a ‘but’ 
accompanied by a gesture of repudiation, and the phrase ‘whatever are 
you thinking of?’) he had just succeeded in warding off both of them 
[i.e. the fear involving both his romantic interest and his father]. (Freud 
1909: 167) 
 
There is a clear pattern here: the great obsessional fear occurs in Mr R’s mind, 
and generates a compulsion to some action or prohibition (in the instance Freud 
describes above, the compulsion is a verbal one), and the performance of that 
action temporarily relieves  the anxiety associated with the obsession. 
 
 That pattern was to show up in many other episodes for Mr R, and in 
relation to the same great obsessive fear. One of the most prolonged and 
debilitating of these episodes – it was what resulted in his seeking treatment – 
was a series of attempts to return money to a fellow officer (“Lieutenant A”), 
who had supposedly paid for a pince-nez which had come for him at the post 
office. This came about because he was told by the same cruel captain that 
Lieutenant A had paid the charges for delivery of the pince-nez while he was 
unavailable, and that he was to pay back Lieutenant A directly. The cost was 
3.80 kronen, apparently a trivial amount of money for the time. After he was 
given this news by the captain the great obsessive fear again occurred to him, 
and he felt the compulsion that he was not to pay back Lieutenant A or else the 
feared-for event would come about. In reaction to this compulsion he made the 
vow aloud to himself that he must pay Lieutenant A back: “You must pay back 
the 3.80 kronen to Lieutenant A.” (Freud 1909: 168) 
 
 Mr R spent the following two days in a series of neurotic attempts to 
make good on this vow, but was hindered by events in which he himself was 
implicated. He first tried to pay Lieutenant A back through an intermediary, but 
this person soon returned Mr R’s money to him when he did not come across 
the Lieutenant. Mr R confided to Freud that he had at the time felt relief at this, 
because if the payment through the intermediary was successful it would not 
have counted as a fulfilment of his vow. That is because the wording of his 
vow was that he must pay back Lieutenant A personally. After this he soon 
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found Lieutenant A on his own, but he was told that it wasn’t that Lieutenant 
who had paid for the pince-nez on his behalf but in fact a different officer, 
Lieutenant B. 
 
 This dismayed Mr R, and he spent some time considering how to 
overcome this setback. Towards the end of the manoeuvres he arrived at the 
following solution: he was to go to the post office with both Lieutenants A and 
B, that A should pay the amount to whomever was working at the post office, 
that they give the money to B, and that then Mr R himself could “pay back” A 
the original amount. In this way, Mr R would be carrying out the original vow 
and according to its exact wording. When he came up with this solution it was 
the end of manoeuvres, and everybody was returning home. He was therefore 
hesitant to request this complex arrangement of both Lieutenants. What 
followed was a confused inner struggle in which Mr R was torn between 
allowing the vow to go unfulfilled and insisting that the two officers help him 
to perform the task. The struggle was accompanied, Mr R reported to Freud, by 
an acute feeling of guilt: was it more cowardly to avoid asking Lieutenant A, or 
was it more cowardly to carry out his vow just in order to ameliorate his 
obsessional fears? 
 
 His last chance to ask Lieutenant A the favour was on the day after 
manoeuvres had ended, since he was to be travelling on the train with A to a 
town called Przemysl.32 From there A would drive an hour to the town where 
he was staying. So Mr R would have time to ask the favour. Being racked with 
doubt, he let this opportunity pass him by, but intended to detour to A’s town 
during the day and ask him the favour. The post office was close enough to 
Przemysl that he would have time to carry out the plan at the post office and 
have time to catch one of the last trains to Vienna. In fact, he didn’t carry out 
this plan, and in his confusion ended up on the train to Vienna at ten in the 
morning. At almost each stop on the way to Vienna he planned to get out at the 
next station and return to Przemysl to carry out his plan, and this went on until 
he resolved to visit his friend in Vienna and ask his advice. That friend insisted 
that they return to the post office together and pay the amount, where it had 
                                                     
32 James Strachey (Freud 1909: 170n1) infers the name of the town from Freud’s original notes 
on the case. 
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turned out that he owed neither A nor B, but just the post office itself. That is 
what precipitated the treatment. 
 
 What makes the actions of Mr R particularly odd is that it turned out 
later on that the truth of the matter about the money was available to him since 
the very beginning of the ordeal. That is to say, Mr R later recalls during the 
analysis that he had met another higher officer before he had met the captain on 
the occasion that the latter had told him (falsely) that he owed Lieutenant A 
money. This officer, on learning Mr R’s name, had mentioned that he had been 
at the post office where the attendant had asked if he knew Mr R and whether 
he could be relied upon to pay the amount for the pince-nez. The officer said he 
did not, but the attendant had in any case decided that she would pay the 
charges until Mr R could pay her back. So Mr R must have known at this point, 
before his obsessional vow, that he owed the post office attendant alone rather 
than Lieutenant A or Lieutenant B. 
 
 There is some background material about Mr R’s earlier life which 
came out during the analysis with Freud. A common theme that ran through Mr 
R’s relationship with his (deceased) father was an inchoate feeling that his 
father was a barrier to his freedom to pursue romantic interests. There are many 
examples of this that came to light in the analysis. One of these was an episode 
shortly before his father’s death. Mr. R had been considering extending a 
proposition of marriage to his romantic interest, but was inhibited in this 
because he didn’t have the finances that were necessary for such a proposition. 
It then occurred to him that the death of his father might bestow him with an 
inheritance that would allow him to propose. Another example of this kind of 
thought occurred during Mr R’s first sexual experience. During intercourse Mr 
R imagined to himself: “This is glorious! One might murder one’s father for 
this!” (Freud 1909: 201) Mr R also remembered an episode of this kind from 
earlier in his childhood. At the age of 12, Mr R had been infatuated with a 
young girl who did not seem to be interested in him. He imagined that perhaps 
if his father had died, then the girl would be sympathetic to him, and return his 
affections. 
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 These episodes are counter-intuitive against the background of Mr R’s 
everyday relationship with his father, which was very close. He insisted that 
they were like the best of friends. Indeed, this genuine love for his father 
accounts for the terrible guilt that Mr R felt at his great obsessive fear, and his 
frantic and obsessional compulsions to sanction against them. But this 
ambivalence seems to go back into Mr R’s very early childhood, as is 
demonstrated in an early episode of hostility by Mr R towards his father. This 
story was recounted by his mother, who remembered his father punishing Mr R 
after some misdemeanour.33 
 
The patient…informed me that his mother had repeatedly described to 
him an occurrence…which dated from his earliest childhood and had 
evidently escaped being forgotten by her on account of its remarkable 
consequences. He himself, however, had no recollection of it whatever. 
The tale was as follows. When he was very small…he had done 
something naughty, for which his father had given him a beating. The 
little boy had flown into a terrible rage and had hurled abuse at his 
father even while he was under his blows. But as he knew no bad 
language, he had called him all the names of common language he 
could think of, and had screamed: ‘You lamp! You towel! You plate!’ 
and so on. His father, shaken by such an outburst of elemental fury, had 
stopped beating him, and had declared: ‘The child will be either a great 
man or a great criminal!’ (Freud 1909: 205) 
 
Let’s start putting some of these pieces together. The first hypothesis that was 
made here in order to elucidate Mr R’s obsessional neurosis was that the 
patient’s relationship with his father was profoundly ambivalent. This means 
that although the patient did indeed love his father, he also harboured a deep 
hostility towards him. This is in spite of the fact that Mr R was not entirely 
aware of this hostility. The facts that warrant this inference include the early 
                                                     
33 On the basis of the primarily sexual nature of the ambivalence (his father as an obstacle to 
his romantic and erotic gratifications) and from the fact that he did not masturbate until shortly 
after his father’s death, Freud (1909: 205) infers that the misdemeanour in question must have 
been a sexual one (masturbation, for instance). That may be. But my argument will not rely on 
this inference about the causal origins of the ambivalence, and what I am interested is just the 
fact that there is some such emotional ambivalence, and that it is expressed in Mr R’s great 
obsessive fear. 
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episode of rage towards his father, and the recurrent later representations of his 
father as an obstacle to his romantic interests and erotic gratification. 
 
 The posit of emotional ambivalence towards his father, and the 
unconscious hostility which it includes, allowed Freud to interpret the great 
obsessive fear as a wish-fulfilment. That is to say that the fear that rat torture 
would be applied to his father was an inchoately wished-for state of affairs, 
which was represented as being brought about. That emotional ambivalence 
also explains the sanctions that Mr R exhibited in reaction to his wish-
fulfilment, and the feelings of guilt that were omnipresent in relation to it. 
More particularly, his affection towards his father – which he was certainly 
aware of – meant that he was affected by a terrible guilt whenever these 
obsessional fears arose, since he felt (and indeed, in a sense was) responsible 
for them. This renders intelligible the compulsive sanctions which were aimed 
at dispelling the obsessions, and his self-imposed difficulties in carrying them 
out (surely his heart was not truly in it, given the depth of his putative hostility 
towards his father). 
 
 I want to make clear at this point the extent to which this particular case 
is relevant. First, the case can raise further questions for the psychoanalytic 
inquirer; for example, why is it that Mr R has such an ambivalence towards his 
father in the first place, such that these wish-fulfilling obsessions torment him 
so? What is the source of this emotional conflict? One could indeed give a 
more distal account of the origins of the neurosis, and Freud goes on to do so in 
his hypotheses about childhood development (e.g., Freud 1910). But what is 
more important for the purposes of this argument is the employment of the 
concept of wish-fulfilment in the clinical context, a context where inquiry is 
driven by the same basic reasoning as in our everyday psychological 
interpretation of other persons. For this reason I will leave those more distal 
considerations to the side in order to concentrate upon the more proximate 
explanation in this case. Second, it is also important to note at this point that 
my analysis does not hinge on the contingent matter of whether or not Freud 
got the case of Mr R right. What is important here is the mode of explanation 
that he employs. The idea of wish-fulfilment is central to the way that this 
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mode of explanation proceeds. It is that concept which allows us to understand 
various behavioural phenomena that would otherwise remain inscrutable. 
 
2.1.2. Wish-fulfilment: intentional or sub-intentional? 
 
 The nature of wish-fulfilment is a matter of controversy. One of the 
central points of this controversy is whether wish-fulfilment implies an 
intention on the part of the agent (or some agential subsystem thereof) to form 
the representation of the wish as fulfilled. That wish-fulfilling representation 
may be a mental state (like a delusional belief), or it may be a symptomatic 
behaviour that comes under an intentional description (like the behaviour of an 
exhibitionist). An intentional theory of wish-fulfilment will state that the 
symptom is intentionally produced. A sub-intentional theory of wish-fulfilment 
will state that it is not.34 An example of an intentional theory of wish-fulfilment 
is the classical Freudian model, on which some part of the person (e.g., the 
unconscious ego) generates the symptom in order to simultaneously satisfy two 
or more incompatible demands. In the case of Mr R, an intentional theory of 
wish-fulfilment might state that the unconscious part of the ego, when faced 
with an incompatible love and hatred for the same person, gives expression to 
the latter by forming obsessional thoughts that the love-hated person is coming 
to great harm. 
 
 There are some serious problems with the intentional analysis of wish-
fulfilment.  The most serious is that it is subject to a classic objection against 
psychodynamic explanation that is exemplified in Sartre’s (1982 [1956]) 
critique of Freud. The particular hypothesis which Sartre is challenging is the 
partitive hypothesis, which states that the mind is composed of agential 
subsystems. An intentional theory of wish-fulfilment must rely on the partitive 
hypothesis, because it proposes that the symptom is formed intentionally. That 
intention is not consciously available to the patient. Therefore, the intention 
must belong to a part of the agent that is not conscious.35 The part or subsystem 
                                                     
34 As far as I am aware, it is Tamas Pataki (2000) who first makes this distinction between 
intentional and sub-intentional analyses fully explicit. 
35 The necessity of this reasoning is challenged in Pataki’s (2014) own intentionalist theory of 
wish-fufilment. Pataki thinks that we can partition the agent in a way that the intention is 
always that of the same agent, but who is engrossed in different agential roles. So it might be 
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is called agential because it can exercise agency in this way: it can form 
intentions to pacify (through symptomatic mental states or behaviours) the 
unconscious wishes of the agent. The way Sartre glosses the partitive 
hypothesis is that the mind is composed of at least three such subsystems: the 
unconscious, the conscious mind of the patient, and the part which mediates 
between the conscious and unconscious part (the “censor”). The unconscious 
subsystem of the mind is composed of impulses to action, some of which may 
cause anxiety if they are allowed to become conscious, or which may even 
cause disaster if they are allowed to be carried out. It is therefore the task of the 
censor to distinguish between impulses that are permissible and impulses that 
are not, and prevent impulses of the latter type from reaching consciousness. 
This may involve the generation of symptoms, as in Mr R’s great obsessive 
fear. 
 
 Now, and as Gardner (1993: 43) points out, this naïve partitive 
hypothesis is not one that Freud held to throughout the progression of his work. 
So we might immediately object that Sartre is arguing against a straw-man. But 
there are two things to be said which might make us rethink this reply. The first 
is that it seems on the face of it as though any division of the person into 
subsystems – even if this division is not as naïve as in Sartre’s exegesis of the 
Freudian theory – will fall prey to this paradox; it generalizes as a critique of 
partitive conceptions of the mind in general. And it does seem on the face of it 
– given the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states – that 
psychodynamic explanation requires at least a minimally partitive conception 
of the mind. The second point to consider is that even if Sartre’s opponent is a 
straw-man, the criticism is influential enough36 that the burden of proof is on 
the defender of psychodynamic explanation to show either that it need not be 
partitive in this way or show how it can be so partitive without falling into 
Sartre’s paradox. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
that there is an intentional analysis of wish-fulfilment that is not subject the problems I am 
discussing here. See also Pears (1984) for another reply to Sartre. 
36 E.g., “Admittedly, there were strong whiffs of homunculism [associated with the Freudian 
notion of defence]. For id, ego, and superego were treated as little minds, whose functioning 
was taken for granted in a way that’s impossible today.” (Boden 2006: 243-244) 
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 Sartre’s problematization of the partitive conception of mind runs as 
follows. Presumably the reason that the censor is introduced in the first place is 
to explain the peculiar failures of self-knowledge that symptom formation 
implies, if the psychodynamic treatment of it is correct. That is to say that the 
division of the mind into parts is to explain how motivated self-deception is 
possible; self-deception of the kind that we have seen in Mr R (and, I argue, as 
we can see in anosognosia for hemiplegia). The issue prior to the partition of 
the agent is therefore this: how is it that a patient can both be unaware of a 
psychological state and all the while actively work to prevent becoming 
conscious of it? That is the paradox of self-deception. The partitive solution 
that Sartre is criticizing is based upon the concepts of repression and resistance. 
The patient is not aware of the unconscious impulses because he actively 
represses them, relegating them to the unconscious part of the mind. Attempts 
on the part of the analyst to bring these repressed impulses into the awareness 
of the patient often results in resistance to these attempts; the patient “shows 
defiance, refuses to speak, gives fantastic accounts of his dreams, sometimes 
even removes himself completely from the psychoanalytic treatment.” (Sartre 
1982 [1956]: 208) But it is the censor, not the whole patient, that represses 
those impulses, and which puts into action those behaviours which constitute 
resistance. So the burden of explanation is placed firmly on the censor. 
 
 Now, it seems that the following necessary condition is placed upon 
successful explanation of those self-deceptive phenomena by the censor. The 
censor must differ substantively from the patient. What that means is that the 
properties that are predicated of the censor must not be properties that are 
predicated of the whole person. So if we predicate a belief of the censor it 
cannot be a belief that we would also predicate of the person. This condition is 
a necessary one because otherwise the problem that confounds explanation 
(i.e., the paradox of self-deception) of self-deceptive phenomena in ordinary 
commonsense-psychological terms will be duplicated at the level of the censor, 
and the explanation will fail for the same reasons. 
  
But despite this condition it seems as though the censor is just a reduplication 
of the person at a subpersonal level of explanation – a rational homunculus. 
The reasoning for this claim is as follows. If the censor is to be successful in 
78 
 
repressing dangerous material from the unconscious part of the mind then it 
cannot do so at random; there needs to be some kind of rationale as to what is 
rejected and what is allowed to come into awareness. It therefore needs to have 
the capacity to distinguish between “good” and “bad” ideas, where the bad 
ideas are the ones to be repressed. That implies awareness of the repressed 
material – beliefs about what to repress and what to let through, and desires to 
repress what is not to be let through. If the censor has all the same beliefs and 
desires as the person that are relevant to the self-deceptive phenomena to be 
explained, then for the purposes of that explanation it is no different than the 
person. Therefore, this kind of partitive explanation is not genuinely 
explanatory. Gardner (1993: 49-50) explains this with reference to a plainer 
example than the exotic behaviours we find in the psychoanalytic consulting 
room: 
 
Any rational action of a person’s could also be partitively ‘explained’. I 
desire to smoke, believe this to be a cigarette, and light it. Partitive 
explanation says: there is a part of me that does not have my desire to 
smoke, but shares all my beliefs, and desires that my desire to smoke be 
satisfied. It reasons that getting me to light the cigarette will satisfy my 
desire to smoke, and therefore causes that action. Clearly, this is 
harmless partitive explanation, which will always ‘succeed’, because it 
is not really explanation at all. That minds can always, logically, be 
redescribed as communities of rational homunculi shows nothing 
important. 
 
The accusation is therefore not only that the explanation fails but that what 
appears to be explanation in partitive terms is naught but mere redescription. 
These are serious issues that demands resolution; Gardner’s (1993) whole 
discussion of psychoanalytic theory is framed in terms of this Sartrean 
challenge. And indeed, it is on the philosophical elucidator of psychodynamic 
explanation to show us either that it does not require a partitive conception of 
mind or that the way in which it requires the partitive conception is not subject 
to the Sartrean objection. 
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 One solution to this challenge is to give a sub-intentional analysis of 
wish-fulfilment. That analysis would show that wish-fulfilment and the 
generation of symptoms can occur without any intervening intention on the 
part of an agential subsystem. The way in which this would dissolve Sartre’s 
concern is by making it so that the parts of the patient that allow his self-
deception are not so complex as to entail fully-fledged agency. An early 
example of this strategy is in Davidson’s (2006 [1982])  suggestion that mental 
partition is necessary in order to explain particular irrational phenomena, like 
that of ordinary self-deception. He suggests that there is nothing paradoxical 
about a theory of partition that meets three criteria: first, that the mind is made 
up of a number of “semi-autonomous” parts (presumably this means that 
beliefs and desire in these parts can co-exist with contradictory beliefs and 
desire in other parts); second, that each of these parts is composed of a 
constellation of propositional attitudes – like beliefs and desires – that are 
related to each other in an overall consistent manner; and then third, and most 
importantly, that instances of the irrationality to be explained are not a result of 
rational relations between the semi-autonomous parts, but just causal relations. 
That is to say that mental states in unconscious parts of the mind are the causes 
of the irrational symptoms, but not reasons for them. 
 
 The reason that reducing the partitive relations to causal ones makes a 
difference to the argument is that it means that we remove unconscious 
deliberation from the picture. What that means is this. Ordinarily, at least on 
the Davidsonian (2006 [1963]) picture, an intention to act is formed from a 
desire to bring some state of affairs about and a belief that performing a 
particular act will bring about that state of affairs. The belief and desire cause 
the action, but are also a reason for it. That means that if an agent does 
something intentionally he did it because he had a reason for doing it. So if we 
take a symptom (Mr R’s great obsessive fear, for example) to be a mental state 
that is intentionally fabricated, then this means that it must have been 
fabricated by an agent who had a reason for doing it. That is what leads to the 
Sartrean problem. But if we state that the relationship between the symptom’s 
antecedents (Mr R’s emotional ambivalence towards his father and his desire to 
see him harmed) and the state itself (the great obsessive fear) is just a causal 
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one, then we are not obliged to posit an intention, and therefore not obliged to 
posit an agential subsystem of the kind that Sartre finds objectionable. 
 
2.1.3. The sub-intentional analysis of wish-fulfilment 
 
 Hopkins (2012) wants to give a sub-intentional analysis of wish-
fulfilment that is based upon an commonsense-psychological view of how it is 
that ordinary rational action is usually brought about. The example that he 
draws upon initially is thirst, and the satiation of thirst. Ordinarily, we might 
schematize the causal process of action like this (Hopkins 2012: 257): 
 
A des P [A drinks] Æ P [A drinks] Æ A exps, bels P [A drinks] Æ A des P 
pacified37 
 
Here is what the above schema means. The agent has a desire to bring about a 
particular state of affairs; in this case, that he have a drink. This desire is 
presumably caused by deeper homeostatic imbalances that are associated with 
thirst. Through ordinary rational action the agent brings it about that P; that is, 
he has the drink. The actual state of affairs then causes the experiential belief in 
the agent that he is drinking, which pacifies the original desire. The 
pacification of the desire occurs in contrast to its actual satisfaction; that is to 
say, the desire to drink is pacified before the actual physiological hydration 
occurs. 
 
 Now consider again Freud’s dream of drinking that we considered in 
the previous chapter. Freud goes to bed thirsty and has dreams of himself 
drinking great quantities of cool fresh water before he eventually wakes up to 
have a real drink. If we are to understand dreaming as a kind of wish-
fulfilment, then we might follow Hopkins (2012: 257) and schematize the 
dream like this: 
 
A des P [A drinks] Æ A dream-exps bels P [A drinks] Æ A des P 
temporarily pacified 
                                                     
37 “A” is here to stand for an agent, like Freud or Mr R, and “P” is to be replaced by a 
description of some state of affairs, as is given in the square brackets. 
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What is going on here is that the desire gives rise directly to a doxastic state 
rather than a genuine action. That is to say this: under ordinary circumstances, 
the desire that P might give rise to P through A’s bringing this about, and the 
fact that P will cause in A the belief that P. That belief is what satisfies the 
original desire that P. But in the case of wish-fulfilment this process is short 
circuited and the desire directly gives rise the belief-like representation that P, 
which temporarily pacifies the desire. Hopkins (2012: 259) gives an analogous 
formalization of Mr R’s great obsessive fear: 
 
A des P [A’s father tortured] Æ A imaginarily exps, bels P [A’s father 
tortured] Æ A’s des P temporarily pacified  
 
Notice the following implicit features of Hopkins’ analysis. First, the 
circumstances under which the desire that P causes the wish-fulfilling 
representation that P are circumstances under which that desire is frustrated. 
For a desire to be frustrated is for it to be inapt for action through the usual 
channels (i.e., rational action construed on the Davidsonian model). The 
frustration in question here may be heterogeneous. What I mean by that is that 
this frustration may have many sources. It may result from the unrealistic 
nature of the desire (it may be a desire for omnipotence), or it may result from 
a conflict between that desire and other motivational states in the agent. Freud 
(e.g., 1910) famously thought that the deepest frustrated desires were infantile 
desires directed towards its first caregivers, and in the case of Mr R we can see 
that  his desire is frustrated due to the inner emotional conflict that he feels 
towards his father. But I would like to leave room open to allow that mundane 
cases may be more central and concentrate on the form of that kind of 
psychological ascription. For example, if it is a frustrated desire that is the 
cause of some cases of anosognosic delusion (perhaps a desire for wellness, 
though I admit that this way of putting it is rather simple), then this frustration 
may not be a product of inner emotional conflict but perhaps more plausibly a 
conflict between the desire and what it is possible for the patient to bring about. 
 
 Second, note that on Hopkins’ analysis the desire that P directly gives 
rise to a doxastic representation that P. It does so without the intervention of 
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the appropriate intention. In the case of Freud’s dream of drinking, the doxastic 
representation is the experience that he is drinking. In the putatively wish-
fulfilling case of anosognosic delusion, the doxastic representation is the belief 
that one is not impaired. I have left the precise nature of the representation 
underspecified for the time being; Hopkins, for example, variously refers to it 
as a dream-experience, an imaginary experience, and a belief-like 
representation.38 What is most important at this point is the causal role it plays 
in pacifying the motivational state from which it is originally precipitated. That 
causal role is the same as that which ordinary (non-fictive) experience and 
belief plays in the pacification of desire. We noted that in ordinary action the 
experience of the state of affairs being brought about causes a pacification of 
the desire, even if the agent experiences that state of affairs before it has the 
chance to satisfy the physiological need that causes the desire. The experience 
of drinking, for example, will contribute to the satiation of one’s thirst before 
the drink of water causes actual physiological hydration. In wish-fulfilment, the 
doxastic representation (temporarily) pacifies its precipitating desire in the 
same way.  
 
On Hopkins’ analysis then, the causal process of wish-fulfilment is a 
kind of conflict management that allows Mr R to simultaneously express the 
ordinary filial love that he feels for his father as well as the hostility and fear 
that he feels towards his father as a punitive figure who stands in the way of his 
erotic gratification. The key innovation here is the idea of pacification in 
distinction from satisfaction. A desire is pacified if the agent (temporarily) 
ceases to have the desire. A desire is satisfied if the satisfaction-conditions of 
the desire are brought about and this causes the desire to be pacified. This 
means that a desire can be pacified without being satisfied, as indeed is thought 
to occur in dreaming, and in wish-fulfilment in general. This is a sub-
intentional reading of the processes that psychodynamic explanation appeals to, 
because it posits causal links that proceed without any particular intention – for 
example, an intention to self-gratify, or self-deceive. 
 
                                                     
38 This is noted in Pataki (2014: 64-65). 
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 Pataki (2014) has argued that there are problems with the sub-
intentionalist analysis of wish-fulfilment, and he includes Hopkins’ analysis in 
his treatment of these problems. Pataki’s first criticism is that the analysis 
cannot be right because it runs counter to the conceptual link that beliefs have 
with evidence. That means that the bare causal link between the desire that P 
and the imaginary experience or belief39 that P cannot work, on our 
understanding of what beliefs are. The argument runs as follows, and has two 
parts. First, according to Hopkins’ analysis of wish-fulfilment, a frustrated 
desire that P will, under certain circumstances, give rise directly to a b-rep that 
P. Now, beliefs do not typically appear in such an ungrounded manner – they 
require evidence, whether this evidence is comprised by other beliefs or by 
some perceptual experience. In fact, the link between evidence and belief is so 
strong that it can be claimed that it does not make sense to speak of an agent 
holding a belief without there also being some evidence on the basis of which it 
is held: “The claim that one believes that p, but for no particular reason or 
grounds, that one just does, is incoherent.” (Pataki 2014: 57) But the link 
between the desire and the b-rep in Hopkins’ analysis is a causal, and not a 
rational one; the belief is not formed on the basis of evidence. So in the 
absence of an evidential link, we are left wondering just how it is that the 
desire can cause the b-rep. 
 
 Pataki’s second criticism is specific to the notion of the b-rep itself. In 
particular, he thinks that the notion is an ad hoc solution which is meant to be 
capable of pacifying desire without being a fully-fledged belief that would 
need to be held on the basis of evidence. Pataki (2014: 66) puts it like this: 
“[…] the b-reps which are imaginal or experience-like cannot by themselves 
deliver pacification, and the b-reps which are merely belief-like – without 
experiential content – leave unilluminated what most needs to be illuminated: 
the role of dream, symptom and their congeners in the cycle of wish-
fulfilment.” What I think Pataki means by this is that the b-reps in question 
must be belief-like enough to play their explanatory role in wish-fulfilment, but 
that it is unclear what this similarity consists in. According to Pataki, it cannot 
                                                     
39 These both come under Hopkins’ neologism b-rep, or “belief-like representation” (Hopkins 
1996), by which he means a state which represents the world as currently being a certain way, 
and which has a phenomenology.  This is also what I mean when I use the term “doxastic 
representation.” 
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be right that the similarity consists in a phenomenology, because beliefs do not 
have a phenomenology. But if the similarity neither consists in the normative 
aspect of belief that is a result of its conceptual link with evidence, then it is on 
the defender of the b-rep to explain more precisely what exactly the similarity 
to belief proper consists in. 
 
 
 
 These objections of Pataki’s imply a couple of deeper issues. The first 
is that he seems to be making a strict – perhaps too strict – distinction between 
beliefs and experiences. Certainly, on the neo-Kantian viewpoint from which 
Hopkins is working there is no such strict distinction between the conceptual 
content that is characteristic of beliefs and that of experiences; all perceptual 
states are conceptually laden.40 Pataki anticipates this reply, and he is ready for 
it with the following objection: “Beliefs and quasi-beliefs do not have a 
phenomenology, though of course states associated with them such as pleasure 
or terror do.” (65) That fact is meant to convince us out of the idea that “seeing 
is always believing…” (80) Now, the first clarification to be made here is that 
the proposition at issue is not whether all beliefs have a phenomenology, but 
whether phenomenological items have conceptual content. Pataki reasonably 
suggests that the first of these propositions seems implausible.41 But the second 
has a long history of respectability – particularly since Kant. On the neo-
Kantian theory of perception which lies at the foundation of Hopkins’ theory, it 
is a core hypothesis that all instances of experience are the product of 
unconscious inferences, and therefore bear conceptual content. Note that this is 
an empirical hypothesis, and not amenable to refutation on a priori grounds. It 
is for this reason that I feel we are justified in assuming the innocence of the b-
rep until the evidence demonstrates otherwise. 
 
                                                     
40 This neo-Kantianism comes in through Hermann von Helmholtz, who is seminal for the 
predictive processing or “free energy” theory of cognition that informs Hopkin’s recent work 
and whose “major philosophical contribution was an attempt to ground Kant’s theoretical 
division between phenomena and noumena within empirically verifiable sense physiognomy.” 
(Jensen 2013; Cf., Lenoir 2006) 
41 But even then, it’s plausibility is becoming increasingly controversial. A good recent 
example of this can be found in Bayne and Montague (2011). 
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 That leaves us with Pataki’s first objection against Hopkins’ theory. To 
reprise that objection, it is that the causal link between the frustrated desire and 
the b-rep is underspecified. According to Pataki, it is an analytic truth that 
beliefs require what he calls agent-evidence; there needs to be some evidence 
on the basis of which the agent holds the belief (even if it is bad evidence, 
normatively speaking). That seems to rule out frustrated desires directly 
causing wish-fulfilling beliefs, since there is no agent-evidence on that causal 
link, and the frustrated desire itself does not constitute agent-evidence. But the 
theory here is not that desires cause beliefs, it is that they cause the belief-like 
representations which are the relevant concept within the process of wish-
fulfilment. That means that the problem reduces to this: the causal link between 
the frustrated desire and the b-rep is not adequately explicated – we have been 
given no causal mechanism which explains how that causal process could 
occur. But that is the role of the sub-personal mechanism which will later come 
into the story; more specifically, in chapters three and four of this thesis.42 So 
assuming that those mechanisms are plausible then this objection will have 
been dealt with. 
 
 It seems to me, then, that the sub-intentionalist analysis of 
psychodynamic explanation survives the objections that can be given against it 
from an intentionalist point of view. Much hinges upon the adequacy of the 
underlying mechanisms which are called upon to fill out the account. But 
assuming that the filled-out account is cogent then we need not worry about 
Sartrean paradoxes or criticisms from the intentionalist’s point of view – with 
one exception, which I will treat in section 2.1.5. 
 
2.1.4. The fragility of wish-fulfilment 
 
 There is a feature of wish-fulfilment that I think we should be careful 
not to overlook. That is the ultimate impotence of wish-fulfilling strategies for 
doing any more than temporarily pacifying an agent’s frustrated desires. The 
truth of this is clear. If it were possible for an agent to bring about permanent 
pacification of desire by way of wish-fulfilment then it is difficult to see why 
                                                     
42 Jim Hopkins (2012) does suggest a particular mechanistic explanation of wish-fulfilment, 
and I discuss his suggestion at length in chapter three. 
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there would be rational action in the first place; surely we would all seek out 
dark rooms in which we could engage in wish-fulfilment until our deaths. So 
wish-fulfilment is a strategy that is adopted by the agent when nothing else will 
do – either because of the demands of the external world or the inconsistency 
of the desire with others that we hold. In other words, it is adopted under 
circumstances of frustration. Wish-fulfilments that are successful over long 
periods of time are not pathological wish-fulfilments in the form we are 
considering in this thesis. 
 
 The reason I want to emphasize this point is because it makes certain 
other features of the clinical phenomena intelligible. More specifically, it 
allows us to make more explicit the association that wish-fulfilment has with 
frustrated desires, and get a better handle on the clinical phenomena in virtue of 
this association. When the frustrated desire that precipitates wish-fulfilment is 
only temporarily or unsuccessfully pacified, then that desire must surely recur. 
And the recurrence of that desire may cause emotional symptoms in the 
patient. We can begin to see this through the dream of drinking again. In that 
dream, Freud’s experience that he is drinking soon gives way to his awakening 
and his need to have an actual drink. The wish-fulfilment fails. But now 
consider the case of anxiety dreams or nightmares, in which the anxiety of the 
dream awakens the dreamer. In this case, the failure of the dream to present the 
frustrated desire in an acceptable form causes anxiety in the dreamer, and he 
awakes. 
 
 Let me say something general about this. In cases where wish-
fulfilment occurs, it occurs because there is a desire that is frustrated; that is to 
say that it is not apt for action by way of the usual channels. This might come 
under what Freud calls repression. (I hope the discussions thus far will have 
persuaded the reader that there is not necessarily anything agential about this 
expression, as long as it is given a plausible mechanism of action.) Now, in 
these cases we also see that those frustrated desires are pacified by recourse to 
wish-fulfilment; they cause symptoms which pacify the desire. However, the 
symptoms in question only cause a temporary pacification, and the frustrated 
desire persists. It therefore may cause other symptoms which are distinct from 
the primary wish-fulfilment. The wish-fulfilment is therefore a return of the 
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repressed, in the sense that the frustrated desire may find representation in 
distinct symptoms. 
 
 One interesting thing about this is that a return of the repressed may 
often be an anxiety in the face of the frustrated desire, or some other negative 
emotion rather than a gratification; or at least in many cases this anxiety seems 
to be present as well. That is often because the desire is incompatible with 
other attitudes that the agent holds. Freud (1916: 216) discusses this in a 
treatment of dreams, and in particular with respect to nightmares: “[…] a 
dreamer’s relation to his wishes is a quite peculiar one. He repudiates them and 
censors them – he has no liking for them, in short.” Let’s again consider the 
case of Mr R. Freud infers for this case that Mr R has hostile feelings towards 
his father that he is not aware of. That is to say that they are repressed. 
However, those hostile feelings were not successfully kept unconscious but 
continued to press for representation in Mr R’s varied symptoms. There are a 
great many symptoms that Freud describes that are distinct from the great 
obsessive fear. One example is an episode during consultation where Mr R 
paces around the room in a seeming fear of Freud, hiding his face as though he 
was afraid that Freud would hit him. Freud infers that what is occurring during 
this episode is that Mr R’s fear and hatred towards his father is pacified in this 
instance by transferring that feeling onto Freud. That allows him to express it 
openly. If Freud was right about this, it is an example of the fragility of wish-
fulfilment; there are often many symptomatic strategies that are needed in 
order to accommodate the one frustrated motivational state, and not all of these 
are gratifications. 
 
 This fragility of wish-fulfilment – the need for many symptoms in order 
to pacify a single frustrated desire, and the common failure of these symptoms 
– will become important when we go on to look at how psychodynamic 
explanation might work in the context of AHP. That is because in particularly 
severe cases these patients exhibit episodes of tearfulness that coincide with 
awareness of their impairment, and these patients also seem to “displace” 
negative emotions from their impairment onto objects in their environments for 
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which this negative response is inappropriate.43 I am going to want to say that 
we can interpret these episode of tearfulness and displacements of negative 
emotion as a failure of the wish-fulfilment in the sense discussed above, where 
the wish-fulfilment in question is instantiated by the delusional denial of 
impairment. 
 
2.1.5. A reluctant concession on enactment and explanatory scope 
 
 I have said that I think we need not worry about Pataki’s (2014) 
criticism of sub-intentionalism. But this is not entirely true. We can distinguish 
between two types of success that Pataki might have in refuting sub-
intentionalism. The first would show that sub-intentionalism cannot be true. 
The second would show that sub-intentionalism cannot be true for a subset of 
the phenomena which it purports to adequately explain. For example, he might 
show that a sub-intentionalist analysis of wish-fulfilment cannot explain how 
particular complex actions pacify frustrated desires on the part of the patient. I 
think Pataki has succeeded in giving the second type of refutation, at least 
pending an adequate reply to his critique; at present I have none. 
 
 Pataki’s case for intentionalism is at its most powerful when he is 
considering putative cases of wish-fulfilment that are complex and enacted.  
What that means is that these cases involve complex premeditated actions that 
are a far cry from what we see in the case of Mr R’s great obsessive fear, which 
is a thought insertion that the patient feels little to no control over (with the 
exception of course, of the extent to which his compulsion can ameliorate the 
obsession). One of Pataki’s most compelling examples of this kind is that of an 
exhibitionist, as reported in Stoller (1979). Stoller describes a man whose 
motive in exposing himself is to strangers is not to seduce them but rather to 
acquire evidence that he is sexually important; this wards off his suspicions 
that he is emasculated and insignificant. Here’s a selection of what Pataki 
(2014: 57) cites: 
 
                                                     
43 The full range of evidence for this empirical claim is given in chapter five. 
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You will find if you get to talk with the exhibitionist, that his purpose in 
displaying  his genitals is not to seduce a woman into making love with 
him but rather to shock her. If she is upset – is embarrassed, becomes 
angry, runs away – and especially if she calls the police, he has, he 
feels, absolute proof that his genitals are important. 
 
Complex cases like these, to the extent that they are wish-fulfilling, seem to be 
much better explained on an intentionalist model than they do on a sub-
intentionalist one. That is because the case does appear to lend itself much 
more readily to interpretation in terms of the intentional generation of agent-
evidence for some wish-fufilling belief. For the exhibitionist, for example, the 
whole “perilous charade” (Pataki 2014: 57) that he puts himself through is 
intended to get him to the stage where he can believe that his genitals are 
important. 
 
 I therefore feel that I should qualify the explanatory scope of what I am 
doing here. The case I am making in this thesis is that current theories of AHP 
can be profitably supplemented with an interpretation of some of the attendant 
symptoms as wish-fulfilling. That is because current – particularly cognitive 
deficit – theories of AHP fail to satisfactorily explain the pathologies of 
emotion that occur in the condition, nor do they explain how those pathologies 
are related to the illness’s doxastic features. The sub-intentional analysis of 
wish-fulfilment of which I am availing myself here is therefore only meant to 
apply to those symptoms. That does not oblige me to explain complex cases of 
the kind that Pataki is most interested in. It may well be that those more 
complex wish-fulfilling enactments, to the extent that they are wish-fulfilling, 
are underpinned by different mechanisms than the ones I explore in this thesis. 
It is to AHP that I now turn. 
 
2.2. How might AHP be psychodynamically explained? 
 
 The work of Weinstein and Kahn is an early attempt to formulate a 
theory of anosognosia which draws heavily from the psychodynamic 
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tradition.44 Weinstein and Kahn presented the outlines of their hypothesis over 
two papers and one monograph (Weinstein & Kahn 1950; 1953; 1955), and it 
is usually these sources that are used as a reference point by the critics of the 
psychodynamic theorization of AHP (e.g., Bisiach & Germiniani 1991). The 
first move that Weinstein and Kahn make in their argument is to criticize what 
they call the explanation of anosognosia by “focal lesion” which causes 
damage to the brain’s representation of the body. We might understand the 
“focal lesion” explanation as being akin to the one-factor theory as discussed in 
the introduction.  The theory might be that this lesion causes damage to the 
way that the brain represents the body, and that this failure in representation – 
in conjunction with ordinary processes of belief fixation – causes the 
unawareness of deficit. Weinstein and Kahn attack these kinds of theories of 
anosognosia on grounds that run parallel to the considerations we mentioned 
earlier on, those that motivate for the two-factor theory of delusions. More 
specifically, they attack them on the grounds that the unawareness of deficit 
dissociates from damage to body-representation (Weinstein & Kahn 1950: 787-
788). 
 
Now, and in contrast to the implicit localizationist claim that there is 
something special about anosognosia for hemiplegia, Weinstein and Kahn 
(1950: 789) generalize anosognosia such that it is a general denial of illness 
rather than a specific denial of left hemiplegia. The task then becomes to give a 
general theory of anosognosia which is to be applied to all varieties of 
anosognosia – that is, to cortical blindness, aphasia, and so on – as well as left 
hemiplegia. Their theory consists in the following claims: first, that 
anosognosia is to be understood as a species of self-deception in which the 
denial of illness is a strategic solution to a psychological problem (the 
possibility of catastrophic anxiety that would result from awareness of 
                                                     
44 Though it should be noted that Weinstein and Kahn admit a debt to the anti-localizationist 
tradition in neurology, as well. They acknowledge a debt in particular to the work of John 
Hughlings Jackson and Kurt Goldstein: “The alteration in function is best described in the 
concepts of Hughlings Jackson…” and “The person with anosognosia relates to the 
environment largely in terms of his needs and feelings. His main need is to be well. This, in 
itself, is not a pathological manifestation but is present in all people. Goldstein called it ‘the 
drive to self-actualization’.” (Weinstein & Kahn 1950: 789) I present Weinstein and Kahn’s 
work at this point because they are the object of most of the contemporary criticisms levelled 
against including psychodynamic factors in a theory of anosognosia (e.g., Biasich & Geminiani 
1991); the more sophisticated theory of Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000) is brought into the 
picture in chapter five. 
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impairment); second, that the occurrence of anosognosia is closely related to 
the premorbid personality; such that, third, it is an amplification of the patient’s 
extant strategy of coping with frustrating aspects of the environment that, in 
AHP, is enabled by damage to overall brain function. 
 
The generalization of anosognosia over and above the particular 
physical impairment that it occurs for (e.g., cortical blindness, aphasia, 
hemiplegia, and so on) means that Weinstein and Kahn are in a position to give 
a psychological explanation of the syndrome. In particular, it puts them in a 
position to claim that the denial of illness is a psychological adaptation which 
is intended to help the patient cope with frustrating aspects of his environment. 
We might schematize this way of explaining the patient’s denial along lines 
similar to that of Hopkins’s treatment of Mr R: 
 
A des P [A’s bodily integrity is intact] Æ A forms the doxastic 
representation that P [A’s bodily integrity is intact] Æ A des P [A’s bodily 
integrity is intact] temporarily pacified 
 
In explaining the genesis of the delusion in this way, we are stating that the 
patient’s belief that he is well is formed in order to pacify a frustrated desire. I 
have characterized the desire in question thus because I am sceptical as to 
whether the desire which precipitates the anosognosic delusion, if it is indeed a 
wish-fulfilment, is propositional. It seems much more likely that the desire 
would be something more like an inchoate desire for wholeness or integrity, 
rather than a propositional desire of the kind ordinarily cited in commonsense 
psychology; something like the desire for a drink of water.45 There are also 
symptoms present in the patients for which psychodynamic explanation is 
appropriate that can be understood in terms of the insight that wish-fulfilment 
is fragile. More specifically, it has been found that patients seem to be 
experiencing a great deal of negative emotion – not at their impairment, which 
they are unaware of, but rather at objects in their environment that do not seem 
to merit such a negative response (e.g., Kaplan-Solms & Solms 2000: 163; 
Turnbull, Jones & Reed-Screen 2002). 
                                                     
45 Thanks to Geoff Boucher for raising this issue with me. 
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The assessment of this way of explaining anosognosic delusion will 
have to wait  until chapter five, because it is there that I give a comprehensive 
overview of the syndrome and the symptoms that particularly motivate for a 
psychodynamic approach. I here just want to demonstrate that there is a prima 
facie case to say that anosognosic delusion falls under the scope of 
psychodynamic explanation as it is here defined.  
 
2.3. Metapsychology and the role of mechanism 
 
2.3.1. The objection from “mechanistic vagueness” 
 
 I mentioned in the introduction of this thesis that one common criticism 
of motivation-based explanations of irrational phenomena is that they are 
unacceptably vague when it comes to the mechanisms by which the active 
motivations cause the irrational phenomena. I will once again quote Peter Ditto 
(2009: 28) on this matter, because I feel that he pinpoints the issue well. In this 
following passage he is discussing the perceptual bias literature in experimental 
psychology and a subset of this literature which moved to explain such biases 
in terms of motivation. One example of this is that of the “perceptual defense” 
theorists, who suggested that students’ tendency to fail to see affectively-
loaded or offensive words (e.g., “whore”) in a recognition task that presented 
them for very short durations was an unconscious attempt to avoid the negative 
affect that these words would otherwise cause in awareness (McGinnies 1949). 
The issue with these theories is that they were in a prima facie conflict with the 
cognitivism within which they were pitched. Ditto puts it like this: 
 
[The problem with perceptual defense theory was] a dominant 
metatheory that was inhospitable to the notion of motivational 
influences on cognitive processes. The prevailing information 
processing perspective and its guiding metaphor of the person-as-
computer had little need for motivational variables in its explanatory 
framework. Computers, after all, do not have emotions or preferences, 
and the view of people as flawed information processors offered a host 
of cognitive mechanisms that could be flexibly drawn upon to explain 
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virtually any judgment outcome – even those that deviated significantly 
from rationality – as a product of limitations and biases in our ability to 
attend to, encode, store, and retrieve relevant information. This ability 
of the burgeoning cognitive perspective to offer plausible, specific, 
process-based accounts of judgmental errors (at least post-hoc ones) 
contrasted sharply with the mechanistic vagueness of motivational 
accounts, which seemed to provide little guidance regarding how 
underspecified motivational constructs such as the need for “self-esteem 
maintenance” might alter judgment outcomes. 
 
What Ditto is pointing out here is that there is a significant tension between 
motivation-based accounts of irrationality and the information processing 
framework within which they must be formulated, such that the 
psychodynamic theorist faces theoretical challenges that the cognitivist does 
not. The most salient of those challenges is to provide a plausible mechanism 
of action by which emotional and motivational processes could influence 
cognitive processes of belief-fixation, and to explain why this mechanism 
should be selected  in preference to the extant information-processing stories 
about irrationality. In the absence of such a supplementary justification for this 
further mechanism of action, it seems fair to say that motivation-based 
accounts are to be rejected on the grounds that those phenomena (e.g., self-
deception or delusion) can already be parsimoniously explained in an 
information processing vocabulary of heuristics and biases. 
 
2.3.2. What is metapsychology, and what does it do? 
 
 Although the most salient way of drawing the distinction is by 
contrasting commonsense psychology to the kind of mechanistic explanation 
given in most subpersonal psychology, the distinction between personal and 
subpersonal explanation is also sometimes characterized as a distinction 
between explanation that is horizontal  and explanation that is vertical 
(Bermúdez 2005, chapter two; Drayson 2012: 2-3). What that means is that 
personal explanation is taken to proceed in terms of a series of singular events 
which are temporally ordered. It is called horizontal because the explanation 
will look like a horizontal line of temporally ordered events. That can be seen 
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by looking at Hopkins’s (2012) analysis of wish-fulfilment, which I have 
drawn on heavily here. Subpersonal explanation is typically called vertical 
because it explains not in terms of causal antecedents but in terms of the 
constitutive features of the thing to be explained. The classic example is a 
broken window. We can ask for a horizontal explanation of why the window 
was broken, and be given an answer that involves a ball hitting the window and 
causing it to break. Or we can ask for a vertical explanation of why the window 
was broken, and be given an answer that appeals to dispositional properties of 
the window itself, like its brittleness. A complete explanation of this kind 
would likely go on to give a structural specification of what brittleness is in this 
case, in terms of the microstructure of glass, and so on. 
 
 I think that we can view metapsychology as constituting a vertical 
treatment of psychodynamic explanation, in contrast to the ordinary way it 
proceeds in clinical treatment, which is horizontal.46 We can see that the 
explanatory distinction between horizontal and vertical accounts applies to 
psychoanalytic theory by looking at the difference between clinical explanation 
of irrational behaviour in terms of wish-fulfilment and the kind of model-
building that goes on in Freud’s more theoretical moments. It is one thing to 
say that his dream of drinking is caused by a desire to drink and it is quite 
another to make this particular explanation intelligible in terms of the general 
model that Freud gives in chapter 7 of The Interpretation of Dreams. 
 
FIGURE 2.1: FREUD’S METAPSYCHOLOGY FROM THE 
INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (Freud 1900: 541) 
                                                     
46 This must be said with the caveat that some explanations in the clinical setting are likely 
vertical as well. One example of this might be the explanation of some symptom in terms of 
defense mechanisms. This is not a horizontal explanation, because it is not explanation in terms 
of causal antecedents. The symptom itself is explained in virtue of its constituting a defense. 
However, this also implies a horizontal explanation because presumably there is some cause 
for the defense being employed by the patient in the first place. 
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 This metapsychological model of mental function is meant to explain 
how it could be the case that motivational states (like the desire to drink) could 
directly cause doxastic states (like the dream experience that one is drinking). 
Furthermore, it will be observed that it is an explanation of a paradigmatically 
vertical kind: it is giving an account of the phenomenon at issue in terms of the 
constitution of the mechanism which is its condition of possibility, rather than 
in terms of the causal power of a temporally antecedent event. Freud’s 
explanation in this particular case is as follows. 
 
The world ordinarily impinges upon the mental apparatus by way of the 
sensory subsystems (Pcpt). This interaction causes psychic energy to accrue in 
the mental apparatus, which is stored in memories. These memories are linked 
by association, and are unconscious. At the other end of the organism (the 
“motor” end) is the preconscious (Pcs), which consists of all those memory 
traces which can be readily called to  conscious attention under particular 
circumstances. During dreaming, the body is paralysed and so the  mental 
apparatus cannot discharge energy through action. But the mental apparatus 
continues to be subject to endogenous excitation from the body. The excitation 
thus moves in a “regressive” direction, towards the sensory end of the 
apparatus and the perceptual subsystem. That elicits the doxastic 
representations that constitute the dream. Now, I obviously don’t mean to 
endorse this model as it currently stands (and in such a cursory form), but it 
gives us a concrete idea of what it means for something to be a vertical 
(metapsychological) explanation in the context of wish-fulfilment. 
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 If we were to give a vertical and mechanistic account of wish-
fulfilment, then this would satisfy critics who doubt that psychodynamic 
explanation has a plausible mechanism of action available to it. It should also 
satisfy criticism from the point of view of intentionalism, where that criticism 
points to the under-specification that is present in sub-intentional analyses of 
wish-fulfilment. But we would need to satisfy two further conditions. First, our 
metapsychology would need to be plausible in light of the contemporary 
sciences of mind. That means that most if not all of Freud’s metapsychological 
explanations that he gives in his work are unavailable. Nobody today thinks 
that it is plausible to suggest that the brain is made up of neurons which are 
filled with energy and flushed of this energy when endogenous needs are 
satisfied (Freud 1895), but I will argue that there are many ideas in Freudian 
metapsychology that are plausible and enlightening when they are given the 
appropriate treatment against the background of the relevant contemporary 
sciences. So we cannot rely on extant Freudian ideas, though we may recycle 
some of them. Secondly, we would still have to deal with the objection that 
information processing accounts of irrationality are more parsimonious than 
psychodynamic accounts. That argument from parsimony is based on the 
assumption that all the phenomena in our horizontal explanations are just as 
well accounted for by existing information processing accounts to the point 
that we do not require any new vertical explanations – and certainly not of 
wish-fulfilment. But I hope to show in my later discussion of AHP that the 
presumption which this argument is based on is false. More specifically, I 
intend to show that there are symptoms which merit explanation in terms of 
wish-fulfilment, and which evade explanation that proceeds exclusively in 
terms of cognitive deficit. 
 
2.4. Metapsychological commitments of psychodynamic explanation 
  
 The metapsychological commitments of psychodynamic explanation 
will place constraints of adequacy on the sub-personal account of 
psychodynamic explanation that is required. Those commitments stem from 
features of psychodynamic explanation as here defined – the explanation of 
particular irrational behaviours as wish-fulfilling – that shape in advance the 
way that our vertical account of psychodynamic explanation must be. They are, 
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in Gardner’s (1993: 175) words, the “conditions of possibility” of 
psychodynamic explanation. I suggest that there are three specific criteria that 
any satisfactory sub-personal account of psychodynamic explanation must 
meet. 
 
2.4.1. Motivations as doxastic forces 
 
 The first burden on any sub-personal account of psychodynamic 
explanation will be explaining how it is that motivation can play a role in 
ordinary belief formation. That is a problem with sub-intentionalism that is 
identified by both the intentionalist critic and the critic whose worries are more 
along the lines of those that Ditto (2009) articulates. It corresponds to the first 
causal relation in Hopkins’s (2012: 257) characterization of wish-fulfilment in 
its personal level guise (with reference to Freud’s dream of drinking): 
 
A des P [A drinks] Æ A dream-exps bels P [A drinks] 
 
What this causal relation consists in is the causation of a doxastic state (in this 
case, the dream-experience of drinking) by a motivational state. Moreover, the 
relationship between the doxastic state and the motivational state is a very 
particular one; the two have a coincidence of content. What this means is that 
the content of the doxastic state is such that, were it veridical, it would be a 
necessary condition for the pacification of the motivational state. That is 
because it is an experiential state of that motivational state being satisfied. In 
this case, for example, the dream-experience of drinking would be a necessary 
condition for the pacification of the desire to drink. It cannot be any old 
doxastic state that plays this role – there must be this coincidence of content. 
For example, a dream-experience that I am eating a hamburger would not 
satisfy my desire to have a drink of water. 
 
2.4.2. The circumstances under which wish-fulfilment occurs 
 
 It seems to follow from the fact that desires can directly cause doxastic 
states that there must be a particular set of circumstances under which this 
process occurs. That is because if there were not some particular set of 
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circumstances that were necessary for this process to occur, then it is hard to 
see why agents would engage in rational action; if all it takes to pacify a desire 
is the generation of wish-fulfilling symptoms, then why bother to genuinely 
bring about the state of affairs that is desired? In the classical psychodynamic 
account, what distinguishes the circumstances under which wish-fulfilment 
occurs are circumstances under which the precipitating desire is not 
consciously available to the agent. The name for this phenomenon is 
repression. It seems to me that wish-fulfilment can only occur under 
circumstances of repression, because in order to work wish-fulfilment requires 
some kind of negation of an actual state of affairs (e.g., one denies that one 
lacks the wished for object, or one denies the hateful state of affairs). 
 
 However, this is not the bare unavailability to consciousness that the 
repressed states of psychoanalytic theory shares with (say) the implicit states of 
cognitive psychology. It is at its barest a particular kind of unavailability that is 
rationally intelligible in light of other beliefs and desires held by the agent. 
Freud himself often speaks of repression as though it were the result of some 
intentional turning away on the part of the agent from some ideas within 
himself that he finds unacceptable, or as the result of some process carried out 
by a agential subsystem within the person: “Repression is a preliminary stage 
of condemnation, something between flight and condemnation […]” (Freud 
1915b: 146) Similarly, in his discussion of dreams, he sometimes talks about it 
as the result of a censor mechanism which is itself a quasi-agent (e.g., Freud 
1900: 267). As I hope to have established early on in this chapter, these quasi-
agential formulations of psychodynamic processes will not do; we need to find 
a plausible sub-personal mechanism which could instantiate them. The first 
task in specifying the conditions under which wish-fulfilment occurs is 
therefore to give a sub-personal specification of the mechanism which might be 
thought to instantiate what Freud calls repression. 
 
 The link that repression has to wish-fulfilment is twofold. First, the 
wish-fulfilment only occurs under conditions of repression; that is to say that it 
only occurs for motivational states that have been subject to repression. 
Secondly, wish-fulfilment constitutes an indirect expression of this repressed 
material – the “return of the repressed.” That provides us with the following 
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problem: demonstrating how desires can be frustrated by way of repression and 
yet simultaneously be active such that they come to be represented in wish-
fulfilling symptoms. That is to ask a question about the fragility of wish-
fulfilment: why, if they are repressed, don’t these desires come to be replaced 
by more realistic desires, or just disappear entirely? Why do they continue to 
return in wish-fulfilling symptoms? Any account of the circumstances of wish-
fulfilment must answer this question. 
 
 The last requirement which is associated with a demonstration of the 
circumstances under which wish-fulfilment occurs is that of being able to 
distinguish between relatively innocuous forms of wish-fulfilment – like 
ordinary cases of self-deception or wishful thinking – and those forms of wish-
fulfilment that constitute diagnosable psychopathology. One way of fulfilling 
this requirement is to suggest a process of development according to which the 
wishful distortion of reality is at the immature end and at which the realistic 
attitude is at the other, and to suggest that wishful psychopathology consists in 
a regression along this spectrum of development (cf., Freud 1914; Ferenczi 
1952). That is the approach that I take to this last requirement in the following 
chapter, though I will be suggesting that it is a mistake to take the 
“developmental” part of this hypothesis too literally. 
 
2.4.3. The opacity of wish-fulfilment 
 
 It is the opacity that occurs for certain cases of wish-fulfilment that 
leads to our final metapsychological commitment. There is a significant 
difference between the following two cases of wish-fulfilment, a difference 
that leads to a substantial distinction. The first case is Freud’s dream of 
drinking. In this case, the representation of the motivational state as fulfilled 
has a direct and transparent link with the motivational state itself; that is to say 
that there is a transparent coincidence of content. The second case is that of 
Freud’s dream of Irma’s injection. In this case, the representation of the 
motivational state as fulfilled (the desire to be free of responsibility for Irma’s 
continued illness) is what we might call opaque. That means that it does not 
have this direct and transparent link with the motivational state – there is no 
coincidence in content. Rather, there seem to be a number of quasi-inferential 
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steps that one would need to make in order to get to the wish-fulfilling 
representation from the motivational state. In the case of the dream of Irma’s 
injection, these steps involve the projection of that responsibility onto Otto at 
least:  
 
The conclusion of the dream, that is to say, was that I was not 
responsible for the persistence of Irma’s pains, but that Otto was. Otto 
had in fact annoyed me by his remarks about Irma’s incomplete cure, 
and the dream gave me my revenge by throwing the reproach back on 
to him. (Freud 1900: 118) 
 
It therefore seems that, to the extent that the Freudian model of wish-fulfilment 
is cogent, the frustrated desires that give rise to wish-fulfilment can be pacified 
by a wide range of representations, much wider than seems possible in rational 
action.47 In rational action, the state of affairs that pacifies the relevant desire 
typically comes under the same description as the action does. For example, the 
state of affairs that will pacify A’s desire that A drinks a glass of water is the 
state of affairs in which A drinks a glass of water. In more interesting cases of 
wish-fulfilment, on the other hand, it seems as though there are very many 
doxastic representations that can pacify the relevant desire. That is to say that 
the doxastic representation is not always a direct representation of the desire as 
fulfilled. This needs to be accounted for in any adequate sub-personal account 
of wish-fulfilment. I give a fuller characterization of this phenomenon of 
opacity in chapter four, where it is discussed at length. 
 
 There is one additional aspect to this opacity which has not yet been 
fully discussed. That is the way in which not all of the symptoms – instances of 
                                                     
47 The truth of this claim can be demonstrated in part by looking at the wide variety of 
symptoms that are reported in psychoanalytic case studies, and the oblique links that these have 
to their precipitating causes. One good example is reported by Hanna Segal (1991: 27): “In 
1957, in my paper ‘Notes on symbol formation’, I tried to tackle theoretically the problems of 
symbolic functioning I was struggling with in my clinical work…At the beginning of that 
paper I described two patients, a hospital psychotic who since his illness had stopped playing 
the violin, and who, when asked why, answered with violence, ‘Do you expect me to 
masturbate in public?’; whilst an analytic patient I had at the same time had dreams about 
playing the violin, also representing masturbation and associated phantasies which in no way 
interfered with his sublimation in playing the violin.” It seems to me inconceivable that the 
desire to masturbate could be satisfied in rational action through playing the violin, yet it is 
putatively pacified in wish-fulfilment in this way. 
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the return of the repressed – associated with some given wish-fulfilment may 
be understood as gratifying for the agent. In fact, some of them may elicit a 
great deal of anxiety and negative emotion. There is an obvious example that 
we can immediately give of this phenomenon. This is that of anxiety dreams or 
nightmares, which as Freud understood very early on seemed to be a 
counterexample to his theory that all dreams are wish-fulfilments. The answer 
that he gave to this counterexample was as follows: 
 
We too, of course, feel the need to explain to ourselves why there are so 
many dreams with a distressing content and, especially why there are 
anxiety-dreams […] No doubt a wish-fulfilment must bring pleasure; 
but the question then arises ‘To whom?’ To the person who has the 
wish, of course. But, as we know, a dreamer’s relation to his wishes is a 
quite peculiar one. He repudiates them and censors them – he has no 
liking for them, in short. So that their fulfilment will give him no 
pleasure, but just the opposite; and experience shows that this opposite 
appears in the form of anxiety […] Thus a dreamer in relation to his 
dream-wishes can only be compared to an amalgamation of two 
separate people who are linked by some strong element in common. 
(Freud 1916: 215-216) 
 
It seems to me that this kind of answer – at least as it is formulated here – will 
be unsatisfactory for our purposes. That is because it relies upon the posit of 
agential subsystems, and this is off limits given the sub-intentional constraints 
on our theory of wish-fulfilment. There is however a significant insight here 
that we would do well to avail ourselves of. That insight is that the wish or 
motivational state may be incompatible with other attitudes that the agent 
holds, and thereby cause anxiety in virtue of this incompatibility. That 
incompatibility will be central to the explanation that we give for repression in 
chapter three, and I will also appeal to incompatible attitudes in order to 
explain the opacity of pacification in chapter four. 
 
2.5. Concluding remarks 
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 This chapter has played a few roles in the overall argument of the 
dissertation and so here I point out the most important conclusions that I want 
to bring forward into the next three chapters. The first is that psychodynamic 
explanation constitutes a clear mode of psychological explanation whose form 
can be unambiguously specified. This specification serves as a reply against 
complaints like those of Macmillan (1991), who has claimed that 
psychodynamic explanation is too disunified and overdetermined by prior 
theoretical commitments to be considered a distinct mode of psychological 
explanation. This will also become important in our discussion of AHP, 
because it is this distinct mode of explanation (i.e., wish-fulfilment) that I will 
argue can play an illuminating role in the elucidation of that illness. 
 
 The second point that I want to make salient in preparation for the 
following chapters is the complete absence of intention in the analysis of wish-
fulfilment I have here endorsed. On an intentionalist view of psychodynamic 
explanation (as we can find in Freud’s work, or like the one explicated in 
Pataki (2014)), the fictive representation of the wished-for state is caused by a 
mental subsystem which forms the intention to generate that experience. In the 
quasi-Freudian theory of dreams that Sartre is attacking, for instance, the 
dream content is generated by the censor subsystem which does so in order to 
mediate between the demands of the id and that of the ego. That content is 
intentionally produced, because it must be produced in such a way that gratifies 
the dreamer. This lack of intervening intention will be important later on in the 
thesis because it contradicts the common criticism – for example, on the part of 
Sartre (1982 [1956]) – that psychodynamic explanation is homuncular (or, as 
some more recent criticism would have it (e.g., Fotopoulou 2013: 14), 
“psychogenic”). 
 
 A common theme throughout this chapter has been the way in which 
wish-fulfilment – at least as its explanatory form has been analysed thus far – is 
underspecified. What that means is that we have claimed that frustrated desires 
can cause doxastic representations (or “belief-like representations”) of their 
fulfilment, but we have not specified the mechanisms which are the conditions 
of possibility for that causal process. This leaves us open to the “mechanistic 
vagueness” objection which is put forward by Ditto (2009). There is therefore a 
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need for the metapsychological commitments I have outlined towards the end 
of this chapter – the role of motivations as doxastic influences, the 
circumstances of wish-fulfilment, and the opacity of wish-fulfilment – to be 
given a robust sub-personal specification.  
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3. Predictive processing and the circumstances of wish-fulfilment 
 
3.1. Freud and free energy: an early attempt to mechanize wish-fulfilment 
 3.1.1. Freud’s innovations 
 3.1.2. Freud’s errors 
3.2. Predictive processing and the free energy principle 
 3.2.1. The basic predictive processing framework 
 3.2.2. Active inference and the dark room problem 
 3.2.3. Priors and pro-attitudes 
3.3. Psychodynamic mechanisms in the free energy view of the brain 
 3.3.1. Binocular rivalry as a model for “repression” 
 3.3.2. Complexity reduction as a model for “regression” 
3.4. Concluding remarks: the circumstances of wish-fulfilment 
 
 The task of the previous chapter of this thesis was to explicate the 
distinctive mode of psychological explanation that I am calling psychodynamic 
(or psychoanalytic), and to demonstrate that it is plausible for it to be applied in 
the case of AHP. It has been so applied in the past – I cited Weinstein and 
Kahn (1950) as a salient example – but that style of explanation has seriously 
fallen out of favour since, and particularly with respect to illnesses like AHP 
which have a significant neurological element. One of the reasons sometimes 
given for this is that psychodynamic accounts lack a plausible mechanism of 
action; that is to say that the causal mechanism by which frustrated desire can 
create fictive representation is underspecified, and is in need of a sub-personal 
specification that is plausible in the light of all else we know about the mind. 
Metapsychology has played this role in the past, but metapsychological models 
leave themselves open to the same criticisms of vagueness if they are out of 
touch with work in cognate disciplines. That is because they lack constraints on 
their adequacy, and proliferate. This need for integration with work in other 
disciplines also follows from what I have said in the first chapter of this thesis, 
that is, about psychoanalytic explanation having a source of warrant in IBE; 
once psychoanalytic hypotheses increase in their level of generality, then they 
will come into competition with hypotheses in cognate disciplines (cf., 
Lacewing 2012: 31-33; Hopkins 2013). 
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 In this chapter I will be looking at a particular way of thinking about the 
mechanisms that underlie psychodynamic explanation that is based upon the 
idea that the mind is an organ whose overall function is to minimize excitation. 
In Freud’s (1895) Project for a Scientific Psychology, written very early on in 
his career, he conceptualizes the mind as an organ whose overall function is to 
minimize energetic excitation by discharging accumulated levels of this 
excitation through action, and whose operation results in the production of 
fictive experience when action is impossible. This mechanistic 
conceptualization of the mind is meant to account for some of the clinical 
phenomena with which he was dealing, and that includes wish-fulfilment.48 
Freud was to hold on to the idea of wish-fulfilment as excitation-reduction for 
a long time after he disowned the Project, and it has been claimed by followers 
(e.g., Gill & Holzman 1976) and critics (e.g., McCarley & Hobson 1977) alike 
that this conceptualization has had a negative influence on psychoanalytic 
theory. 
 
 I would like to argue, however, that Freud’s conceptualization of wish-
fulfilment as underpinned by a reduction of excitation is valuable, and that 
some of the ideas in the Project can be recycled in a contemporary context. 
That contemporary context is the “free energy principle” framework for 
understanding neural function, as formulated by Karl Friston and his 
collaborators (e.g., Friston 2005, 2013; Friston et al. 2012; Friston & Stephan 
2007). The free energy principle states that the overall function of biological 
agents is to minimize free energy, which is an information-theoretic measure of 
states that are surprising to that agent. Action, cognition, and perception are 
conceived as three complementary modes of free energy reduction. Given that 
Freud’s metapsychology of the Project and the Fristonian model of brain 
function posit very similar cognitive architectures – that is, of mental activity 
as the reduction of quantity – it is reasonable to suppose that the latter could be 
drawn upon to give an analogous sub-personal account of how emotions might 
be regulated by the process of motivational states giving rise directly to 
doxastic states, as in psychodynamic wish-fulfilment. 
                                                     
48 The Project was written at a time when Freud was beginning to discard his idea that 
psychoanalytic symptoms are caused by traumatic memories and replace it with the idea that 
they are the result of repressed impulses – that is to say, that the symptoms in question are 
wish-fulfilments. 
106 
 
 
 The contents of this chapter therefore proceed as follows. I begin by 
giving a brief exegesis of the metapsychology of Freud’s Project for a 
Scientific Psychology, and examine the way in which wish-fulfilment was 
mechanistically construed within that metapsychology. The errors that plague 
Freud’s theory here are fatal (McCarley & Hobson 1977), but I will be arguing 
that there are a number of key innovations in the Freudian model which we 
would do well to return to within a contemporary context. These are firstly, the 
role of endogenous needs as a source of quantity which the mind seeks to 
minimize; and secondly, the idea that this minimization has a close association 
with positively-valenced emotions.49 After the discussion of Freud’s 
metapsychology, I give an overview of free energy minimization as it has been 
conceptualized in recent cognitive neuroscience. That is the predictive 
processing framework, which has recently been touted as a unifying account of 
perception, cognition, and action.50 Then I go on to show how a few key 
psychodynamic concepts can be accounted for within the framework. These are 
concepts that are implied by the overall analysis of wish-fulfilment that I gave 
in the previous chapter; those of “repression” and “regression.” Giving an 
account of these concepts will allow us to meet the metapsychological 
commitments of explaining: i) how it is that motivational states can directly 
cause doxastic states; and ii) the circumstances under which they are likely to 
do so. That will put us in a position to discuss how emotion enters into this so 
far largely cognitive picture; that is the subject of the subsequent chapter.  
 
3.1. Freud and free energy: an early attempt to mechanize wish-fulfilment 
 
                                                     
49 There are of course antecedents with respect to these ideas in isolation, for example in the 
work of Gustav Fechner (Ellenberger 1970: 477). But it is in Freud that these ideas are 
synthesized, and with a view to making sense of the clinical phenomena with which he is 
concerned. 
50 In order to avoid any potential confusion: the predictive processing framework is a theory 
about cognitive architecture which draws upon the idea that the fundamental activity is that of 
model-based prediction. Action-oriented predictive processing extends this model-based view 
to action as well as perception. The free energy principle is intended to apply the mathematics 
of action-oriented predictive processing to the functioning of biological systems in general. But 
the more specific of these frameworks can be seen as applications of the most general; i.e., 
Karl Friston’s free energy principle. (Jakob Hohwy, personal communication) 
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 As vitalism – the view that biological systems contain an “élan vital” or 
life force that is absent from non-biological systems – waned in the 19th 
century biological sciences, largely due to the influence of Hermann von 
Helmholtz and the “school of Helmholtz” in medicine (Meulders 2010), 
students of psychopathology began to theorize the mind and its peculiar 
disturbances in terms of speculative brain anatomy. This tendency, called 
Hirnmythologie (brain mythology), was the dominant one up until the 
pioneering nosological work of Kraepelin (Ellenberger 1970: 284), and 
Kraepelin’s influence is still seen in the diagnostic approach exemplified by the 
DSM. 
 
 Freud’s (1895) Project for a Scientific Psychology should be seen as a 
continuation of the Hirnmythologie of the school of Helmholtz (Bernfeld 1944) 
which takes into account further themes that are not dealt with by earlier 
theorists. The most salient of these is the role of affect and imagination in 
psychopathology, and the integration of these themes is the conceptual origin 
of the hypothesis that wish-fulfilment is a mode of cognition that is distinct 
from ordinary mentation. The work – started early in Freud’s career, but soon 
after abandoned – was his own attempt to put psychological explanation of the 
type used in the clinic on a quantitative footing; more specifically, to 
“represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of 
specifiable material particles, thus making those processes perspicuous and free 
of contradiction.” (Freud 1895: 295) 
 
 In this work Freud theorized the mind on the model of a primitive kind 
of neural network (Glymour 1991), as was later done with a great deal more 
technical sophistication in connectionism (e.g., McClelland, Rumelhart & 
Hinton 1986). That is to say that he thought of it being made up of a number of 
“neurones” 51 which would be activated along pathways that corresponded to 
representations of stimuli. The operation of the neural network corresponded 
largely to what he called the “principle of inertia.” This stated that the network 
                                                     
51 This translation of the German Neuron is an idiosyncrasy of the Strachey translation of 
Freud. I will use the more contemporary “neuron” from here on in. 
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would act to divest itself of “free energy” (formalized as Qἠ)52 to the extent 
that this was possible; that excitation was thought to accumulate in the network 
through the sensory impingements of the environment upon the network. 
Furthermore, the accumulation of Qἠ in the network would cause specific 
activation pathways to be traced out in the network, which Freud thought could 
be glossed as memories. 
 
 At that initial moment in the Project, every excitatory stimulus is to be 
understood as exogenous. That is to say that no distinction has yet been made 
between stimuli which issue from without the organism and stimuli that issue 
from within the organism; motor activity is understood exclusively as a 
function which serves to put distance between the organism and the source of 
excitation: “[…] among the paths of discharge those are preferred and retained 
which involve a cessation of the stimulus: flight from the stimulus.” (Freud 
1895: 296) 
 
What now complicates this simple model is the introduction of 
endogenous stimuli. Motor activity cannot remove the organism from the 
object which is causing the excitation, since the source of the excitation is 
within the organism: “These have their origin in the cells of the body and give 
rise to the major needs: hunger, respiration, sexuality. From these the organism 
cannot withdraw as it does from external stimuli; it cannot employ their Qἠ for 
flight from the stimulus.” (Freud 1895: 297) Therefore, concludes Freud, 
another strategy is required to minimize Qἠ that originates from these 
endogenous stimuli. That strategy is to store endogenous Qἠ in motor pathways 
that can be activated in order to bring about goal-directed action in the 
organism’s environment. 
 
It is with this basic model that Freud begins to describe wish-fulfilment, 
and in particular a situation in the human infant’s early life that will become 
central thereafter to psychoanalytic theory as a paradigm of the way in which 
                                                     
52 Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010) have made a compelling case to the effect that we are 
justified in taking Freud to be equating the Qἠ of the Project with “free energy” as it was 
conceived in Helmholtz’s work, and as they conceive it in their own. See their list of 
supporting citations in (2010), and the supplementary material which contains the citations 
themselves. 
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we can think about a particular kind of cognition as a process of emotional 
regulation through the production of fictive experience (cf., Hopkins 2013). 
The situation is this. After birth, the infant is in a situation where it is entirely 
dependent for the satisfaction of bodily needs on that of another: the caregiver. 
Freud asks us to imagine the infant in its first experiences of bodily need – 
which, in the vocabulary of the project, means the first instances in which 
endogenous excitation occurs (hunger), causing the accumulation of free 
energy which the nervous system as a whole then seeks to discharge. 
 
Endogenous excitation of this kind is experienced as unpleasure, and in 
the first moment of this scenario the infant will seek to discharge the 
accumulated free energy by means of what Freud calls internal change: 
“expression of the emotions, screaming, vascular innervations…” (Freud 1895: 
317) This is of course ineffectual, given that “flight from the stimulus” is 
impossible with respect to endogenous stimuli. What is required is help from 
the infant’s caregiver, and this is indeed how the nutritive needs of the infant 
must be subsequently met: “the helpful person has performed the work of the 
specific action in the external world for the helpless one…” (Freud 1895: 318) 
 
What occurs in the second moment of the paradigmatic situation is an 
association between the somatic experience of satisfaction – the cessation of 
that endogenous excitation through minimization of Qἠ, and which is 
experienced as pleasure – and the perceptual and motor states that accompany 
that cessation. This can be glossed as a kind of associative learning, and which 
is conceptualized in the mechanism of the Project as the facilitation of a 
pathway between those two mnemic images – the feeling of homeostatic 
satisfaction, and the series of perceptual and motor states that led up to that 
satisfaction. Here’s how Freud (1895: 319) puts it: 
 
[…] as a result of the experience of satisfaction, a facilitation comes 
about between two mnemic images and the nuclear [neurons] which are 
cathected in the state of urgency. No doubt, along with the discharge of 
satisfaction the Qἠ flows out of the mnemic images as well. 
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It is in the third and last moment of this paradigmatic situation that the most 
conceptually significant event occurs. The event is the reoccurrence of need or 
endogenous excitation in the infant and the wishful response to it in the 
absence of the possibility for goal-directed action. Freud (1895: 219) explains 
it thusly: 
 
Now, when the state of urgency or wishing re-appears, the cathexis will 
also pass over the two memories [the series of perceptual items leading 
to up to the satisfaction of the need, as well as the memory of that 
satisfaction itself] and activate them. Probably the mnemic image of the 
object will be the first to be affected by the wishful activation. I do not 
doubt that in the first instance this wishful activation will produce the 
same thing as a perception – namely a hallucination. 
 
This is remarkable passage. Freud is here theorizing that the generation of 
doxastic states (i.e., the hallucination of satisfaction) sometimes occurs in the 
agent (in this situation, the infant) as a Qἠ minimizing strategy in situations 
where ordinary rational action is unavailable. This kind of shift towards 
perception in lieu of action occurs – at least at this early stage in its explication 
– prior to the advent of the secondary process and its governing rule, what 
Freud calls “the reality principle.” On the basis of this early wishful 
representation and its inevitable failure – after all, it does not correspond to the 
way that things really are – the infant can begin learning about realistic 
satisfaction, and what is actually required to bring it about. 
 
3.1.1. Freud’s innovations 
 
 There are two features of Freud’s Project that I think we would do well 
to heed as we move into the discussion of a more contemporary theory of the 
mind as an organ of quantity-minimization. The first of these is the insight that 
the brain does not only receive input from the external environment, but also 
from the agent’s own body. That is to stress the importance of endogenous need 
in the overall function of the brain. This would be in contrast to a view that 
overemphasizes the role of the external environment in determining the 
behaviour of the agent, for example, in understanding the behaviour of the 
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agent as a mere response to environmental stimuli. The benefit of bringing 
endogenous need – or “drive” – into the picture is that it makes wish-fulfilment 
teleologically intelligible; that is to say that we can understand the 
phenomenon as occurring in order to perform a specific function, where that 
function is for Freud the (temporary) pacification of the endogenous need. This 
is important, because if we forget about those endogenous sources of input and 
concentrate merely on the way in which the organism responds to the 
environment, then the role of wish-fulfilment becomes obscure: why is it that 
we have these peculiar discordances with the environment, if all the agent is 
doing is trying to get in sync with that environment? Taking the agent’s own 
body to be part of this environment mitigates this particular confusion. 
 
The second insight that we can extract from the Project is the idea that 
we should expect to find a close association between the increase in free 
energy and negatively-valenced emotions. In The Project, this is reflected in 
the idea that as endogenous excitation increases the organism moves further 
away from homeostatic equilibrium: its comes to need satiation, nourishment, 
and so on. That is represented to the organism itself as negatively-valenced 
affect, whereas the restoration of equilibrium is experienced as positively-
valenced affect. This allows us to see the way in which wish-fulfilment is 
linked with emotional experience. More specifically, it allows us to see why a 
failure to minimize levels of excitation (or free energy) would cause negative 
affect in the organism, and therefore why we can see wish-fulfilment as a kind 
of affect regulation. 
 
3.1.2. Freud’s errors 
 
There are some underlying assumptions in Freud’s model of the Project 
that are not in accord with our current best theory of the way that the brain 
functions, and insofar as this is true those errors are fatal to that project as a 
sub-personal account of wish-fulfilment. These errors were identified by 
McCarley & Hobson (1977), who wanted to challenge Freud’s theory of 
dreaming in order to clear the ground for their own “activation-synthesis” 
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account of what dreaming is.53 In this paper they think that they can challenge 
the Freudian theory of dreams by identifying errors in the Project, because they 
(rightly) infer that there is a great deal in Freud’s later metapsychological 
writings that is a transposition of the quasi-neurological ideas of the Project 
into an exclusively psychological key. But I will be arguing that their critique 
does not prevent us from retaining what is valuable in Freud’s account. 
 
The primary concern of McCarley and Hobson seems to be this: the 
language of energetics which is so prevalent in the Project, which Freud 
inherits from the German Hirnmythologers and which exerts an influence over 
his later sub-personal psychological theories, confuses the thermodynamic 
properties of the nervous system with its functional properties. This is 
expressed in their claim that: 
 
Freud believed that the same rules of description and functioning might 
be applied to both body and mind and that both had the same structures, 
the same basic operating principles, and the same rules of energy 
transfer, or dynamics. Whether one talked about physiological or 
psychological data seemed to be a matter of convenience and ease, for 
there were simple rules for mapping the concepts and operations of one 
domain onto the other. (McCarley & Hobson 1977: 1211) 
 
Those thermodynamic properties that Freud appeals to must be necessary to the 
function of the brain, but it seems that the proper function of the brain is 
probably not best stated in terms of those properties. What I mean by this is 
that it must be the case that the brain minimizes free energy – the quantity of 
energy available for work (Atkins 2007: 81ff) – because all biological systems 
minimize free energy (cf., Schrödinger 1944; Friston 2013).  But it would be a 
mistake to make inferences about the function of the brain from this fact in 
such an isomorphic manner, and it leads Freud to make a number of erroneous 
assumptions about the functioning of the brain. Or at least, this is the basis of 
McCarley and Hobson’s criticism. 
                                                     
53 The activation-synthesis theory of dreaming in its original form is now considered 
insufficient (Hobson, Pace-Schott & Stickgold 2003: 31), and has been supplemented by a 
theory which takes it to be in part a process of complexity reduction (Hobson & Friston 2012) 
and perhaps memory  reconsolidation and emotion regulation as well (Cartwright 2012). 
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 The kind of reply I want to give to McCarley and Hobson is something 
like this. It isn’t the case that the errors that are made in the Project with 
respect to the nervous system eclipse some of the more valuable features of 
that account. This is because those functional features of his theory can be 
taken in independence from the mistaken neurological underpinnings, and it is 
the functional features that cast light on what a mechanistic theory of wish-
fulfilment might look like. We do not have to assume that the brain works like 
a steam engine, but it may be the case that a functional analogy that borrows 
concepts from thermodynamics may offer some useful insights (as in, for 
example, the Boltzmann (Hinton & Sejnowski 1986) and Helmholtz (Dayan et 
al. 1995) machines in connectionism). In any case, if we downgrade the status 
of Freud’s neurological assumptions to helpful heuristics rather than necessary 
conditions (as McCarley and Hobson would seem to want to have it), then it is 
open to us to admit that one argument for the view that mental function should 
be understood in terms of the reduction of quantity is false – that is that 
straightforwardly neurological argument implied by the Project – but then to 
qualify that this does not logically imply the falsity of energy minimization 
view itself, if that view is taken to be relevant to mental function rather than a 
literal thesis about the brain. That would leave the truth of the view open to 
further questioning. All this means that we are still not entitled to claim that 
mechanism of quantity reduction as a sub-personal underpinning for wish-
fulfilment, but it also means that there might be features of the central idea that 
we could profitably recycle in the context of a contemporary understanding of 
brain function. At any rate, that is what I will be suggesting in an examination 
of the free energy minimization view in contemporary cognitive science. 
 
3.2. Predictive processing and the free energy principle 
 
3.2.1. The basic predictive processing framework54 
 
                                                     
54 My treatment of predictive processing and the free energy principle takes its cues from Clark 
(2013) and Hohwy (2013) (particularly the latter), who have both done good introductory work 
that probes some of the consequences of the general view. 
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 The free energy principle states that biological systems act to minimize 
their free energy, which is a measure of how surprising55 some set of sensory 
states is. The free energy principle is an extension of the predictive processing 
framework, which is itself a particular theory of brain function. It is a theory of 
what brain – and cognitive – function consists in. In its simplest form, the 
predictive processing framework can be construed as an answer to this 
question: how do brains cope with information from the environment 
(including the body, and “internal milieu”) in order to discern causal structure 
in the world on the basis of ambiguous and noisy input resulting from 
impingement upon its sensory organs? Let me put this somewhat more plainly: 
it’s been known at least since the physiological work of Johannes Müller 
(1838) that the perceptual experience that we enjoy during the excitation of our 
senses by the environment depends not upon the kind of excitation itself (e.g., 
pressure, light, or vibrations in the air) which causes the perception but rather 
upon the internal structure of the sensory organ being excited. For example, 
pressure upon the eye will cause a visual experience rather than a tactile one 
(though tactile senses around the eye may produce tactile experiences as well). 
Now, what is given in this case is not the direct experience of light, but rather a 
stimulation of the organ in a way that generates neural firings which are then 
interpreted as a visual experience. The question then is this: how does the brain 
interpret those firings in order to uncover the complex causal structure of the 
world; that is, how does it, using only its sensory states, derive a model of the 
causes of those states? That is the perceptual problem which the predictive 
processing framework is intended to give an answer to. 
 
 The problem is much more complex than it might at first appear. That is 
because there are multiple hypotheses which are compatible with any given set 
of sensory states. One can give an informal description of this problem by 
pointing out that the retinal image of some object will not directly carry any 
information about how far that object is from the observer. What is required is 
some implicit theory about how the distance of that object can be inferred from 
                                                     
55 Surprise here is to be distinguished in its information-theoretic sense from the ordinary 
meaning of the word. The information-theoretic quantity is sometime called surprisal, and it is 
a measure of how well predicted some set of data was by a model. If a set of data occurs that 
was very unlikely, given some model, then that set of data is very surprising (Cf., Clark 2013: 
196). 
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sequences of sensory states. Hohwy (2013: 13) gives another example of this 
which is meant to illustrate the same point:  
 
Consider the potentially identical sensory input from different objects 
such as a bicycle or a mere picture of a bicycle, or a whole bicycle 
occluded by a bush as opposed to detached bicycle parts strewn around 
a bush, or more outré possibilities such as it being an unusually well-
coordinated swarm of bees causing the sensory impression of a bicycle. 
 
There are two overall kinds of response to the problem of perception. These 
can be roughly characterized as a passive bottom-up story about perception 
against an active top-down story about perception. Let’s consider vision alone. 
Bottom-up accounts of visual perception in cognitive science take it to be a 
process of synthesis: feature detectors towards the “sensory end” of the 
organism generate information about basic properties of the environment 
which are concatenated in order to build up a richer and more global picture of 
the visual field. A bottom-up theory might suggest, for instance, that a three-
dimensional representation of the visual field is algorithmically constructed 
from lower-level feature detectors which reliably respond to highly specific 
features of the two-dimensional retinal image, like edges between regions of 
darkness and light. What we have here is the proposal that the brain creates a 
representation of the world by piecing together very many simple pieces of 
information into a complex picture; it is an atomistic approach to the problem 
of visual perception. 
 
 The alternative conception as proposed within the predictive processing 
framework is, by contrast, a holistic one. That idea is that the brain deals with 
noisy and ambiguous sensory input from the world by passing up information 
into higher centres only if it confounds predictions or prior beliefs about the 
visual input that is simultaneously being passed down. This top-down 
generation of predictions is driven by a hierarchical model of the causes of 
sensory input which is updated where it encounters prediction error. Visual 
perception is therefore theorized to be a largely top-down process in which the 
agent  actively attempts to predict its sensory states on the basis of a model of 
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the causes of those states. That is in stark contrast to a passive system which 
concatenates sensory information as it arrives. 
 
 There are a number of reasons to think that this top-down and 
knowledge driven picture of perception is more plausible than the bottom-up 
view. The first is the underdetermination of the hypothesis about the causes of 
sensory input by that sensory input itself. That is to point to the problem 
already discussed: that one set of sensory states is compatible with very many 
different hypotheses about the world. The second reason for its greater 
plausibility is a neuroanatomical one: there are very many more top-down 
neural pathways (that is, from higher brain regions and association cortices to 
sensory organs) than there are bottom-up neural pathways, and this is what we 
would expect to find if perception did indeed work by prediction error 
minimization. That is because prediction error is only passed forward when it 
is not explained away by higher level hypotheses. There are a range of 
neuroanatomical facts like these that cohere with the predictive processing 
framework, and so it seems plausible that the human brain actually implements 
an architecture of this kind.56 
 
 What makes the predictive processing theory of perception stand out 
among top-down theories of perception is that it is a Bayesian theory of 
perception. That means the theory states that perception is a process of 
statistical inference that is structured in a particular way. That “particular way” 
has three important features. First, it is model-based. That means that the 
inference from (sensory) states to the causes of those states is based on a model 
that generates predictions about future sensory states. The model is accurate to 
the extent that these predictions come out true, and it is inaccurate to the extent 
that they come out false. Second, the model in question is hierarchical. That 
means that inference from states to causes proceeds on a hierarchy of levels of 
spatial and temporal generality. Predictions at higher levels exert influence on 
what is inferred at subordinate levels, so that expectations about more 
ephemeral states of affairs are largely determined by expectations about more 
invariant states of affairs. Last, the way in which the model is updated in 
                                                     
56 For a survey of this range of neuroanatomical evidence, see Friston and Stephan (2007). 
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response to erroneous prediction – in other words, in response to prediction 
error – proceeds according to the norms of Bayesian inference. I will say a bit 
about these three features of the view in turn. 
 
FIGURE 3.1: SIMPLE GENERATIVE MODEL 
 
 
 A generative model of the causes of some set of data is a theory which 
generates predictions about future data. This can be visualized in a simplified 
form with the aid of  a simple model which is intended to predict population 
levels in a small town.57 Each point on the graph represents a different 
measurement; these data points are analogous to the “sensory states” in the 
predictive coding theory of perception. The line on the graph is the “generative 
model” (not yet hierarchical!) which is meant to explain current sensory states 
and to predict future ones. We call it generative because the direction of the 
line generates predictions about further data points, or future sensory states, or 
whatever – in this case, one can extrapolate from the direction of the line to 
predict future population levels. This is a very simple example, but it illustrates 
well what is meant by “generative model.” 
 
 A generative model is hierarchical if it predicts future states on the 
basis of a number of levels that represent causal depth, where causal depth is 
considered in terms of differences in spatiotemporal regularity and variance. In 
                                                     
57 I adapt this exegetical strategy from Hohwy (2013: 43-44), who uses the example of rainfall 
rather than population. 
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watching a movie, for example, we are given a series of changing scenes which 
are themselves composed of numerous shots; these shots are themselves 
composed with a particular mise-en-scène in mind. Though these lower level 
features of the film are variant and prone to change rapidly, the narrative which 
these lower level features compose endures through time in a way that those 
lower features do not. Except perhaps in a film with a plot twist, which 
generates prediction error with respect to our expectations of what is going to 
happen next. Hierarchical inference is thought to be structured in this way, with 
more invariant regularities informing the processing of lower level regularities 
that are more ephemeral. Conversely, lower level regularities can help revise 
our representations of the higher level regularities to the extent that they 
confound them. For example, for some sound I am trying to interpret, 
predictions at a low level of generality may involve what I expect to be going 
on in the next room over, while predictions at a higher level of generality may 
involve what I expect to occur in kitchens more generally. But if I hear snoring 
coming from the room, then I may want to revise my assumption that the room 
is a kitchen. 
 
 For some instance of perception, then, that perception will be driven by 
a multi-level prediction of sensory states based on contextual features of the 
current situation, and the prediction will be updated over time where it 
encounters prediction error signals that are fed back from the sensory organs. 
That is to say (in a nutshell) that perception is inference from some stimulation 
to the causes of that stimulation, given prior beliefs about those causes. This 
process of prediction and updating works according to the norms of Bayesian 
inference; that is, it is construed as a process of belief revision as this is 
formalized in Bayesian statistics. In explicating this process we can return to 
our population example above. Our prior beliefs are analogous to the plotted 
line in that example, which can be extrapolated in order to predict the 
population of the town in future years. Now, it may be that the population in 
the subsequent years is different from that predicted on the basis of the 
generative model. If that is so, then that new and surprising information 
generates prediction error. In order to account for this prediction error, the 
model will need to be updated. If it is not then we risk continuing to make 
erroneous predictions and encountering surprising information. That process of 
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updating the model proceeds through an application of Bayes’ rule, which can 
be expressed like this58: 
 
ܲሺ݄ȁ݁ሻ ൌ ܲሺ݁ȁ݄ሻܲሺ݄ሻܲሺ݁ሻ  
 
 What this means is as follows. The symbol h represents some 
hypothesis entertained by the agent. Hypotheses are generated from the model. 
So on our population example, the model is the plotted line itself and the 
hypothesis is the part of the extrapolated line that gives us an expectation for 
the population in some future year. The symbol e represents a piece of 
evidence, in this case, the actual population once that future year rolls around. 
The expression to the left of the equals sign is a conditional statement; it gives 
us the probability of the hypothesis assuming the existence of some piece of 
evidence e. That is called the posterior probability: it is a measure of the degree 
of belief we should hold for our hypothesis, given some new piece of relevant 
information. To the right of the equals sign are a number of expressions. Above 
the dividing line is the probability of the evidence given the truth of the 
hypothesis, and the probability of the hypothesis in general. The first is called 
the likelihood: it represents how probable the new information is, given our 
hypothesis about its causal origin. So, in a perceptual context, the probability 
of the sound of clanging pans next door would be quite likely if it were true 
that there was a kitchen next door. The second is called the prior belief: it is a 
measure of our degree of belief in some hypothesis in general – for example, 
that there is a kitchen in the next room. The expression below the dividing line 
is the probability of the piece of new information in general, though it is 
usually set out differently, and is intended to “normalize” the final result by 
ensuring it remains between the values of 0 and 1 (Hohwy 2013: 37). The 
updated probability of our hypothesis in light of Bayes’ rule is compared to 
competitor hypotheses and the highest of these is selected after updating. At 
                                                     
58 I give only a brief and colloquial overview here, which is sufficient for the purposes of the 
chapter. The mathematics that is used for updating in fully fledged predictive processing are 
much more complex for a number of reasons, not least because beliefs are represented by 
probability distributions. For a more sophisticated treatment I refer the reader to Hohwy (2013: 
34-37, 41-58), also Friston & Stephan (2007). 
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this point the posterior belief becomes the new prior for the agent. As Davies 
and Egan (2013: 695) put it, “today’s priors are yesterday’s posteriors.” 
 
  
 
 We get a more concrete formulation of how this rather spare framework 
might be implemented in Rao and Ballard’s (1999) much lauded paper on the 
way that the brain actively predicts the states of the retina. According to Rao 
and Ballard, these predictions comprise the representational content of 
perception, and this representational content is not some end-state resulting 
from the computation and synthesis of the retina’s actual states. They 
demonstrate the way that some such arrangement would work in the figure 
reproduced below. 
 
FIGURE 3.2. RAO & BALLARD (1999: 80) 
 
 What is being illustrated here is the way in which the predictive 
processing59 story might work for a specific and quite small part of the 
perceptual apparatus; that of the stage of visual perception closest to the retina. 
There are two kinds of connections here – feedforward or top-down 
connections, which extend from higher brain regions to lower regions 
(plausibly, from visual cortex V1 to the lateral geniculate nucleus and then to 
                                                     
59 Rao and Ballard label this process “predictive coding,” a term which has its origins in 
machine learning. Most treatments of the process that are pitched at a more general scope have 
begun to move away from this terminology (Cf., Clark 2013: n5). 
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“local image patches” on the retina); and feedback connections, which extend 
from lower to higher level areas. These feedback and feedforward connections 
interact on a number of hierarchical levels which are labelled PE in Rao and 
Ballard’s diagram. At each level, the prediction or prior belief that is feeding 
forward interacts with the prediction error signal which is feeding back, and 
either the prediction error is explained away by the prior hypothesis (there is no 
conflict, and the prediction error signal terminates) or the prediction is 
statistically updated in the Bayesian procedure that has just been discussed. 
 
 This leads us to a problem that demonstrates the incompleteness of the 
account that I’ve given so far. The problem is that if every piece of information 
(hypotheses and evidence) are treated equally when it comes to belief revision, 
then there is a significant chance that the belief revision will result in a model 
of the causes of sensory states that is “overfitted.” We can demonstrate this 
statistical concept by recourse again to the example of population growth. 
Imagine that we have a number of years of growth that follows a regular 
pattern, but on the day in 2014 that the population levels are sampled, there is a 
sporting event on that causes people from other areas to visit the town. That 
would give us a model like this, assuming the model is exponential: 
 
FIGURE 3.3: OVERFITTING 
 
 
 If this data point (the reading from 2014) is included in the model with 
the same weighting as the others then it will distort the model which will in 
turn generate erroneous predictions. The more overfitted a model is, the less 
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useful it becomes for generalizing from the original set of data. That is because 
it is based upon information that is not linked to the genuine causal regularity 
(or set of regularities) for which the model is a model. In our example, the 
measurement on that day in 2014 is what we call a “noisy” signal: it is 
distorted by information that is not relevant to the regularity of population 
growth. In that case the noise in question is the influx of people who have 
come in from out of town. A model on which every piece of new information is 
treated as certain would become so overfitted that it would be useless for 
prediction; there is typically uncertainty for every sensory state. (Note that in 
the original example, which appealed to a linear model, the line was plotted on 
a course between some data points – that is to say that it did not treat them as 
certain.) 
 
 The solution to this problem is in a value called “precision.” Precision 
is a quantity that encodes how reliable or uncertain some given signal is. What 
that means is that it is the quantity for which a high value separates genuine 
information from unreliable information or mere noise. That is to say that a 
prediction error signal which is encoded with high precision will be considered 
very reliable and indicative of something meaningful about the underlying 
causal process. Therefore, it is more likely that the agent’s prior belief will be 
updated on the basis of this error if the two are in conflict. On the other hand, 
prediction error with a  low precision is considered relatively unreliable and 
“noisy,” and it will be much less likely that it causes the agent’s prior beliefs to 
be revised. 
 
 Figure 3.4 demonstrates how a prior belief will be updated in response 
to sensory states of varying precisions, but it does so with probability 
distributions rather than discrete data points as in the previous examples. The 
topmost picture gives a baseline which can be compared to the second picture 
(which represents precise sensory states) and the third (which represents 
imprecise prior beliefs). In the second picture, the precise sensory state is at 
odds with the agent’s prior belief, and the sensory state is considered very 
reliable. It therefore causes a dramatic change in that agent’s model of the 
world, which is represented by the posterior belief after updating. We see a 
similar thing going on in the third picture: the imprecise or unreliable nature of 
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the prior belief means that it is updated to a greater extent than it otherwise 
would be. 
  
FIGURE 3.4: PRECISION (Adams et al. 2013: 2) 
 
 
 Notice that the way in which precision weighting is represented above 
is in a situation where we are dealing with probability distributions rather than 
bare data points. In this situation, there is uncertainty as to what is being 
represented by the prior belief or prediction error signal; the probability 
distribution is clustered over a number of possibilities. Precision here is a 
measure of how tightly the probabilities cluster around some point, and is 
visualized by the height and “skinniness” of the distribution. The above might 
be a representation, for instance, of a system like Rao and Ballard’s (1999), 
which is attempting to predict the location of points of light on some patch of 
the retina. We might imagine that the example of increased sensory precision 
takes place when conditions are good and the system is more willing to 
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consider new information reliable; we might consider the example of decreased 
prior precision to take place in a situation where the agent is not sure what it is 
looking at, and so has less knowledge by which to predict the location of those 
points of light in a top-down fashion. It is therefore more likely to take heed of 
prediction error. 
 
3.2.2. Active inference and the dark room problem 
 
 In “action-oriented predictive processing” (Clark 2013: 181) this 
Bayesian framework is extended to explain action as well as cognition. This 
extension of scope is often attributed to Friston (2005), but as Friston (2012) 
himself acknowledges the roots of this idea can be seen in previous thinkers – 
most famously in the work of Helmholtz (1971 [1878]), but there are similar 
ideas that have been discussed in phenomenology (e.g., Merleau-Ponty 1962). 
Helmholtz’s innovation is to describe the way in which an agent’s movement 
can be seen as constitutive of the way in which that agent perceives the world, 
because that action constitutes the sample of sensory information from which 
the agent can infer the causes of that information. One of the most important of 
these movements for perception is that of visual saccading, movement of the 
eyes around the visual field: 
 
In my work on physiological optics I have tried to explain how our 
knowledge of the field open to vision is gained from visual images 
experienced as we move our eyes, given that there are some perceptible 
differences of location on the retina among otherwise qualitatively 
similar sensations…with the eyes alone we can achieve rather precise 
and reliable comparisons of various lines and angles in the field of 
vision, provided that through the eyes’ normal movements the images 
of these figures can be formed quickly one after another on the retina. 
(Helmholtz 1971 [1878]: 382) 
 
Let’s return to the statistical example of population growth in order to get a 
start on elucidating this idea. The idea as applied to that example is this: not 
only can we better predict future levels of population on the basis of our model 
by updating the model in response to prediction error, but we can also predict 
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future levels of population more accurately by changing the way that we 
sample data. For example, we might find that we have been measuring 
population levels on days that give unhelpful results – for example, on the day 
when there were many people visiting from out of town. That gives us a data 
point that generates large quantities of prediction error, because it is far from 
what has been predicted by our generative model. But it does not make sense in 
a case like this to update our model in light of the faulty reading; rather, it 
would be better to change the way in which the reading was taken. That is to 
say, on this example, that we change our sampling methods in order to avoid 
taking readings on days that will give inaccurate data. We selectively sample 
the environment, based on prior beliefs about how reliable our samples are. 
 
 Likewise, this distinction between passive and active sampling – there 
placed in the context of empirical investigation – can be rehearsed in the 
context of mental function. On this view, the underlying process that drives 
both perception and action is prediction-error minimization. Now, on the view 
of perception as unconscious inference the way that perception proceeds is by 
generating predictions from a generative hierarchical model of the causes of 
sensory states, and updating this model where it encounters prediction error. 
The content of some perceptual item is not the sensory states themselves, but 
rather the inferred causes of those states. However, this is not the only way in 
which prediction error that is associated with the model given some set of data 
can be minimized. The agent can also minimize prediction error by changing 
the way in which it samples sensory states, and thereby increase the accuracy 
of the model. 
 
  One relatively non-controversial example of such a process which we 
have already alluded to is the way that the human eye saccades (moves rapidly 
between salient features) in order to take the entire visual field into view. 
Helmholtz (1971 [1878]) discusses this often: “We can…estimate the actual 
size and distance of objects which are not too far away from us with 
considerable accuracy by means of changing perspectives in our visual field…” 
Consider the previous perceptual problem posed to us by Hohwy: how to 
distinguish between a bike, a number of detached bike parts, a whole bicycle 
occluded by some other object, and so on. Getting the eyes to focus on 
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different places in the visual field will increase the sensory states from which 
the perceptual solution can be inferred. Animals with eyes that cannot saccade 
because they lack the appropriate muscles (like owls), tend to move their heads 
from left to right in order to achieve a similar result – these are called “head 
saccades” (e.g., Whitcurch & Takahashi 2006). 
 
 The proponents of action-oriented predictive processing want to extend 
the basic idea beyond visual saccades. The idea can be applied to 
proprioception, for example, and thereby used in order to understand ordinary 
movement. The explanation goes like this: the agent forms a prior belief to the 
effect that it has a sense of (say) its arm being in such-and-such a position, but 
because the belief is false it will encounter proprioceptive prediction error. In 
order to minimize this prediction error, the agent selectively samples its 
environment to produce the stream of sensory states that would be expected 
were the prior belief true. This involves moving its arm into such-and-such a 
position so that the proprioceptive sensory states are identical to the prior belief 
and so cease to generate prediction error. This active minimization of 
prediction error is called active inference. 
 
 Active inference can even be applied in understanding complex and 
goal-directed sequences of movements, like my going into the kitchen for a 
glass of water. A series of prior beliefs are formed to the effect that I will be in 
the kitchen drinking a glass of water, which will cascade down and generate 
predictions of all the associated perceptual states – the feeling of the glass in 
my hand, being able to see out the kitchen window above the sink, the feeling 
of the cold tiles underneath my feet, and so on. These prior beliefs are (at 
present) false, and so will encounter prediction error. That prediction error is 
minimized in the case of my action by the selective sampling of my 
environment such that those predictions come out true. This is how action is 
thought to work within the predictive processing framework. 
 
 It might be appropriate to make clear at this point exactly what is meant 
by “prior belief” in this context. There are two issues that need to be resolved. 
The simpler one has to do with the personal/sub-personal distinction. 
Obviously, the prior beliefs being relied upon in this theoretical formulation are 
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not most appropriately described on the level of the personal – rather, they are 
informational states of the brain that are best described in the sub-personal 
vocabulary of the predictive processing framework. They are “doxastic 
representations” in the way I have described earlier on or “b-reps” in the way 
that Jim Hopkins describes.60 But they are able to play a role in the 
psychodynamic explanation of symptoms in virtue of the link between personal 
and sub-personal explanation that we established in chapter one of this 
dissertation (see in particular section 1.3.2). 
 
 The second issue to be resolved has to do with how we distinguish 
beliefs and desires in this framework, if (according to the predictive processing 
framework) the direction of fit by which they are usually distinguished is not 
stark. A more accurate way of putting it would be as follows. First, in order to 
avoid personal/sub-personal confusion, we might distinguish between 
“doxastic states” and “motivational states” rather than “beliefs” and “desires.” 
The former are distinguished by the role that they play in the behaviour of the 
agent, and are the relevant theoretical concepts in the predictive processing 
framework. 
 
 The claim here is that all motivational states are doxastic states. 
However, some doxastic states are able to play a role analogous to desires in 
commonsense psychology in virtue of their being recalcitrant in the face of 
prediction error. What this means is that they are assigned more precision such 
that the agent will tend to selectively sample his environment such that these 
states come out true, rather than update these states in response to indications 
that they are not currently true. The claim is not therefore that there is no 
difference in direction of fit between doxastic and motivational representations, 
but rather that the manner in which this direction of fit is specified is such that 
it makes sense to consider the motivational state a species of doxastic state. 
 
 The way we understand action within the predictive processing 
framework leads to a significant issue which has to do with the nature of the 
model for which the agent is minimizing prediction error, given some set of 
                                                     
60 See section 2.1.3 of this dissertation. 
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data. This problem – the “dark room problem” (Friston, Thornton & Clark 
2012) – can be expressed by pointing out that prediction error can be related to 
surprise -- how surprising some set of sensory states is for an agent with a 
particular set of prior beliefs. The minimization of prediction error is therefore 
also the minimization of surprising sensory states, since surprising sensory 
states generate prediction error. The problem is then this. If the ultimate 
principle governing not only perception but also action is the need for the agent 
to minimize surprising states, then why don’t we find that all such agents are 
radically averse to novelty? That is, we might expect that an agent whose 
raison d’être is to minimize surprise seeks out an environment as free as 
possible from novel sensory input (for example, the “dark room” which gives 
this objection its name) and simply stay there until it dies from starvation. 
Minimizing sensory input tout court is surely one way if not the best way to 
minimize surprise, says this kind of critic. But that behaviour is not in keeping 
with our basic expectation that animal behaviour is more or less adaptive, most 
of the time; at the very least, we do not expect it to be suicidal. So the apparent 
entailment that biological agents are radically averse to novelty poses a 
problem for the claim that action of those agents is governed by drive towards 
prediction-error minimization. 
 
The appropriate response to the dark room problem is to point out that 
the agent is not only driven to minimize prediction error that issues from 
exteroceptive states (from the “special senses” like vision, hearing, and touch) 
but is also driven to minimize prediction error issuing from interoceptive states. 
Interoception is the name for the perception of the physiological status of the 
body, the “internal milieu.” Interoceptive states include states like hunger, 
thirst, and sexual drive. So the agent will not only be minimizing prediction 
error with respect to its environment, but also with respect to its own body. 
Now we can see that moving into the dark room will be a bad strategy for 
prediction error minimization because although this might minimize surprising 
input from  the environment it will not minimize surprising input from the 
body. That is why the agent cannot just minimize prediction error in a way that 
eliminates novelty; doing so will result in an increase in prediction error, 
because the internal milieu will deviate from expected states. Those states are 
expected in the sense that the generative model includes prior beliefs to do with 
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the physiological state of the body that are violated in episodes of hunger and 
thirst; i.e. during deviations from homeostasis. Here’s how the solution is set 
out by Andy Clark in his paper with Friston and Thornton: 
 
The free-energy principle relies on free energy (bounding surprise) 
being defined relative to a model. We must here understand “model” in 
the most inclusive sense, as combining interpretive disposition, 
morphology, and neural architecture, and as implying a highly tuned 
“fit” between the active, embodied organism and the embedding 
environment. The dark-room scenario cannot obtain unless staying in 
the dark room is itself the way to minimize surprise relative to the 
expectations implicitly defined by that entire, and importantly niche-
reflecting, model. That means that for creatures like us, the dark room is 
simply not an attractor. (Friston, Thornton & Clark 2012: 6) 
 
We already found this kind of solution to the dark room problem implicit in the 
first section of Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology. The organism 
cannot entirely remove itself from all excitation by removing itself from 
stimuli, since some of those stimuli are endogenously generated. That is to say 
that “flight from the stimulus” is a poor adaptive strategy when it is universally 
applied. From a historical point of view the presence of this conceptual issue in 
Freud’s work is not so unusual, since there are remarkable parallels between 
the Project and later connectionist modelling (Glymour 1991), and those kinds 
of models – to the extent that they operate through the reduction of quantity – 
are bound to run into these kinds of problems when applied to action as well as 
perception. 
 
3.2.3. Priors and pro-attitudes 
 
 There is another interesting feature of action-oriented processing which 
I have not yet discussed, and it is one which leads to another objection against 
this general way of looking at the relationship between action, cognition, and 
perception. That interesting feature is that it might seem to make pro-attitudes 
obsolete in the explanation of action. That is because the explanatory work 
formerly performed by pro-attitudes is taken up by prior beliefs which are 
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stubbornly held in the face of prediction error and for the sake of which the 
brain selectively samples the environment. 
 
The problem that this leads to is that there seems to be a clear 
distinction between beliefs about the future and pro-attitudes towards some 
state of affairs, and intuition suggests that these sometimes (if not often!) 
diverge. That must mean that the distinction is required to explain action, and 
that beliefs alone will not do. For example, it may be that I do not expect to 
win the lottery but would very much like to win the lottery. It might seem 
impossible to express this important phenomenological difference if I cannot 
distinguish between prior beliefs and pro-attitudes. Here’s how Gershmann and 
Daw (2012: 306) express the issue: 
 
Although the free-energy principle appears at the least to be a very 
useful formulation for exposing the computational parallelism between 
perceptual and decision problems, the more radical manoeuvre of 
treating them both as literally optimizing a single objective function is 
harder to swallow […] Should the first amphibian out of water dive 
back in? If a wolf eats deer not because he is hungry but because he is 
attracted to the equilibrium state of his ancestors, would a sudden 
bonanza of deer inspire him to eat only the amount to which he is 
accustomed? How can he adapt if an ice age arises, or a new 
competitive dear-eating predator? Should a person immersed in the 
“statistical bath” of poverty her entire life refuse a winning lottery, as 
this would necessitate transitioning from a state of high equilibrium 
probability to a rare one? 
 
This criticism can be seen as closely related to the dark room problem, in that it 
uses the fact that biological agents sometimes seek out novel situations in order 
to challenge the way that the free energy principle and predictive processing 
tends to equate surprising states with ones that the agent is out to avoid.  
 
 The appropriate response to this particular criticism is to remind the 
critic that prediction-error minimization occurs over a hierarchical and richly 
layered model of the causes of sensory states – that is to say that prediction-
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error minimization occurs over levels that encode hypotheses at ever increasing 
levels of temporal and spatial generality. This means that there must be 
situations in which prediction error is being minimized at some level in the 
hierarchy and not at others. Consider the example given by Gershmann and 
Daw, that of the person who refuses a lottery ticket in order to avoid a 
surprising state of affairs. Given that winning the lottery is very unlikely, 
accepting the winnings would put the agent in a statistically unlikely state. We 
should therefore suppose according to the free energy principle – says this 
critic – that people tend to avoid winning the lottery. But this is not the case, so 
the free energy principle seems false. That seeming falseness only holds, 
however, if we neglect the hierarchical nature of free energy minimization. We 
might suppose, for instance, that the agent has strong priors to the effect that 
she is in a well-fed state and that these are held with a higher precision than the 
prior belief that winning the lottery is very unlikely. Given that the prior belief 
of being well-fed implies other beliefs concerning the acquisition of resources, 
et cetera, it seems as though there is not necessarily any contradiction between 
that lottery win having low prior probability and it being likely that the agent 
will accept the lottery win. 
 
 We might also point out that action-oriented predictive processing is a 
very skeletal theory which has a lot of room for internal differentiation; 
differentiation, for example, with respect to different kinds of prior beliefs. 
There seems to be a move towards this in Friston’s own identification of 
“control states,” whose role is assigned in virtue of their having unusually high 
levels of precision and which are meant to be those priors whose direction of fit 
is that of pro-attitudes under the classical model of action (Friston et al. 2013: 
3ff). This means that we can continue to make a distinction between beliefs and 
pro-attitudes in a rough and ready way. The only way in which pro-attitudes 
are made obsolete is that they interact with beliefs in much the same way that 
beliefs themselves do, on the predictive processing framework; that is to say 
that they interact with beliefs through the Bayesian inference that is the engine 
of that framework. 
 
 That in fact gives us a solution to one of our metapsychological 
problems. Recall in the previous chapter that one of the problems with the sub-
132 
 
intentional analysis of wish-fulfilment was its underspecification – that is to 
say, its lack of a causal mechanism which would explain how wish-fulfilment 
is possible. One of the explananda here was the way in which a frustrated 
desire might directly generate a belief which then pacifies it. It’s worth again 
citing Ditto (2009: 28), who points out that “[…] motivational accounts […] 
seemed to provide little guidance regarding how underspecified motivational 
constructs such as the need for “self-esteem” maintenance might alter judgment 
outcomes.” This is also one of Pataki’s (2014) criticisms of the sub-intentional 
theory of wish-fulfilment; that is to say, that it is missing a causal story about 
how motivational states can cause belief. But after explication of the preceding 
framework for understanding the mind we should see that there is no great 
puzzle about how desires could influence belief formation within that 
framework. That is because desires are construed as prior beliefs of a certain 
kind, and with a certain origin. More specifically, they can be seen to influence 
beliefs through the usual Bayesian channels: beliefs are brought into line with 
desires insofar as the latter are considered prior beliefs, and insofar as prior 
beliefs exert an influence over the formation of posterior beliefs. 
 
 Note that this isn’t all we need in order to give a sub-personal 
specification of the mechanisms of wish-fulfilment. In section 2.4 of this thesis 
I attempted to show that there are a number of metapsychological 
commitments that would need to be underwritten in order to give a satisfactory 
specification of this sort. What the overlap between priors and pro-attitudes 
demonstrates is that there is a theory in the offing for how beliefs could be 
influenced by motivation. But we have not yet demonstrated why or how this 
process might occur. So let me give a recap of what I need to do to have 
discharged some of the metapsychological commitments of the previous 
chapter. 
 
 Those commitments which are relevant for this chapter are those which 
concern the circumstances under which wish-fulfilment occurs. The first 
question to be answered is this: how is it that certain motivations come to be 
satisfied through wish-fulfilment, rather than through rational action?  One way 
to put this issue is like this: we have specified how it is that motivational states 
can directly cause doxastic states, on the occasions on which they in fact do 
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directly cause them. But we have not yet specified why this might occur in 
preference to rational action. The second question to be answered is this: how 
are we to distinguish between wish-fulfilment that does not result in 
diagnosable psychopathology (e.g., ordinary wishful thinking and other 
varieties of irrationality) and wish-fulfilment that does in fact result in 
psychopathological states? 
 
3.3. Psychodynamic mechanisms in the free energy view of the brain 
 
 It seems to me – and to the authors I am about to discuss (Hopkins 
2012; Mathys 2013) – that the predictive processing framework affords us the 
resources in order to answer these two questions. Let me sketch the overall 
picture that I will be arguing for here, before I go on to show how it might be 
instantiated in terms of predictive processing. The motivational states that are 
candidates for representation in wish-fulfilling symptoms (rather causing 
rational action, as would ordinarily be the case) are those which are repressed, 
which means that they are not consciously available to the agent. The wish-
fulfilling symptoms constitute a return of the repressed, in which these 
motivational states generate wish-fulfilments which then temporarily pacify 
those states. The introduction of repression and its characteristic failure allows 
us to distinguish between desires that are apt for satisfaction through rational 
action and desires that are prone to pacification through wish-fulfilment. 
 
 Now, why is it that wish-fulfilment can result both in relatively benign 
irrationality as well as serious psychopathology? That seems to be a question 
that requires answering, if wish-fulfilment is considered to be a causal factor in 
both cases. What is it that distinguishes them? The answer to this question will 
hinge upon the idea that there is a developmental continuum along which 
wishful distortion of reality is gradually replaced by a process of learning in 
which the agent comes to recognize the world as it really is. Particularly severe 
distortions of reality can be conceptualized as a regression back along this 
developmental continuum. This idea was sometimes taken quite literally as a 
theory of infant development by Freud, though there is evidence that he had 
misgivings about doing so: “The primary narcissism of children which we have 
assumed and which forms one of the postulates of our theories of the libido, is 
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less easy to grasp by direct observation than to confirm by inference from 
elsewhere.” (Freud 1914: 90) I will be suggesting that we can avail ourselves 
of this idea without committing ourselves to the hypothesis that it actually 
describes developmental stages in the life of the child, which has been 
challenged on sound empirical grounds (e.g., Rochat 2012). 
 
3.3.1. Binocular rivalry as a model for “repression” 
 
 Binocular rivalry is a subjective visual effect that can be elicited under 
a particular set of experimental conditions (Hohwy, Roepstorff & Friston 
2008). A subject is presented a different stimulus to each eye, resulting in a 
different image being projected onto the retina in either eye. This is usually 
performed with a specialized set of goggles which is fitted so that there is one 
image (say, a face) that is displayed to the left eye and another image (say, a 
house) that is displayed to the right eye. The visual field of each eye is 
dominated by the image with which it is presented, and there is no overlap 
between each field. What the subject will experience when the goggles are in 
place  is an alternation between the two images. That is to say that the 
experimental participant  might first perceive a house for a few seconds, then a 
face, and then the house again, and so on. There will also be a brief period 
between the alternation in which the previous image will be obscured by the 
new one “breaking through.”  
 
FIGURE 3.5: BINOCULAR RIVALRY (Hohwy, Roepstorff & Friston 2008: 
693) 
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 The visual effect of binocular rivalry has a specific explanation under 
the predictive processing framework. That explanation is as follows. First, it is 
claimed that each of the images presented to the participant represent a 
different hypothesis for the total visual data that the participant has available – 
that is the image of the face on one eye and the image of the house on the 
other. What the brain must then do is decide between these two rival 
hypotheses. Neither of the hypotheses has an immediate advantage over the 
other when it comes to likelihood or prior probability. What that means is that 
both of the hypotheses equally well explain the data (more or less), and that 
each of these hypotheses is equally probable in independence from that data 
(more or less). Furthermore, the overall model of the causes of sensory states 
contains a strong prior belief – a “hyperprior” (Hohwy, Roepstorff & Friston 
2008: 691) – to the effect that it is impossible for two objects to simultaneously 
occupy the same stretch of space; that is, it is a priori extremely unlikely. What 
occurs, then, is that one hypothesis (e.g., the face) will be momentarily selected 
over the other. Now, while the selection of this hypothesis minimizes or 
“explains away” the prediction error that is generated by the data that it is able 
to accommodate, the data that conflicts with the selected hypothesis continues 
to drive upwards through bottom-up pathways and push for explanation. The 
strength of that prediction error signal eventually causes the alternative and 
more or less equally likely hypothesis to be selected (e.g., the house), and then 
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the same upwards driving occurs with respect to the prediction error from the 
data that is now being ignored. This instability continues indefinitely, and it is 
what causes the binocular rivalry effect. 
 
 Jim Hopkins (2012) has suggested that the process that binocular 
rivalry demonstrates – that of hypothesis competition within a single 
overarching model – plays a key role in the psychodynamic phenomena that 
are investigated by clinicians. More specifically, he suggests that it provides an 
idea of what the inhibition of ideas that the psychodynamic tradition posits – 
the notion of repression – might look like within the predictive processing 
framework. He also thinks that it can help us account for what has been called 
the “return of the repressed.” I discussed this in the previous chapter in my 
section on the “fragility” of wish-fulfilment. That fragility consists in the fact 
that defensive solutions to emotional conflict (including repression) tend to 
fail, in the sense that the pacification of that desire which the wish-fulfilment is 
meant to prevent becoming conscious can cause symptoms which are the result 
of properties of the desire which are not accommodated in the wish-fulfilment. 
In the case of Mr R, for example, the patient’s hatred of his father is 
incompatible with the best current model of himself as being the “best of 
friends” with his father, but continues to exist as error signal and so is 
accommodated in the overall model by means of symptoms like his “great 
obsessive fear.” Here’s how Hopkins (2012: 242) puts it: 
 
[…] Bayesian conflict-suppressed unconscious sensory input as we find 
in the face/house case has a role closely analogous to that of material 
subject to Freudian repression, in the sense that it is perpetuated (as 
error signal) by being rendered unconscious. This entails that (so long 
as it is active) the input presses upward for conscious representation, 
and hence remains in causal and representational conflict  with the 
dominant conceptual model. 
 
This mechanistic account seems to instantiate the relevant features of 
repression: it explains to us how it is that some representations come to be 
unavailable to conscious awareness, and it also explains to us how it is that 
despite being so unavailable these representations are nonetheless able to exert 
137 
 
an influence over the behaviour and mental economy of the agent, as the brain 
struggles to accommodate the resulting prediction error in the overall best 
model of the causes of sensory input. 
 
 However, I think that Hopkins’s account leaves us with the following 
questions. First, if this account of repression is correct, then why doesn’t Mr 
R’s hierarchical generative model simply update in order to accommodate both 
of these images of his father – both as close friend, as well as punitive tyrant? 
That is to say, why doesn’t the brain simply create a new hypothesis which 
could accommodate the fact that Mr R perceives his father in both ways? If it 
could do this, then this would seem to make the posit of repression redundant. 
There are two answers that can be given to this question. The first answer 
Hopkins (2012: 245) gives himself. This is that – like in the case of binocular 
rivalry – the two competing models are prevented from being accommodated 
together in virtue of a prior belief to the effect that it cannot be that both of 
them are true. That is the “hyperprior” that the authors of the binocular rivalry 
paper suggest has content to the effect that two objects cannot occupy the same 
space at the same time: 
 
Perceptual selection of a unitary hypothesis follows naturally from the 
predictive coding. This is because, a priori, the brain has learnt that 
there can be only one cause of sensory input at the same place and time. 
This generic constraint (a “hyperprior”) reflects the way we sample the 
visual world; binocular vision, in primates, rests upon both eyes 
foveating the same part of visual space. (Hohwy, Roepstorff & Friston 
2008: 691) 
 
The idea is therefore that in the case of Mr R, as well, there is an 
incompatibility between the model of his father as tyrant and the model of his 
father as friend, though certainly this incompatibility must probably be far less 
basic than that which Hohwy and colleagues identify in their discussion of 
binocular rivalry.  
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The second answer that we can give to the question is more simple, and 
this is that ideally it will so update during psychotherapeutic treatment.61  It 
may be in some cases that the emotional conflict in question runs too deep, but 
the goal of treatment in these cases is to allow the patient to accommodate his 
emotional ambivalence towards his father to be consciously avowable by him, 
rather than denied. Hopkins (2012: 261) also alludes to this fact:  
 
[There] was a turning point in the analysis, which apparently enabled 
the patient to revise his image of his father, and so to continue to love 
him while accepting that he had thought him terrifying and dangerous 
as a child, and perhaps wanted to hurt him in consequence. 
 
 
That leaves us with this question: what is the nature of the hyperprior which 
prevents the incompatible representations of Mr R’s father from occupying the 
same overall model, and which is apparently revised to some extent in the case 
of a successful treatment?  Hopkins is ambivalent on this point. On the one 
hand, he identifies the hyperprior in question with the Freudian concept of 
“superego.” That concept is meant to denote an internalised representation of 
early relationships which is the source of conscience and moral guilt. Hopkins 
(2012: 245) claims that “[…] the underlying generative model, at the same 
time acting as ego, was also acting as a kind of conservative conceptual 
superego, whose insistence on adherence to prior modes of thought prevented 
(it in its role as) the ego from employing a concept framed for this new case.” 
On the other hand, however, he also seems to want to identify this 
representation of early relationships as one of the competing hypotheses in the 
rivalry, which is not itself the hyperprior. 
 
 There is something unsatisfactory about this answer. The first reason 
for this is the seeming equivocation between the model of father-as-friend as 
hyperprior and the model of father-as-friend as one of the competing 
hypotheses. It cannot be both. The second reason for this is because it seems as 
                                                     
61 I am agnostic as to whether the best treatment in this case would necessarily be 
psychodynamic, but certainly the psychodynamic insight about his emotional ambivalence 
seems to be a necessary condition for an informed treatment of his case.  
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though there is something of a disanalogy between the hyperprior in the case of 
binocular rivalry (the inability for two objects to occupy the same space), and 
the putative hyperprior in the case of Mr R. The hyperprior in this latter case 
Hopkins (2012: 259) identifies with Mr R’s model of him and his father “as 
having always been affectionate best friends.” But why would this prior be so 
recalcitrant to change, such that it is the cause of the repression of Mr R’s 
incompatible hostility towards his father? In the case of binocular rivalry, we 
can well imagine why it is that we have a hyperprior to the effect that two 
objects cannot occupy the same space; it is unlikely that anyone has ever 
observed such a thing. But in the case of Mr R, it seems much less clear why 
the representation of his father as a friend should be similarly recalcitrant; 
fathers and sons fight all the time, especially in adolescence. 
 
 I think that we can supplement Hopkins’s conception of repression in 
order to give a more satisfactory answer to this question. The answer which I 
am proposing has its origins in suggestions by Mathys (2013) to the effect that 
certain psychiatric phenomena should be understood in terms of complexity 
reduction. With the introduction of this notion, we can distinguish between 
generative models that can tolerate the conflict between competing 
representations of attachment figures, and generative models that cannot 
perform that task. And we can do this without falling back on what I have 
claimed is a disanalogy between these competing representations and that of 
the hyperprior in the case of binocular rivalry. It is to the notion of complexity 
reduction that I now turn. 
 
3.3.2. Complexity reduction as a model for “regression” 
 
 We can explicate the notion of complexity reduction in the context of 
psychiatric disorder by beginning from Carhart-Harris and Friston’s (2010: 
1276) suggestion that psychotic patients “may develop delusions as a 
compromise strategy for containing the increase in free energy” and that “from 
the free-energy perspective, withdrawal, psychomotor poverty and delusional 
thinking may be last resorts for someone who finds everything surprising and 
unpredictable.” This suggestion that the withdrawal from reality in acute 
psychosis is a compensatory mechanism has recently been developed in more 
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detail by Mathys (2013), who wishes to develop in the free energy framework 
the idea that there is a psychodynamic aspect to delusion which should play a 
role in its explanation. 
 
 One prerequisite for understanding the proposal is an acquaintance with 
current work on schizophrenia within the free energy framework (e.g., Adams 
et al. 2013; Hohwy 2013, chapter 7). The explanation of the psychotic state is a 
failure to attenuate (i.e., reduce the precision of) prediction error. What this 
means is that the schizophrenic agent cannot distinguish noisy sensory states 
from states which genuinely signal an underlying cause, and so over-estimates 
the reliability of all his sensory states. The evidence on which this claim is 
based include situations in which the schizophrenic agent has more accurate 
perception than the non-schizophrenic agent does: firstly, there are certain 
visual illusions like the hollow mask illusion to which the schizophrenic agent 
is immune (Dima et al. 2009); secondly, the schizophrenic agent is also better 
at responding to rapid and erratic changes in direction when visually tracking 
objects in an experimental setting (Adams et al. 2013: 15-16). It is also thought 
that dopamine is important in the regulation of precision assignments (Friston 
et al. 2012), and it has been known for some time now that schizophrenia is 
closely associated with dopamine dysregulation (e.g., Frith & Friston 2013). 
 
 Now, Mathys’s argument is based upon the way in which the reduction 
of free energy within some generative model, and given some particular set of 
data, can be decomposed as a trade-off between accuracy and complexity. That 
is to say that the free energy of some model is a function of these two 
quantities, where accuracy is a measure of how closely the predictions of the 
model explain  away prediction error and where complexity is a measure of 
how many parameters are needed in order to proceed with that explanation.62 
What is meant by the reduction of free energy being a trade-off between these 
two quantities is that they cannot both be reduced while still minimizing free 
energy. That is because an increase in accuracy will tend to cause an increase 
                                                     
62 Jim Hopkins has suggested in conversation that one good example of the way that model 
complexity works is in astronomy, with the comparison of the Ptolemaic and Copernican 
models of the solar system. The Copernican model is simpler because it requires less 
parameters, unlike the Ptolemaic model which infamously requires the posit of epicycles in 
order to accurately predict the movement of the planets. 
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in complexity, and increasing complexity also increases the free energy of the 
model. 
 
 Think of it in this way: if there are a number of data points and we wish 
to give a model that can be used to explain them and predict new ones, then 
often the best model will be one in which not all of the data points are taken 
into account. That is to say that the best theory will often be the more 
parsimonious one. That is because the aim of the model is to reveal the 
underlying causal regularities which created those data points, not necessarily 
to fit them all to a single pattern. These are not the same, because some of the 
data points may be noisy and so often the best model will not match those data 
points exactly. Fitting them all to an excessively “accurate” pattern will 
overcomplicate the theory with unnecessary parameters and make it difficult to 
generalize the theory to predict new data. This corresponds to the phenomenon 
we examined in section 3.2.2 under the name of “overfitting.” 
 
 The idea with respect to schizophrenia is that the sudden increase in 
model accuracy which occurs as a result of the failure to attenuate prediction 
error leads to a consequent increase in complexity. That is to say that the 
schizophrenic begins to treat noisy sensory states as genuine signal, which 
leads to a model of the causes of sensory states that is far more complex – 
overfitted – than that in normal agents. This leads to an increase in free energy 
of that model which the schizophrenic agent is driven to reduce. However, the 
only way in which free energy can now be minimized is through the reduction 
of complexity, since the inability to attenuate prediction error makes the 
reduction of the excessive accuracy impossible. 
 
Another way to colloquially define complexity in this context is the 
extent to which the prior beliefs of some model need to be updated in order to 
successfully predict new information: “Complexity is the difference between 
posterior and prior beliefs. Complexity reports the degree to which prior beliefs 
have to be abandoned to predict sensory samples accurately.” (Hobson & 
Friston 2012: 89) If a higher complexity means that prior beliefs are more 
likely to be updated, then, it seems that in a model with lower complexity prior 
beliefs will be less likely to change. Excessive complexity reduction, like that 
142 
 
in schizophrenia and perhaps other dopamine-based psychopathologies, will 
result in priors exerting an undue influence over belief formation. This seems 
to match well with recent discoveries about dreaming. That is to say, it has 
recently been put forward by Hobson and Friston (2012) that one of the 
functions of dreaming is to reduce complexity in the generative hierarchical 
model.  
 
A good model has low complexity and only updates a small number of 
parameters to provide a parsimonious explanation for observed data 
[…] Crucially, prior beliefs about the model’s parameters can be 
regarded as being encoded by the presence or absence of synaptic 
connections in the brain. That means that complexity can be suppressed 
by removing redundant synaptic connections and can proceed in the 
absence of sensory data during sleep. In other words, the brain can 
continue improving its generative model by reducing its complexity 
without any new sensory information. (Hobson & Friston 2012: 89) 
 
The logical endpoint of complexity reduction in a generative hierarchical 
model of the causes of input is, as Mathys (2013) explains, a model which is 
the cause of all its own data, and which therefore cannot be surprised by any of 
that data. This is the infamous “primary narcissism” of Freud’s, though Mathys 
has appealed to the work of Sándor Ferenczi (1952) in pitching the notion. That 
is presumably in part  because Ferenczi is one of the first to see the distinction 
between the narcissistic state and the reality-focused state as one on a 
spectrum, rather than one which is sharply defined. That would fit somewhat 
better with the idea that Mathys seems to have in mind. Ferenczi discusses the 
regression towards this state as involving a breakdown in the ability of the 
agent to recognize the boundaries between events in the world that he brings 
about and events in the world that he has no control over; the regression to the 
narcissistic state is regression to a state in which the agent overestimates the 
power of his words and activities, and cannot distinguish between wished-for 
and actual reality. 
 
 Ferenczi’s example of this phenomena are varied, as are Freud’s. One 
of these is the wish-fulfilment through the hallucination of satisfaction that 
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Freud (1895: 219) posits in the child; another is the “magical thinking” that one 
sees in the classical reports of obsessional neurosis. Of the latter, we might 
point to Mr R’s compulsions to irrational and ritualistic action, which he 
seemed to think would reverse the effects of his great obsessive fear and other 
such hostile thoughts: “The patient has to think of certain magical formulas, or 
carry out a certain action; otherwise a great misfortune will befall this or that 
person (mostly a near relative).” (Ferenczi 1952: 215) In both of these cases, 
the common link is the idea that one can directly influence the world just 
through thought; that is, it is a confusion between wished-for and actual reality. 
In a word, it is wish-fulfilment. And it seems that the notion of regression as 
mechanistically realized in complexity reduction gives us a notion in order to 
understand how cognition could be wish-fulfilling to a lesser or greater extent. 
 
So what’s the upshot of all this? I think it is this. The problem I claimed 
to have identified in Hopkins’s (2012) mechanistic specification of the 
psychodynamic notion of repression was an ambiguity with respect to the 
recalcitrance of the conceptual model which is selected in preference to the 
repressed contents. Hopkins claims that it is recalcitrant on account of its being 
a hyperprior in the manner of that specified in the predictive processing 
treatment of binocular rivalry, but it is unclear why a model of early 
relationships would have this extraordinary recalcitrance (high precision) as 
one of its properties. My suggestion here is that we would be better off to 
understand the recalcitrance of the dominant conceptual model in terms of 
complexity reduction. What that means is that the dominant model is less likely 
to be updated in a less complex model; this yields the conservatism that 
Hopkins (2012: 245) is right to point out, but it gives it a less ambiguous place 
in the overall picture. 
 
The concept of regression qua complexity reduction also provides us a 
loose criterion by which to distinguish between ordinary and 
psychopathological cases of wish-fulfilment. Roughly, pathological cases of 
wish-fulfilment are more likely to occur under circumstances where the 
generative hierarchical model of the causes of sensory states is unable to 
normally assign precisions and so engages in an excessive complexity 
reduction. This would presumably be in cases where that inability to normally 
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assign precisions is caused by dopamine dysregulation. Moreover, 
understanding regression in terms of complexity reduction has the very 
welcome benefit that we are no longer required to literally understand it in 
terms of developmental stages, as it has been conceptualized in classical 
psychoanalysis (e.g., Ferenczi 1952). That would commit us to far more than 
we are entitled to claim, because there are good empirical reasons to believe 
that the developmental theory of primary narcissism is unlikely to be true. 
Specifically, there is evidence to suggest that infants have no problem 
distinguishing between self and other at birth (e.g., Rochat 2012). 
 
3.4. Concluding remarks 
 
 Here, then, is the picture that we have sketched with respect to our first 
and second metapsychological commitments – the first of these concerning the 
ability of motivations to influence doxastic states, and the second of these 
concerning the circumstances under which such influence is likely to occur. 
With respect to the first commitment, we can see that within the predictive 
processing framework there is a mechanistic problem with respect to 
motivations having the ability to influence doxastic states. That is because 
motivational states interact with doxastic states within the same Bayesian 
machinery that other doxastic states do; that is to say that they are a kind of 
prior belief with a direction of fit and phenomenology that is characteristic of 
motivational states. 
 
 The situation with the second metapsychological commitment is more 
complex. As I mentioned earlier, giving an account of the circumstances under 
which wish-fulfilment occurs requires us to give an account of the following 
things: first, how to differentiate between ordinary motivational states and 
motivational states that are pacified through wish-fulfilment, and secondly, a 
criterion by which to differentiate normal and pathological wish-fulfilment. 
The first of these requirements, I have argued, can be met by Hopkins’s theory 
of repression as Bayesian hypothesis inhibition. The second of these can be 
met by Mathys’s theory of regression as Bayesian complexity reduction. Both 
of these conceptual innovations demonstrate how we can make sense of 
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psychodynamic phenomena within the context of predictive processing and 
free energy reduction. 
 
There is an interesting conceptual relationship between “Mathysian” 
regression and “Hopkinsian” repression that I have not yet explored. That 
relationship consists in the fact that a less complex model will be less able to 
tolerate conflict. In a more complex model of some set of data, incompatible 
data can be made to cohere by the making of distinctions between them. For 
example, and in considering the case of Mr R, a more complex understanding 
of the relationship that he had with his father would allow him to realize that he 
both loved and hated his father, but that these incompatible emotions stemmed 
from different sources of experience: the latter from his remembered 
experiences growing up with his father, and the former from his repressed 
experiences of his father as a punitive figure. (And indeed, this kind of self-
understanding is what many analysts think that psychodynamic psychotherapy 
aims at.) 
 
 It therefore seems that, to the extent that more complex models of the 
world can accommodate hypotheses that are in conflict, a less complex model 
of the world will not be able to do so. That will mean that there is more data 
that the overall model cannot account for, and which will generate error signal. 
On the level of our clinical vocabulary, that means that we will see more 
symptoms that are explained in terms of the “return of the repressed”; that is, 
symptoms which give representation to prediction error whose source is 
alternative hypotheses which are incompatible with the best current model. 
This is an important point, because it allows us to draw the link between the 
complexity of the model and its relative stability; we might suppose that 
simpler models are less stable with respect to the way in which they can 
accommodate information that is in conflict with the dominant conceptual 
model. 
 
 Now, all this mechanistic talk may seem a bit “cold” in light of the kind 
of phenomena that are the object of psychodynamic explanation. We have 
established the mechanism by which wish-fulfilment can occur, but we have 
not yet given a specification of what is involved in those internal sources of 
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excitation. That is to say, we have not yet given any story about the priors in 
particular that are involved in pathological wish-fulfilment. That is because the 
role of emotions in this story has not yet been appropriately specified. That is 
the role of the next chapter, in which I discuss Panksepp’s (e.g., 1998) work on 
the subcortical emotion systems, their relationship with cognition, and suggest 
that these are good candidates to fill in the story about recalcitrant priors that is 
implicit in the mechanistic account of wish-fulfilment that I have given thus 
far. Bringing the Pankseppian emotion systems into the picture in this way will 
later allow us to have a better understanding of the role that the emotions are 
playing in AHP, which range from feelings of profound loss to those of savage 
hatred. It will also allow us to see how these are related to the doxastic 
pathologies that are the usual focus of discussion of AHP in the literature. 
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4. Drives, priors, and the opacity of wish-fulfilment 
 
4.1. What are the drives, and what do they do? 
 4.1.1. Opacity and the failure of the censorship hypothesis 
 4.1.2. The drive-conflict hypothesis 
 4.1.3. Panksepp’s emotion systems 
 4.1.4. Objections and replies 
4.2. Accommodating drives within the free energy framework 
 4.2.1. Pankseppian emotions as sets of prior beliefs 
 4.2.2. Conflict resolution and the opacity of wish-fulfilment 
4.3. Concluding remarks 
  
 In the previous chapter I made a start on meeting the challenge 
articulated by Ditto (2009), and which I have dubbed the “no plausible 
mechanism” challenge. This is a challenge that we are obliged to meet as soon 
as we endorse the sub-intentional analysis of wish-fulfilment that I explicated 
in chapter two. This challenge stems from the underspecified nature of that 
sub-intentional analysis, which explains irrational symptoms as being 
generated from frustrated desires, but provides no causal mechanism by which 
this generation could occur. The sub-intentional analysis requires us to give a 
story with three parts: first, we need to explain how it is that desires and other 
motivational states can directly give rise to wish-fulfilling representations; 
secondly, we need to explain the circumstances under which these desires tend 
to generate wish-fulfilling representations; and third, we need to explain the 
opacity of the way those representations are able to pacify these desires.  
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the free energy framework as 
endorsed by Karl Friston and his collaborators could get us part of the way to 
providing these three things. More specifically, I suggested that it could help us 
see how the first and the second of these things can be given a mechanistic 
specification. In Freud’s original Project for a Scientific Psychology, and in 
later works, his theorization of action and perception in terms of free energy 
reduction allowed him to suggest that the mind might fall back upon (fictive) 
perception as a strategy to minimize free energy in circumstances where action 
is inhibited or impossible. That is in contrast to the view in classical cognitive 
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science where the relationship between perception, cognition, and action are 
conceptualized on an input-output model. That classical model conceptualizes 
mental function in stages: sensory information is transformed into 
representations, which are cognitively manipulated to generate knowledge, 
which then guides action.63 If we understand perception in this isolated way 
then it becomes very hard to see why perception would deviate from veridical 
representation of the environment under the influence of motivational states. 
 
On the quasi-sensorimotor model that is implicit in Freud (1895), and 
on the genuinely sensorimotor one that is explicit in Friston (2005), things are 
rather different from the classical view. Perception and action are two ongoing 
and simultaneous modes by which the organism minimizes excitation; on 
Friston’s theory (which, after all, is the one I am endorsing) this excitation is 
construed as prediction error, and both of these modes are defined in terms of 
prediction error minimization. That change has interesting consequences for 
the way we understand the predictive representations of the world on the basis 
of which perception and action proceeds. Specifically, it entails that the 
direction of fit associated with some predictive representation – where direction 
of fit is what distinguishes beliefs and desires – is not an essential property of 
that representation, but is an accidental property associated with how 
recalcitrant the representation is in the face of prediction error. That means that 
the distinction between beliefs and pro-attitudes is a fluid one. Jakob Hohwy 
(2013: 28) puts this quite nicely: 
 
What makes the desire for a muffin a desire and not a belief is just its 
direction of fit. Both are expectations concerning sensory input, and the 
“motivator” is the same in both cases, namely the urge to minimize 
prediction error. For action specifically, it is not obvious that a notion of 
reward, value, or utility is needed to explain action…It may seem odd 
that all action reduces to a kind of inferential process akin to perception. 
But this way of putting things is in fact a little disingenuous, since we 
could just as well have said that perception reduces to a kind of agency. 
 
                                                     
63 Cf., Cisek & Kalaska (2010) for a methodological critique of this classical view. 
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This fluidity with respect to direction of fit allows us to see the way in which 
motivational states can be powerful doxastic forces. If we understand action to 
consist in the sampling of sensory states in such a way to confirm some set of 
the agent’s predictions – which I illustrated in chapter three with the example 
of population growth, and which is contrasted with perception qua the 
Bayesian updating of those predictions – then we can see that motivational 
forces may exert an influence over the agent’s doxastic relationship to the 
world if the predictions which comprise those forces are not satisfied through 
action. More specifically, we can see that these priors may under certain 
conditions generate fictive experience which has the role of regulating the 
anxiety that the increase in prediction error would otherwise cause. 
 
 Our task at this point was to specify those conditions under which 
priors are more likely to generate wish-fulfilments than rational action. That 
itself could be broken down into two requirements: first, show how to 
differentiate between states that are apt for satisfaction through rational action 
and states that are apt for pacification through wish-fulfilment; and second, 
show how to differentiate between normal wish-fulfilment and wish-fulfilment 
that is pathological. I suggested that we could meet both of these requirements 
through Hopkins’s notion of repression as Bayesian hypothesis inhibition and 
Mathys’s notion of regression as Bayesian complexity reduction. Both of these 
situate those psychodynamic concepts quite firmly within a mechanistic 
framework, and go some way towards removing the “mechanistic vagueness” 
objection. 
 
 However, this does not yet entirely account for all three of the 
“metapsychological commitments” that were specified in chapter two. In 
particular, it does not account for the way that wish-fulfilling symptoms may 
pacify their precipitating desires opaquely. What I mean by that may be 
demonstrated by appeal to a particular symptom of AHP, the illness which will 
be discussed at length in the following chapter. In some cases of AHP, the 
patient will seem to exhibit a dearth of negative emotion with respect to their 
neurological impairment (the paralysis on the left hand side of the body), but 
will exhibit what seems like a disproportionate amount of negative emotion 
towards other (minor) health complaints (Weinstein & Kahn 1950; Kaplan-
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Solms & Solms 2000; Turnbull, Jones & Reed-Screen 2002). What is puzzling 
about this, if we take the anosognosia to be a wishful distortion of reality, is 
that it seems unclear how or why the emotion that is not experienced with 
respect to its appropriate object is transferred onto a new one. That is what I 
mean when I refer to the opacity of pacification. What is wish-fulfilment, such 
that it can pacify its precipitating motivational state in this way? 
 
4.1. What are the drives, and what do they do? 
 
4.1.1. Opacity and the failure of the censorship hypothesis 
 
 Let me give a few concrete examples of the phenomenon of opacity 
before I go on to identify some generalities that are common to it. The first will 
be an example from one of Freud’s (1909) famous case studies; the second will 
be an example from an experimental study on homophobia and same-sex 
arousal (Adams, Wright & Lohr 1996); and the third will have to do with 
anosognosia for hemiplegia, which is discussed at length in the final chapter of 
this thesis. 
 
 The first example is again from the case of Mr R. There are many 
interesting features of this case, but the one that will best illustrate my point is 
an event that occurred during the course of Freud’s analysis of Mr R. That is to 
say that it is an event that occurred during the course of consultation itself, 
rather than being a past event that Mr R recounted to Freud during 
consultation. During a particular stage in the analysis Mr R began to treat 
Freud with great hostility in his imagination, though on the surface he was 
nothing but polite and deferent. That is to say that he would imagine treating 
Freud and his family with violence and disrespect, and was brought to discuss 
this in the treatment with some embarrassment. At one point in this discussion 
he stood up from the couch and began pacing throughout the room, though 
keeping his distance from Freud. This he initially explained by saying that he 
couldn’t just lie down comfortably while saying such horrible things; but his 
demeanour suggested that he was afraid of Freud, and Mr R later confirmed 
this: 
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[...] soon he himself found a more cogent explanation, namely, that he 
was avoiding my proximity for fear of giving him a beating. If he 
stayed on the sofa he behaved like someone in desperate terror trying to 
save himself from castigations of terrific violence; he would bury his 
head in his hands, cover his face with his arm, jump up suddenly and 
rush away, his features distorted with pain, and so on. He recalled that 
his father had had a passionate temper, and sometimes in his violence 
had not known where to stop. (Freud 1909: 209) 
 
It appears that in this episode of fearfulness Mr R was “transferring” a fear he 
felt towards his father onto Freud. That is a way of saying that his fear and 
hostility towards his father as a punitive figure was finding a new object in 
Freud. This makes sense in the context of the treatment as a whole, since we 
established in our discussion of this case in chapter two that at the basis of Mr 
R’s obsessional illness was a severely ambivalent attitude towards his father. 
What is interesting about this particular symptom, however – the fear of, or 
“negative transference” towards, Freud – is the way in which his strong 
emotions are displaced from their original object and onto a new one. 
 
 An example of a similar phenomenon can be seen in the study by 
Adams, Wright, and Lohr (1996). They found that men who self-rated as 
homophobic had greater sexual arousal when viewing male same-sex 
pornography than non-homophobic controls. The psychodynamic interpretation 
of these results states that the homophobia of these men is a defence – a 
“reaction formation” – against repressed male same-sex attractions.64 The 
general idea is that the homophobe experiences those impulses, finds them 
threatening, and forms the homophobic attitudes as a way to defend himself 
against those impulses. The homophobia is therefore to be construed as a 
symptom that is caused by the repressed male same-sex attractions; it is an 
                                                     
64 The results of this study are compatible with a non-psychodynamic interpretation – for 
example, it may be “[…] that viewing homosexual stimuli causes negative emotions such as 
anxiety in homophobic men but not in nonhomophobic men [and that] this theory [explains] 
increases in erection in homophobic men.” (Adams, Wright & Lohr 1996: 444) For the 
purposes of the present discussion I am assuming that the psychodynamic interpretation of the 
data is the right one, because I am not so much concerned with whether it is true; rather, I am 
interested in what the distinguishing properties of that interpretation are.  
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instance of “the return of the repressed” to be compared to Mr R’s great 
obsessive fear. 
 
 Finally, there is a symptom like this that occurs for AHP, which will be 
the focus of the discussion in the following chapter. Some patients with AHP 
exhibit an unawareness or indifference to their impaired limb which is paired 
with an unusual intensity of negative affect towards events that are unrelated to 
the impairment. For example, a patient of Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000), 
given the pseudonym of Mrs B, exhibited anosodiaphoria (indifference to 
deficit) but suffered from profoundly negative emotional episodes which she 
was unable to inhibit and which she felt somewhat removed from. That is to 
say that she did not understand the reason for these episodes. One example of 
such an episode is as follows: 
 
[…] Mrs B reported an episode involving a 29-year-old man who had 
recently joined the Stroke Aid Society (a voluntary support group for 
stroke patients). The young man was describing his experience of his 
handicaps and weeping, when Mrs B, too, began to cry uncontrollably. 
At this point in the session, the therapist made the rather obvious 
remark that Mrs B was crying in identification with the young man, 
about her own handicaps. However, surprisingly, Mrs B did not agree 
with this remark. (Kaplan-Solms & Solms 2000: 169) 
 
The psychodynamic interpretation of this story is clear: Mrs B’s 
anosodiaphoria is to be construed as a kind of repression of the negative 
emotion that she feels towards the impairment, and which is replaced by 
indifference. However, it seems that this negative emotion cannot be entirely 
inhibited, and it finds representation in outbursts of tearfulness like that 
recounted above. The emotion is transferred onto objects for which it can be 
expressed without acknowledging the repressed representation of her body as 
impaired, and as her feeling the loss of this impairment. 
 
 Let me say something now about what is general to all of these cases, 
and which the Freudian concept of drive is supposed to help account for. First, 
it seems as though there is a certain flexibility or opacity when it comes to the 
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way that repressed impulses are satisfied in wish-fulfilments. That is to say that 
there is an object-substitution that is taking place and which allows the agent to 
express some emotion that is initially not consciously felt towards its 
appropriate object. The cases of Mr R and Mrs B are more directly 
interpretable than the behaviour of the homophobe, since the emotion that they 
are exhibiting is the very same emotion that is putatively repressed. But in the 
latter case, what is hypothesized to be a desire of a sexual nature is replaced by 
what looks like hostility and disgust. The psychodynamic explanation of this 
seeming reversal is that the homophobe defends himself against his impulses 
by repressing them – however, he continues to feel those impulses and they 
continue to push for representation. What then occurs is that he projects those 
sexual impulses into the outside world – imagines them as being external to 
him – and continues to prosecute those impulses with the same hostility and 
disgust as he originally met them when they were experienced as being internal 
to him. 
 
 In any case, in all of these cases what we see is the ultimate failure of 
repression and an opacity in the way that the repressed material is represented 
within the agent’s speech and behaviour. In all of these cases we see also a 
change in the object of the repressed material, and in one of them we see a 
transformation in the emotions that are being expressed with respect to the 
original object. That is to say that the repressed material is represented but in a 
form that is not immediately recognisable for what it is. How are we to explain 
this opacity – that is to say, how are we to account for it in a mechanistic form 
that is plausible within a contemporary context? 
 
 One approach to opacity in classical psychoanalysis is what is 
sometimes called the censor hypothesis. The censor hypothesis posits an 
agential subsystem in the person whose task is to prevent repressed mental 
contents from entering the conscious awareness of that person. The notion of 
the censor originates in the Freudian theory of dreams. Freud (1900) proposed 
that the censor operates during sleep in order to prevent repressed impulses 
from entering awareness and waking the dreamer, and to the extent that these 
impulses enter awareness it often distorts those impulses into bizarre contents 
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in order to disguise their true content from the dreamer. Freud (1900: 142) 
pitched this idea on an analogy with literary censorship: 
 
A similar difficulty confronts the political writer who has disagreeable 
truths to tell those in authority. If he presents them undisguised, the 
authorities will suppress his words – after they have been spoken, if his 
pronouncement was an oral one, but beforehand, if he had intended to 
make it in print. A writer must beware of the censorship, and on its 
account he must soften and distort the expression of his opinion. 
 
The same strategy can be extended to the explanation of opacity in other 
psychodynamic contexts; for example, with respect to the opacity of wish-
fulfilment in clinical context. One might suspect, for example, that the anger 
and fear that Mr R felt towards his father was allowed to enter awareness by 
the censor within him, but was distorted by that subsystem such that it was 
directed onto Freud rather than his father. 
 
 The posit of a censorial subsystem is not available to those of us who 
endorse a sub-intentional analysis of wish-fulfilment. That is because the posit 
is, after all, agential, and so involves attributing intentions to some unconscious 
part of the person. Indeed, the kind of sophistication required of a subsystem of 
this sort rules out the possibility of such a thing within the explanatory 
framework that we are committed to in this dissertation: 
 
[…] the censoring agency operates here as a sophisticated, rational, 
agent […] it must know which wishes and desires are forbidden and 
acceptable and also know appropriate strategies for censoring and 
distorting repressed material in such a way as to make the offensive 
material appear innocuous to the conscious system. (Boag 2006: 7) 
 
We covered this to some extent in chapter two, in our discussion of Sartre’s 
objections against Freud. It may be that such a system can be rendered 
innocuous, but it is certainly unavailable within the context of a sub-intentional 
analysis of wish-fulfilment. 
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4.1.2. The drive-conflict hypothesis 
 
 There is a tradition in psychodynamic theory, however, which suggests 
a different cause of the opacity of wish-fulfilment. This is a view on which the 
opacity of wish-fulfilment is caused by competition between distinct sources of 
motivation, and for which the preferential inhibition of one or other of these 
sources causes them to find pacification in substitute objects that are 
compatible with the goals of the preferred motivational sources (Maze 1983; 
Petocz 1999; Boag 2006). A recent elaboration of this view (Boag 2006) 
formulates the idea in terms of “instinctual drives”65 which enter into this 
process of conflict, inhibition, and object-substitution. I would like to develop 
the same view in the context of our own concerns, and use it in order to 
develop an account of opacity which may serve us well in explaining some 
features of AHP. 
 
 There are a number of advantages of this kind of view. The first, and 
most obvious, is that already mentioned: it does not require an appeal to 
agential subsystems that intentionally distort the content of wish-fulfilments. 
That means that it is a view that is available within a sub-intentional 
framework, but there are other advantages too. One of the most important is 
that it no longer commits us to the assumption that the primary source of 
motivation is libidinal; there are no drives that are a priori repressed, like the 
sexuality of Freud’s account. This allows us to describe a wider range of 
emotional conflicts and outcomes to those conflicts in ordinary irrationality and 
in psychopathology. Here’s how Boag (2014: 6) puts it: “[When repression is 
viewed] in this way there are no a priori “id” drives and […] it is not 
inconceivable that sexuality could repress the aim of self-preservation. What 
becomes repressed is determined by prevailing social factors and inter-drive 
competition […]” 
 
 With that said, let us consider the view in more detail. The first thing to 
be said is that the problem of mechanistic vagueness applies just as much to 
drive theory as it does to the other components of wish-fulfilment. This is 
                                                     
65 For the sake of brevity I will refer to these as just “drives.” 
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acknowledged by proponents of this view. Boag (2006: 12), for example, says 
that “[…] whether repressive inhibition contributes to dream bizarreness is an 
empirical question, one that can be answered, in part, from a consideration of 
the neuroscientific debate.” And so it is not enough to provide a model of how 
drive-competition, inhibition, and object-substitution might occur but also to 
provide an empirical candidate which could instantiate that model. But let us 
first explicate the model itself. 
 
  Freud described the drives as “[…] the psychical representative of the 
stimuli originating within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of 
the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection 
with the body.” (Freud 1915b: 122) That is to say that they are what Petocz 
(1999: 220) calls “biological engines.” They impel the agent to carry out action 
in the world to satisfy endogenous need. Recall from the Project (Freud 1895) 
the way in which the organism is compelled to deal not only with sensory 
excitation from without (that is to say, with exteroceptive information), but 
also from within (interoceptive information). It is when the organism is faced 
with endogenous excitation that the strategy of indiscriminate “flight from the 
stimulus” becomes useless. This endogenous excitation makes demands on the 
mind for work; it compels the organism to carry out action in the world which 
would minimize that excitation. That excitation is what Freud calls drive. 
 
 In the theory that I am explicating the drives are taken to be subject to 
mental representation. This part of the argument is complicated; the reason that 
they are taken to be subject to mental representation is because the one and the 
same drive can intend different objects on different occasions. It is for this 
reason that Petocz (1999: 222), for example, calls them psychobiological: 
 
[…] the instinctual drives can be viewed as constant forces, and in this 
sense they are not […] cut off from psychology and ‘intentionality’ by 
being blind, biological, directionless, non-cognitive urges, a view which 
is nevertheless understandable, given Freud’s later formulations on the 
ego. Thus, through their characteristic of having objects (the things via 
which the aim is achieved), and through their ability to cognise, and 
157 
 
thus be the subject term in psychological processes, the drives are more 
accurately characterised as psychobiological. 
 
Some elucidation is required here. First, Petocz is making a distinction between 
aim and object which has its origins in classical psychoanalysis (Freud 1915a). 
The aim of some drive is the characteristic behaviour or action by which it 
could be satisfied, and the object of the drive is the object towards which that 
behaviour or action is directed. Second, Petocz speaks of an “ability to 
cognise,” but so far this has been left unspecified. We need to tread carefully 
here, at the risk of attributing intention. The reason Petocz speaks of this 
putative ability is because the drive will take a new object if its primary object 
is unavailable or if it is otherwise prevented from being satisfied by that 
primary object. The way in which drives are prevented from taking on objects 
is through a process of repression, which I will want to gloss as Bayesian 
inhibition as specified in the previous chapter. That is to say that these drives 
enter into conflict (or competition), from which a relatively unified picture 
generally has to emerge. That will mean that some of these drives that are 
incompatible with the dominant conceptual model will persist as prediction 
error, and will need to find accommodation within that dominant overall 
model. The way in which they do so is by finding new objects that are distinct 
from the incompatible or inhibited object. 
 
 The drive-conflict account explains the opacity of wish-fulfilment by 
appealing to the way that drives find substitute satisfactions. For a theorist like 
Boag, who understands substitute-satisfaction as being primarily driven by fear 
of punishment that is internalised in early childhood – though I would like to 
remain non-committal on this matter – a substitute satisfaction will be sought 
out in a situation where the original object carries with it the threat of 
punishment. One or a series of such substitutions will explain why wish-
fulfilment has its characteristically opaque character. Here’s how he explains 
the matter: 
 
[…] a child’s wish to harm a younger sibling may be repressed, since it 
may lead to a loss of the caregiver’s affection. However, if the desire to 
harm persists, it may be replaced by an indirect expression, such as a 
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desire to hurt animals, or other substitute objects for the primary target 
(cf. [Mr R’s] hostility towards his brother substituting for hostility 
towards his father […]). If this substitute wish is also evaluated as a 
threat in a similar manner to the primary aim (i.e., it is also believed to 
lead to loss), then it may also be subject to further repression. (Boag 
2006: 11) 
  
Now, it seems to me that an account of this broad kind will place the following 
conditions on any sub-personal mechanism that is a candidate for its 
realization. That is to say that we need to find a candidate for the drives in 
question, and these drives need to have the following properties: first, they 
need to be plastic with respect to object – they need to be capable of being 
directed onto substitute objects in cases where they are frustrated by the 
processes of inhibition; second, they need to be capable of being mentally 
represented – that is to say, they need to be capable of taking on Intentional 
content; which can, third, enter into the cognitive processes which are specified 
by the predictive processing framework that I outlined in chapter three. I would 
like to suggest that the emotion systems as theorised and studied by Jaak 
Panksepp (e.g., 1998), and elaborated upon in his collaboration with Mark 
Solms (e.g., Solms & Panksepp 2012), can play this role.66 
 
4.1.3. Panksepp’s emotion systems 
 
Panksepp and Biven (2012: 24) cite three sources of evidentiary support 
for the former’s theory of the emotions. The first of these is evidence from 
brain research in mammals (and more rarely, in human beings). It is this source 
of evidence in particular that justifies the claim that the emotion systems in 
Panksepp’s typology are to be considered primary with respect to other 
(usually more complex) emotional feelings – for example, disgust or guilt. The 
second source of evidence is the psychological study of human affect (by self-
report or clinical report) when the aforementioned emotion systems are aroused 
through either circumstance or experimental intervention. Experimental 
                                                     
66 Boag (2014: 5) himself even suggests Panksepp’s emotion systems as a potential candidate 
to fill this theoretical role: “Panksepp [...] to some extent suggests a similar position whereby 
he appears to imply that drives engage both cognition and behaviour via the SEEKING system 
[…]” 
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intervention might be made by pharmacological means or deep brain 
stimulation (e.g., Coenen et al. 2009). The third source of evidence is the study 
of animal behaviour. Observation of animal behaviour – in particular, their 
preferences and aversions – in conjunction with brain stimulation  is thought to 
license inferences about the emotional action of certain neural circuits. I will 
endeavour to bring this evidence into the picture where it is relevant to the 
claims being made, but for the most comprehensive treatment of that evidence 
base one should consult Panksepp and Biven (2012). My primary concern here 
is the conceptual question of whether Panksepp’s theory meets the condition 
for serving as a drive theory in the psychodynamic sense. 
 
 Panksepp’s theory of emotion is opposed to what he calls “read-out” 
theories. According to the read-out theory of emotion, emotional feelings are 
generated when physiological states are interpreted by cognitive processes; that 
is to say, when they are “read out” during those processes. Emotion is therefore 
understood on these read-out theories to be a sub-set of cognitive process. 
Panksepp and Biven (2012: 64) give the following example:  
 
[…] you would not run away from a knife-wielding thief because you 
were afraid; rather, you became afraid because you were running away, 
which created all kinds of changes in how your body felt, as “read out” 
by higher brain functions. 
 
One example of such a read-out theory of emotion is that in Antonio 
Damasio’s (1994) Descartes’s Error.67 Damasio maintained in that book that 
the ability to have emotional feelings is only present in agents that have the 
capacity for memory and higher cognition, because it is these capacities that 
can link conscious experiences and reflexively cognize those experiences. It is 
that unification that allows the agent to feel emotions. In the lower animals, 
who putatively lack these capacities, talk of emotional feelings is replaced by 
“emotional behaviour.” 
 
                                                     
67 This is no longer Damasio’s view, who has rejected the read-out theory in light of the 
evidence I mention below. The exposition of his older view is just meant as a concrete example 
of what the read-out view entails. 
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 The big intuition that seems to underlie this kind of view is twofold. It 
involves first, that the ability to feel emotions requires consciousness; and 
second, that consciousness is a function of higher cognitive processes which 
are at least unique to the higher primates. Notice also that this is much stronger 
than the view that emotional feelings may be modulated in various ways 
through interaction with higher cognition; the claim is that higher cognition is a 
necessary condition for the experience of emotion. Otherwise it is just a 
propensity for certain kinds of behaviours: 
 
Read-out theories imply that affects can only occur either in animals 
that are intelligent enough to interpret emotional physiology or in 
animals that have language. This would mean that only human beings 
and perhaps some other primates are affective creatures. Presumably 
less intelligent mammals copulate without lust, attack without rage, 
cower without fear, and nurture without affection. (Panksepp & Biven 
2012: 16-17) 
 
There seem to be two classes of reason that underlie Panksepp’s rejection of 
the read-out theory of emotion. The first of these has to do with recent studies 
in neuroscience, and in particular, studies that have shown that the neocortex 
plays a less significant role in phenomenal consciousness than assumed by the 
read-out theorists of emotion. Merker (2007), in providing some historical 
context for his own studies, recounts those of Penfield and Jasper (1954), who 
performed removals of large regions of the cerebral cortex on patients with 
severe epilepsy. They did so under local anaesthetic, and found that the patients 
would remain conscious even after these large regions were removed. This was 
true even up to and including the removal of an entire cerebral hemisphere. 
Total lesion of the cortex will lead to unconsciousness, but in such cases there 
is also disruption to the normal function of brainstem regions that are 
implicated in cortical pathways. It was on the basis of these case studies (750 
of them) that Penfield and Jasper converged on the “centrencephalic proposal”: 
the proposal that the upper brainstem, not the neocortex, plays the centralizing 
role of coordination and functional integration which consciousness was 
previously thought to play. (Merker 2007: 66) This does not necessarily make 
the neocortex unnecessary for consciousness, but it means that the upper 
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brainstem is also implicated in the process, and even that it is more central to 
the process than the cortex. Merker’s own work involves the study of children 
who have hydranencephaly. Hydranencephaly is a condition in which a human 
infant’s cerebral cortex is destroyed in utero, sometimes in its entirety. It is 
treated palliatively and such children rarely live longer than a year. However, 
those children that do live exhibit a rich variety of discriminative behaviours 
that suggest that they are responding emotionally to the environment, and in a 
way that is conscious (although often their exteroceptive capacities are severely 
impaired). And indeed, Merker argues for his own “centrencephalic proposal” 
on the basis of these cases: 
 
[The hydranencephalic children] express pleasure by smiling and 
laughter, and aversion by “fussing,” arching of the back and crying (in 
many gradations), their faces being animated by these emotional states. 
A familiar adult can employ this responsiveness to build up play 
sequences predictably progressing from smiling, through giggling, to 
laughter and great excitement on the part of the child. The children 
respond differentially to the voice and initiatives of familiars, and show 
preferences for certain situations and stimuli over others […] (Merker 
2007: 79) 
 
The second of the reasons that motivates against a cognitivist view of emotion 
has to do with the behavioural evidence for emotional experience in animals, 
particularly in rats. This evidence is not quite as compelling as that preceding, 
but nonetheless has a fairly plausible ground. The thrust of the objection is that 
the lower mammals (like rats) exhibit behaviours that certainly make it seem 
that they are subject to emotional experience, and this should be a reason to 
think that they in fact do have these experiences. And if they do, then this 
would mean that the read-out theory is false; that is because the read-out theory 
supposes that higher cognitive functions are necessary for emotional 
experience, and the higher cognitive functions in question are unique to the 
higher mammals (like primates). One of Panksepp’s examples is that of play 
vocalizations in rats (e.g., Panksepp & Burgdorf 2000), and his work abounds 
with similar cases (e.g., Panksepp et al. 1994). In opposition to “read-out” 
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theories of emotion, Panksepp offers the following gloss of how emotions are 
related to cognition: 
 
We feel it is better to envision how various levels of brain organization 
contribute to the complete emotional experience in terms of nested 
hierarchies…In this view, the lower BrainMind functions are embedded 
and re-represented in higher brain functions, which yield not only 
traditional bottom-up controls but also top-down regulations of 
emotionality. This provides two-way avenues of control that can be 
seen to be forms of “circular causality” that respect the brain as a fully 
integrated organ that can have dramatic intra-psychic conflicts. 
(Panksepp & Biven 2012: 77) 
 
It might be helpful to frame my commentary on Panksepp’s view in terms of its 
figuration below. He envisions brain activity as proceeding on a hierarchy with 
at least three levels. On the first of these levels are seven basic emotion 
systems. These are thought to be common to all mammals and are subserved by 
subcortical brain regions. These raw affects both compel certain behaviours (or 
perhaps Freudian “aims”) in the agent and give rise to specific feelings. In the 
upper limbic region of the brain, these affects are associated with objects and 
drive learning as construed in behaviourism – that is, learning by way of 
classical and operant conditioning. This learning is in turn regulated by higher 
cognition in neocortical centres, but higher cognition is itself influenced and 
made possible by the more primitive interactions with the environment enabled 
by the primary process emotions. 
 
FIGURE 4.1: PANKSEPP’S HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF BRAIN 
FUNCTION (Solms & Panksepp 2012: 150) 
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 Zellner and Solms (2012) suggest that this hierarchy fits in the 
following way with the concept of drive. First, they take care to distinguish 
between drives and drive-derivatives. Drives are never consciously 
experienced by the agent, but a drive-derivative is. Drive is the endogenous 
excitation that makes demands on higher functions for satisfaction in the world, 
and the derivative of the drive is the way in which that force or excitation is 
mentally represented. So, for example, it may be that the feeling of hunger is 
caused by a particular drive, but the content of that feeling is not the drive. 
Instead, the feeling of hunger is the drive-derivative, and is itself caused by the 
drive. The right specification of the drive will lack psychological content: it 
will consist in a specification of the way in which hunger and satiation is 
physiologically regulated. Zellner and Solms (2012: 54) therefore make a clear 
distinction between drives, which have no innate aim; and instincts, which they 
think do have innate aims: 
 
In Freud’s model, drives in themselves have no particular behaviours 
associated with them, but the tension of drive pressure give rise to 
experiences of satisfaction when the drive demand is met. The 
experience in question then becomes the aim of the drive; but it is of 
paramount importance to recognize that this is achieved by a secondary 
process, via learning. Drives do not have intrinsic representational 
content. Instincts, by contrast, do represent innate aims. Instincts evolve 
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for biological reasons out of the biological imperative to link certain 
drive demands with certain situations of universal significance for 
individual and reproductive success. Some relations are too universal to 
be left to the vagaries of learning. 
 
As far as I can see, this yields a picture like the following. There is a distinction 
between drives and instincts, where drives have source and pressure but lack an 
innately specified aim and object. Instincts often have an innately specified 
aim, but lack an innately specified object. It seems, however, that Zellner and 
Solms want to continue to say that some instincts only acquire their aim 
through learning; that is, through experiences of satisfaction. That seems to fit 
with what I have said about the drive-conflict hypothesis thus far, so long as 
we equate the “instincts” of Zellner and Solms with the “instinctual drives” of 
Petocz (1999) and Boag (2006), which I am just calling “drives.” Panksepp’s 
emotion systems are to be identified with these drives. 
 
Panksepp identifies seven basic “primary-process” emotional systems, 
which he gives the names SEEKING, LUST, PANIC/GRIEF (henceforth 
referred to as SPG, which is short for separation distress/panic/grief; Cf., 
Hopkins 2013), CARE, RAGE, FEAR, and PLAY. These have distinct 
physiological correlates and metabolic up- and down-regulators, and there is a 
range of behavioural evidence in favour of their link with each associated 
affect; for example, the link between SPG and the emotional feeling of 
separation distress (e.g., Panksepp et al. 1988). This short summary will be 
light on physiological detail, but interested readers can find the relevant 
information in Panksepp and Biven (2012). The table below specifies the seven 
Pankseppian emotion systems, with positively-valenced emotion systems 
coloured in red and with negatively-valenced emotion systems coloured in 
blue. The left hand column gives the name of the system and its associated 
emotional phenomenology, with the central columns giving the rough neural 
correlates of that system and with the right hand column giving the 
neuromodulators – that is to say, the biochemical molecules that activate and 
deactivate that system. I will go on to briefly discuss SEEKING, SPG 
(GRIEF), and RAGE, since it is these that play the most salient roles in AHP. 
 
165 
 
 
FIGURE 4.2: THE PANKSEPPIAN EMOTION SYSTEMS (Panksepp 2011: 
9) 
 
 
 The SEEKING system plays a central role in connecting up Panksepp’s 
work to the psychodynamic account of human psychology. That is because it is 
SEEKING which is thought to be at the basis of motivation, as the system 
which elicits foraging behaviours and which is associated with a feeling of 
expectancy. SEEKING is also the most studied of Panksepp’s emotion 
systems, albeit under the name of the “brain reward system.” The brain reward 
system was first discovered by Olds and Milner (1954), who found that direct 
stimulation of the “medial forebrain bundle-lateral hypothalamic area” (MFB-
LH) would cause rats to press on a bar to stimulate this area until they were so 
exhausted that they could not do so anymore. (Panksepp & Biven 2012: 82) 
The inference made by Olds and Milner was that the MFB-LH must comprise 
the reward system which enabled learning as construed in the behaviourist 
tradition. 
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 Now, there is another part of the brain which has a similar effect on rats 
in these experimental situations. This is the “septum.” But the behaviour of the 
rats is somewhat different in the case of the septum. When the septum is 
excited, the rat will press the bar for an individual “dose” of the excitation, 
doing this at regular intervals, and no more than is necessary. This is markedly 
different from what happens when the MFB-LH is excited, for which the rats 
press the bar until they cannot do so anymore due to exhaustion. Panksepp’s 
proposed explanation of this difference is that the MFB-LH “provides an 
affective reward in the form of a euphoric general state of expectation, initially 
with no explicit goal in mind” (Panksepp & Biven 2012: 85) whereas 
excitation of the septal area produces pleasure. This inference is substantiated 
in part by the fact that when the septum is excited in humans the test subjects 
report pleasurable sexual feelings. 
 
This is an important distinction. The distinction is between generalized 
pleasure-seeking and the consummatory feeling of pleasure itself. It is the 
former which comprises Panksepp’s SEEKING system. Additional evidence 
for the MFB-LH being associated with pleasure-seeking rather than reward 
comes from a study in which a testing area was divided into two with one of 
these halves filled with lots of objects (“sticks, corks, bottle caps, and food 
pellets…” (Wright & Panksepp 2012: 12)) In the half with objects the rats were 
stimulated and in the other half they were not. And yet what was observed was 
that the rats would carry the objects to the non-stimulus half of the area. If the 
area was associated with reward rather than with SEEKING, then we should 
expect the rats to remain in the stimulation area, because they would not need 
to do anything to receive the reward. Similar “foraging” and appetitive 
behaviour is seen in patients for whom deep brain stimulation has been tried as 
a therapy for certain psychiatric disorders. The patient for whom this was tried 
began 
 
to wear his wife’s clothes, demanded sexual intercourse daily, and 
showed increased risk-taking behaviour, particularly reckless driving. 
The patient was admitted to hospital. He appeared agitated and 
understood that his behaviour was wrong, but he explained that 
‘something was driving him.’ Stimulation was shut off and his urges 
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stopped almost instantaneously. (Coenen et al. 2009, cited in Wright & 
Panksepp 2012: 12) 
 
Continued activation of SEEKING does not lead to satiation – it leads the 
organism to seek out even more pleasurable experiences. For this reason it is 
unlikely that SEEKING is best thought of as having a close association with 
the “reward system” of behavioural neuroscience. That would imply that 
SEEKING directly produces reward in the organism, but what we see is better 
characterized as the expectation of future reward. 
 
 SPG is a system that is thought by Panksepp to help regulate the 
relationship between an infant and its caregiver – in other words, it is meant to 
regulate attachment relationships. Stimulation of this system in humans and 
animals can give rise to a number of responses. Firstly, it gives rise to panic 
attacks, and in animals it gives rise to what have been called “separation 
distress vocalizations.” These are vocalizations that occur once the mammalian 
infant has formed an attachment to a caregiver and is then separated from that 
attachment figure. In a second stage of its activation, it leads animals to 
withdraw and isolate itself from active engagement with the environment. It is 
thought that this two-stage response is adaptive in the following way. In the 
first stage, it alerts the caregiver to the fact of the separation, and allows the 
caregiver to locate the lost infant. In the second, it has the infant behave in such 
a way that it less likely to be found by predators and more likely to be found by 
the caregiver. The SPG system has been stimulated in human participants, and 
in some cases this has led to a (appropriately diagnosed) clinical depression 
that was ameliorated with the shutting off of the excitation (Solms & Turnbull 
2002: 130). 
 
 The RAGE system is hypothesized by Panksepp to be the source of 
aggression and anger, where these latter emotions are construed as secondary 
and tertiary elaborations of RAGE that contain cognitive aspects that primary 
process RAGE lacks. As always, Panksepp and Biven are careful in 
distinguishing this more primitive emotion from its higher cognitive 
elaborations, and they claim only to be committing themselves to scientific 
conjectures about the former: 
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Many of the higher cognitive processes related to human anger and 
hatred remain neuroscientifically impenetrable, particularly when the 
way humans use language, from frustrated and conciliatory tones of 
voice to accusations and cognitive peacemaking, can amplify or 
diminish the passion of anger. But the raw state of RAGE can readily be 
understood, in detail, through difficult animal brain research. (Panksepp 
& Biven 2012: 147) 
 
RAGE is thought to have an interesting relationship with the SEEKING 
system; it is often activated in response to the frustration of SEEKING urges 
(Panksepp & Biven 2012: 149). This brings to mind the example of Mr R, for 
whom it was inferred that he harboured unconscious hostility towards his 
father. If it is indeed true that Mr R experienced his father as an obstacle to his 
erotic and romantic gratifications, then it is not surprising that this elicited a 
RAGE which came to be associated with a representation of his father as a 
punitive figure of this kind. 
 
 In order for these emotion systems to do the appropriate work in 
underpinning the opaque nature of wish-fulfilment, they need to meet the 
criterion of explanatory adequacy for the drive-conflict hypothesis that I earlier 
discussed. The last two of these – the ability to take on Intentional content, and 
the ability to enter into the cognitive processes that are specified by the 
predictive processing framework – will depend on how the Pankseppian story 
about the emotions is integrated into the theoretical apparatus of chapter three. 
But it seems that they meet the other requirement, which is that the drives be 
plastic with respect to object. That is to say that it seems, to the extent that they 
only take on objects once elaborated at higher levels of the neural hierarchy 
(Panksepp’s secondary and tertiary processes), that they can be considered to 
be initially “objectless” in this way. But there are three serious objections to 
this basic idea of an objectless emotion or drive that we are obliged to consider. 
 
4.1.4. Objections and replies 
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 Of the post-Freudian psychoanalytic movements, some thought that the 
classical Freudian metapsychology placed too much emphasis on internal and 
quasi-biological drives while downplaying the primacy of early relationships 
and socio-cultural factors. This includes the object-relations view of Melanie 
Klein, whose psychological interpretation of the drives was the vital stepping 
stone to the later fully-fledged interpersonal views of (amongst others) Fairbain 
and Winnicott. (Greenberg & Mitchell 1983) The basic Kleinian move can be 
characterised as follows. Rather than the drives being construed as originally 
bodily and objectless and as being given an object through interpersonal 
relations, the drives are thought of as expressing interpersonal relations through 
the vehicle of bodily processes (e.g. eating, excretion, etc). For example, Klein 
thought that emotional ambivalence towards the caregiver might be expressed 
in the child’s mind by phantasies that involve the child orally incorporating the 
“good” caregiver and spitting out the “bad” caregiver. (Segal 1979, chapter 
five) In this way the bodily urges of the child give expression to its 
relationships with other people around it, rather than the relationships with 
other people around it being precipitated by the child’s bodily urges 
(Greenberg & Mitchell 1983: 136-144). The priority of bodily and social 
processes is therefore reversed, and object relations are seen as basic. The later 
more radical interpersonal and attachment views seek to do away with drives 
entirely, with a shift to the discussion of internal representations of early 
relationships. 
 
This development implies a criticism of drive theory in the following 
way. Drive theory in classical psychoanalysis suggests that infants form 
attachments with their caregivers because they have needs that are precipitated 
by the drives, and their caregivers are able to meet these needs. But if we take 
pro-social urges and the relationships which they engender to be a primary 
factor in the development of the child, then this suggests that infants are 
disposed to form attachments with their caregivers in a way independent of 
those “homeostatic” drives. Attachment is therefore independent of drive 
satisfaction, and so there are sources of motivation that are independent of 
drive satisfaction.  
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Notice that what is being objected to here is the primacy of pleasure-
seeking above attachment. That is a feature of drive theory in classical 
psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on “primary narcissism.” The primary 
narcissism hypothesis states that the infant cannot initially distinguish between 
self and other – that is to say that there is no sense of self. What occurs, 
according to these views, is that prior to the distinction between self and other 
is a distinction between positively and negatively valenced affect which is an 
indicator of drive satisfaction. The infant is driven to minimize negative affect 
and does so by rejecting negative affects as “out there” and accepting positive 
affects as “in here.” From this initial distinction the infant constructs his sense 
of self, and the psychical challenge becomes one of maturity such that he can 
come to accept certain unpleasant affects and see them experienced by himself. 
It is a regression to this state that we see in cases of dreaming and the “magical 
thinking” apparent in obsessional neurosis and schizophrenia (e.g., Freud 1913, 
1914). 
 
 There is much extant and accumulating empirical evidence that primary 
narcissism in the form it is formulated here is implausible. Most strikingly, 
infant observation studies reveal that the infant seems to be able to distinguish 
between self and other from birth. (Stern 1985: 240-242; Rochat & Hespos 
1997; Rochat 2012) In Rochat & Hespos (1997), for instance, it was inferred 
that infants had the ability from birth to distinguish between tactile stimulation 
from the experimenter and self-administered tactile stimulation. They 
summarize their results like this: 
 
…our results provide…evidence that from birth infants do not blend 
intero- (self-) and exteroceptive stimulation, thus showing signs of a 
basic dualism between what originates from their own body and from 
the outside world. If infants were in a state of fusion with the 
environment, they would not respond differentially to either 
stimulation. 
 
Given the tenor of the objection as stated above, it’s important to realize that 
Panksepp does not fall prey to that objection, and does not fall prey to it on 
account of his departures from classical drive theory. The most important of 
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these departures for the purposes of the objection is the posit of basic pro-
social drives in the form of PANIC, CARE, and PLAY. Although pleasure-
seeking is indeed primary to attachment, on Panksepp’s view, the kind of 
primacy at issue is weaker than that at issue in the primary narcissism 
hypothesis. 
 
 More specifically, Panksepp does not take his view so far that he denies 
the original distinction between self and other on the part of the infant; 
attachment and SEEKING urges presumably come about at the same time. The 
sense in which attachment is dependent on SEEKING is the sense in which an 
interest in the world is a precondition for any kind of social behaviour. That 
means that if there were no SEEKING then attachment would not be possible. 
The stronger view, the narcissistic view, would be that there is a period of 
infancy in which SEEKING operates in the absence of any of the pro-social 
Pankseppian drives. But that is not the view I am endorsing here. So the 
interpersonal critique misses the mark, though this evidence I have described is 
probably successful in contesting stronger drive theories in classical 
psychoanalysis (cf., Gergely 2000). 
 
 The second criticism against the idea of a Pankseppian drive comes 
from evolutionary psychology. One irony associated with Panksepp’s work is 
that while he claims an evolutionary consilience for his theory, it can also be 
disputed on evolutionary grounds. In particular, his views could be disputed 
from the point of view of the evolutionary psychology research programme 
which takes the mind to be “massively modular.” Modularity is a concept 
introduced into the philosophy of cognition by Jerry Fodor (1983). A module is 
a functional component that takes some domain-specific input and performs a 
specific operation on it to give a specific kind of outcome. One of the most 
common examples of a putatively modular process is that of visual perception. 
In the Müller-Lyer illusion, one’s beliefs about the length of the two lines does 
not have an effect on how one perceives the two lines. That is to say, they will 
appear to be of different lengths even after one has taken care to measure them 
both and arrive at the justified true belief that they are in fact of the same 
length. 
 
172 
 
FIGURE 4.3. THE MUELLER-LYER ILLUSION 
 
 
The way in which this illusion is non-responsive to higher cognition is 
explained in terms of the modularity of visual perception. The most important 
features of modules are their domain-specificity and their informational 
encapsulation. Domain-specificity means that the module only deals with a 
very specific kind of input, and so only deals with a very specific kind of 
computational problem. Informational encapsulation means that the 
functionality of the module is inaccessible to any kind of general processing. 
That is to say that the only information that is involved in the process is the 
(proprietary) input and the stepwise computation that is performed on that 
input. Nothing else gets a look in. In the case of the Müller-Lyer lines, we 
could give a simplified modular explanation like the following. The visual 
system takes the patterns of stimulation on the retina and interprets them to 
build up a picture of the visual field. This picture is given as output to central 
processing systems, where they can be cognized and used to guide action. All 
the cognizing agent has access to, however, is this visual field that the modular 
visual system outputs; it has no control over the operations that are performed 
in those modules. This is why we cannot see the Müller-Lyer lines as being of 
the same length, despite our justified true belief that they are. Their perceived 
length is a function of the modules that guide visual perception. 
 
Some evolutionary psychologists take the content of these modules (or 
psychological “mechanisms”) to be innate and evolutionarily specified (Tooby 
& Cosmides 2005). What that means is that their content is not a function of 
learning, but emerges through genetically dictated development. Modules (or 
mechanisms) are therefore seen as adaptations that helped ancestors of the 
agent navigate hostile environments successfully enough to reproduce. That is 
to say that psychological mechanisms are products of natural selection, and 
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only natural selection. Each mechanism was selected in response to a particular 
contingency in the environment, and is adapted to respond that contingency. 
This can be illustrated on an analogy with other bodily organs: each of these 
organs performs the task for which it was specifically adapted. 
 
It seems to follow from this, if the reasoning is good, that the mind is 
massively modular. That would mean that there exists no mental process that is 
not modular. It seems to follow from the premise that the mind has its origin in 
natural selection, because natural selection is incremental and consists of 
adaptations to specific environmental contingencies. A domain general 
mechanism like inference to the best explanation cannot be an adaptation to a 
specific environmental contingency. Another reason for this belief is the 
discovery that some of what we take to come under our capacity for domain-
general reasoning is itself subject to effects like the Müller-Lyer illusion. For 
example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have found that there are specific 
kinds of errors in probabilistic reasoning that are consistently made by normal 
agents. For example, normal agents given a reasoning task consistently fall into 
the logical fallacies associated with the material conditional unless the task is 
framed in terms of the following of social rules. Cosmides (1989) has argued 
that this is due to the action of a cheater-detection mechanism which was 
selected in response to environmental contingencies associated with living in 
groups. If Cosmides is right, then this suggests that the norms governing 
reasoning are dictated by a mish-mash of adapted mechanisms rather than one 
domain-general set of rational norms. 
 
 
The argument I can see a massive modularity theorist making against 
Panksepp’s SEEKING system has to do with the way in which modules are 
supposed to function. They are supposed to be domain-specific, and this is 
because they are naturally selected in response to specific environmental 
contingencies. A massive modularity theorist need not deny that there is (or 
better: there appears to be) domain-general reasoning – like inference to the 
best explanation – but he must deny that any such processes are implemented 
as such within the architecture of the mind. That is to say that he must make 
the claim that such processes are (merely, and despite appearances) composed 
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of a mish-mash of domain-specific processes. That is why they are subject to 
the biases investigated by cognitive psychology. 
 
Panksepp’s SEEKING system is not supposed to function in a way that is 
domain-specific. That is because it lacks clearly defined objects; it requires 
learning to associate it with objects. It is also supposed to be architecturally 
basic; what that means is that it is not something that can be decomposed into 
domain-specific modules in the way that a massive modularity theorist would 
suppose. This all means that it is something that cannot exist if massive 
modularity is true. 
But it should be clear that the preceding considerations do not 
constitute a sound argument against SEEKING unless one takes the massive 
modularity hypothesis to be true.68 But this is quite a controversial premise, to 
the point that it would be reasonable to simply deny the premise. That means 
that this argument against Panksepp is simply a demonstration that Panksepp’s 
theory is in conflict with a strong version of the massive modularity 
hypothesis, not a demonstration that Panksepp’s theory is false.69 So the 
Pankseppian must simply bite the bullet and deny the massive modularity 
hypothesis, on the proviso that if the debate turns out in favour of strong 
massive modularity then the data underlying the SEEKING system will have to 
be reinterpreted within a new theory that does not posit functional domain-
generality. 
 
There is one more objection against the Pankseppian view of the drives 
that I wish to discuss, and this has some curious affinities with the evolutionary 
argument I have just considered. The objection denies that it makes any sense 
to think about psychoanalytic drive as something that is the product of a well-
adaptedness, or as something whose function could be explained in terms of 
the role it has played in adapting the organism to its environment. These 
affinities are curious because the motivation for the objection is one that is 
quite anti-naturalistic in contrast to the argument from massive modularity. 
                                                     
68 SEEKING may be compatible with a weaker grade of the hypothesis; something like 
Carruther’s (2003) “moderately massive modularity.” 
69 Indeed, Panksepp himself has published a polemic with a co-author (Panksep & Panksepp 
2000) against these kinds of assumptions of massive modularity in evolutionary psychology. 
See also Samuels (2006) for a recent philosophical critique of the massive modularity notion. 
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That is to say, this critique accepts the premise that the drive cannot be 
conceived in terms of biological forces, but then takes the other horn of the 
dilemma that this generates: rather than accepting the inexistence of the drives, 
it claims that the drives exist but they are non-biological. It is an argument that 
finds its most recent home in the writings of authors who take their cues from 
work in French theoretical psychoanalysis. 
 
An exemplary example of this kind of criticism has recently been put 
forward by Papoulias and Callard (2012). These authors claim that the 
Pankseppian emotion systems are a bad candidate to fill the explanatory role 
that the drive and drive-representatives play in giving a vertical account of 
wish-fulfilment. This is how they describe the case that they are prosecuting, 
and which has its origins in a theorization of the drives that comes from Jean 
Laplanche (1976): 
 
The term ‘drive’ within Freud does not cohere within a single ‘register’. 
This, we argue, creates difficulties for any attempt to secure the 
crossing between psychoanalysis and the neurosciences through a 
concept of drive built around a biological logic – that is, primed to 
respond to the peremptory demands of self-preservation and 
endogenous bodily needs. If we take seriously Laplanche’s argument 
that the drive represents a deviation from, or mimicry of the vital 
functions, then the current identification and mapping of putative 
functions, circuits and emotion systems within the brain does not – and 
could not – equate to the mapping of the Freudian drive. For such 
mapping does not address the manner in which a certain sexualisation 
of function inhabits and perverts those functional systems, nor how the 
object of the drive emerges as an excessive dimension of the object of 
need. (Papoulias & Callard 2012: 213) 
 
The argument then seems to be something like this. There are phenomena that 
the Freudian concept of drive is mobilized in order to explain that seem to be 
inexplicable in terms of ordinary biological function. This might be for one of 
two reasons. The first is that the drive is the name for a sexualisation of normal 
biological function; the second is that the drive is the name for an “excess” that 
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cannot be fully accommodated into a biological framework. Let us attempt to 
elucidate each of these claims in turn. 
 
 The first reason that this critic thinks that the Pankseppian emotion 
systems cannot serve the explanatory role of the drives is that they separate the 
concept of drive from sexuality, where the drive is supposed to have a 
primarily sexual element: “[…] such mapping [of drive to Pankseppian 
emotion systems] does not address the manner in which a certain sexualisation 
of function inhabits and perverts those functional systems…” (Papoulias & 
Callard 2012: 213) It seems to me that for this to be a good reason to reject a 
biological reading of the drives we would need to be provided with an 
additional argument to the effect that devaluing sexuality amongst the drives 
inevitably leads us to reduce drive to Lorenzian instinct. But as I hope to show 
in considering Panksepp’s emotion systems against the three criteria of 
explanatory adequacy (with respect to the drive-conflict hypothesis) there is no 
good reason to think this. 
 
 The remaining reason in favour of rejecting the Pankseppian view of 
the drives is that it cannot account for “how the object of the drive emerges as 
an excessive dimension of the object of need.” (Papoulias & Callard 2012: 
213) The meaning of this statement is less clear, but it seems to me that the 
intended point here is that the flexibility of the drive – the way that it can take 
on new and varied objects under the circumstances of frustration – obliges us 
to posit a component of the drive that exceeds mere self-preservation. That 
seems to me to be partly right, in that it motivates against the notion that 
Lorenzian drives could play the role, but I disagree that it means that 
Panksepp’s emotion systems are inadequate. We can see that the further 
inference to the explanatory inadequacy of the Pankseppian view is 
unwarranted by pointing again to the explanatory criteria that the view must 
meet, and showing that they are able to meet them. So let me do this in the 
specific context of the Laplanchian critique. 
 
 The drive is a concept which is meant to account for the way in which 
desires can be opaquely pacified in wish-fulfilment. What that means is that 
emotions (including of course sexual desire, but also including separation 
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distress and anger) can come to take substitute objects in cases where their 
original objects are unavailable. The concept of drive accounts for this 
phenomenon by suggesting that the sources of these emotions continue to press 
for representation in such cases, and find new objects which serve as substitute 
and temporarily pacify the desires generated by the drive. Examples of this 
phenomena abound; earlier on in this chapter, I considered a classical 
psychoanalytic example (Mr R), an example from a study on homophobia, and 
an example from a patient with anosodiaphoria.  
 
Now, what it means to instantiate the concept of drive is that whatever 
is a candidate for its instantiation (i.e., Panksepp’s emotion systems) can play 
the same explanatory role. That is to say that it meets the three conditions 
above. If it does so, then it should be able to account for the opacity of 
satisfaction, which is what drive is meant to explain. That should mean that 
other differences – like the relatively peripheral nature of sexuality and the 
drive’s more overtly biological basis – are immaterial. I have argued that 
Panksepp’s theory does indeed meet that criterion of explanatory adequacy. It 
meets it on account of the way that these drives are only given objects through 
learning in secondary processes and higher cognition in tertiary processes. To 
take SEEKING as an example, given that it drives for a bodily state (i.e., 
pleasure) rather than an external object, it seems fair to say that it can play this 
role. It doesn’t seem as though other minor differences between Panksepp’s 
and Freud’s views will be fatal to the role of Panksepp’s emotion systems as a 
substitute for the original notion of drive. 
 
4.2. Accommodating drive within the predictive processing framework 
 
4.2.1. Pankseppian emotions as sets of prior beliefs 
 
 It seems to me that the emotion systems which Panksepp has identified 
are best construed as sets of prior beliefs within the predictive processing 
framework. That is to say that they are hypotheses about the causes of sensory 
input, where that input is to be understood as endogenous excitation that 
signals deviation from the states represented by those prior beliefs. What these 
states are will differ from emotion system to emotion system. To give some 
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examples: SEEKING, in its role of the emotion of expectancy or anticipation, 
seems to predict a feeling of pleasure or relief; and SPG would seem to predict 
the feelings of safety and attachment that would accompany a reunification 
with a caregiver. So I think it is right for us to interpret the emotion systems as 
comprising Bayesian prior “beliefs” or “control states” in the sense defined in 
chapter three (and in Friston et al. 2013: 3ff), which predict the right states for 
the agent to be in: states of pleasure, safety, and so on. These prior beliefs are 
activated in response to deviation from the expected states which they specify, 
and thus elicit the appropriate behaviours and the accompanying 
phenomenology. 
 
 At this point we might encounter the following objection: doesn’t this 
assimilate the Pankseppian theory to a cognitive read-out theory of the 
emotions? Panksepp is quite explicit that the theory is not to be understood in 
this way, and it might seem that if we understand the emotions as consisting in 
prior beliefs about the homeostatic equilibrium of the body, that we are falling 
back into the James-Lange way of understanding emotion as a cognitive read 
out of bodily states. In order to deal with this objection it is important to 
understand Panksepp’s reason for rejecting those read-out theories. Here’s 
where Panksepp and Biven (2012: 13-14) discuss those theories, only to 
subsequently reject them: 
 
Implicit in read-out theories is the equating of consciousness with 
cognitions—our self-conscious awareness of our feelings and 
accompanying thoughts. And if one believes that consciousness is 
always cognitive, then affects must somehow be cognitive too. 
According to read-out theories, affective consciousness cannot emerge 
from the deep brain functions that generate the physiological changes 
and instinctual behaviors of emotions, because these deep substrates are 
noncognitive and must therefore be deeply unconscious. Affects can 
only emerge from the conscious thinking that relies heavily on the very 
top of the brain, our neocortex, which is essential for all of our higher 
cognitive activities. However, a vast amount of animal research and 
many clinical observations oppose this equation of consciousness with 
cognition. 
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The primary concern here seems to be that read-out theories of emotion make 
the feeling of emotion co-extensive with higher cognitive processes. This 
would be problematic for Panksepp because his findings indicate that 
decorticate animals continue to exhibit emotional behaviours. That result is not 
compatible with the identification of emotion in terms of the read-out of 
subcortical excitation by higher cognitive processes. Similarly, there are other 
clinical cases which suggest that human beings can feel emotion without the 
putatively necessary higher cognitive functions intact (e.g., Merker 2007). But 
this worry can be put aside within the predictive processing framework because 
the cognitive machinery of the framework is not limited to the cortex. Given 
that the free energy principle in particular is a theory of biological functioning 
which can extend beyond the cortex and into the brainstem (e.g., Friston 2013), 
we are not committed to saying that the cortex is necessary for affective 
consciousness. So interpreting the emotion systems as prior beliefs or sets of 
prior beliefs does not commit us to the James-Lange theory of emotion. 
 
 There are two advantages of understanding Panksepp’s emotion 
systems in this way. The first is that it does justice to the distinction between 
drives and emotions, where drives are themselves unconscious but nonetheless 
impel the agent to carry out action in the world that would satisfy them, and 
where emotions are conscious phenomenological items that represent the 
current state of the drives which are given objects when they come into 
association with higher cognitive processes. That seems to gel well with what 
we have said about the emotion systems being sets of prior beliefs that generate 
a phenomenology and a characteristic “aim” or behaviour in response to 
endogenous prediction error. The “id” is still “conscious” (Solms & Panksepp 
2012; Solms 2013), though it is also representational. It is just that in its initial 
stages of operation this representation is that of the state of the body, rather 
than that of objects in the environment. 
 
The second advantage of understanding the emotion systems as sets of 
prior beliefs is that it mirrors the hierarchical view that accompanies the 
general theory of emotion. On Panksepp’s theory, some given primary process 
emotion constitutes a state of consciousness that can elicit certain behaviours 
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or aims. Through secondary processes (i.e., memory and learning) the emotion 
state can come to be associated with particular objects, and in tertiary process 
cognition we are able to regulate those emotions in much more sophisticated 
ways. Similarly, it seems as though this basic scheme could be implemented 
within the predictive processing framework, which is itself hierarchical. The 
emotion systems – construed as deep priors – would be shaped over time and 
through experience, and would come to be selectively activated by specific 
objects and events. 
 
 The emotion systems when understood in this way remain good 
candidates for the drive-conflict theory of the opacity of wish-fulfilment. That 
is because – although they often have innate aims and phenomenological 
properties – they do not have innate objects: 
 
This perspective includes the radical assertion that primary-process core 
affects are anoetic (without external knowledge) but intensely 
conscious (experienced) in an affective form (which reflects intrinsic, 
unreflective brain “knowledge”). As we feel our affective states, we do 
not need to know what we are feeling. (Panksepp & Biven 2012: 14-15) 
 
It makes sense to attribute emotional feelings to agents with very little 
cognitive ability if the feeling in question is of such a primitive kind – a 
primitive kind of “indication” as to how the agent is doing with respect to its 
homeostatic needs (which, in more complex agents, include the exigencies of 
attachment). Recall the three conditions for sub-personal candidacy with 
respect to “drive” that I enumerated in section 4.1.2. These were, first, an 
ability to enter into cognitive processes; second, an ability to take on 
Intentional content; and third, a plasticity with respect to this Intentional 
content. The first is satisfied in virtue of the emotion system consisting in a set 
of prior beliefs within the overall hierarchical generative model. The second is 
satisfied in virtue of the way in which those prior beliefs can interact with other 
beliefs in that hierarchical generative model, and come to take on content that 
issues from exteroception. Finally, the third condition is satisfied, since the 
objects which the emotion systems come to be associated with can be revised 
in response to the exigencies of competing hypotheses within the hierarchical 
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generative model (especially in one whose precision assignment is affected by 
dopamine dysregulation), and the cause of exteroceptive input towards which 
the emotion is directed might be misrepresented within the best current model 
of the causes of sensory input. I elaborate on this last point in the next section 
of the chapter. In considering the above, it would be reasonably correct to 
characterize the Pankseppian emotion systems as “knowers” (Maze 1983) in 
the sense required for the drive-conflict model of opacity to be instantiated, but 
this should be taken in the attenuated sense that is implied by the predictive 
processing framework. The only “knower” here is the agent as a whole, and the 
emotion systems are knowers insofar as they consists of beliefs that are 
updated through the ordinary processes of Bayesian inference that are operative 
in the predictive processing framework. 
 
4.2.2. Conflict resolution and the opacity of wish-fulfilment 
 
 Here, then, is the overall picture. Let’s once more take Mr R as our 
example, and gloss the case according to what might be going on with him if 
we interpret it in terms of the sub-personal level theory given in this chapter 
and the last. To begin with, recall Mr R’s central symptom, the great obsessive 
fear. That great obsessive fear was that people very close to him were being 
subjected to the rat torture that he learned about from the cruel captain. The 
people who he imagined being subject to this torture were his father and his 
romantic interest. Now, Freud hypothesized that this great obsessive fear was 
in fact a wish-fulfilment that was brought about as a consequence of emotional 
ambivalence towards these two figures. Hopkins (2012: 259) has formalized 
the pattern of explanation instantiated in that hypothesis like this: 
 
A des P [A’s father tortured] Æ A imaginarily exps, bels P [A’s father 
tortured] Æ A’s des P temporarily pacified 
 
 This formalizes the explanation of Mr R’s great obsessive fear in terms 
of a wish-fulfilment. The obsessive fear is a relatively straightforward case, 
which lacks the opacity that we have been discussing in this chapter. So in 
order to give a more complete overview let’s take the case of Mr R’s negative 
transference in the analysis with Freud, which consists in his irrational fear that 
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he would be beaten by Freud. The explanation of that behaviour as a wish-
fulfilment might be formalized like so: 
 
A des P [to escape his father’s anger] Æ A imaginarily exp, bels P [A 
escapes from father’s “anger” through cowering, etc. from Freud] Æ A’s 
des P temporarily pacified. 
 
Mr R has a desire to escape Freud’s imagined anger, which is itself caused by 
memories of his father as having a terrible anger and through the inhibition of 
this memory in virtue of it being incompatible with a dominant set of prior 
beliefs to the effect that his father and himself are like the best of friends.  But 
the emotion that is a higher elaboration of FEAR is nonetheless activated, and 
needs somehow to be accommodated into the overall model. It is therefore 
given a different object in the form of Freud himself, who is readily available 
to be the perceived source this fear. The emotion system of FEAR finds a new 
object. 
 
 We could give a similar gloss of the homophobic men that were studied 
in the study by Adam’s, Wright, and Lohr (1996). These were men who rated 
as homophobic, but who showed all the physiological signs of sexual arousal 
when they were shown same-sex pornography. I noted that this case is more 
challenging to explain because the emotion which makes the wish-fulfilment 
opaque is one that differs from the repressed emotion, which might have its 
origins in LUST. I also noted that the psychodynamic explanation of this 
phenomenon states that the reason this is so is because the censorious RAGE 
that was initially directed towards oneself for having these impulses was 
directed outwards when those same-sex attractions were also directed 
outwards, and attributed to others in the homophobe’s environment. The 
emotion-system of RAGE that was initially directed towards the self finds a 
new object, in the world. In this way it follows the same pattern as we see in 
the case of Mr R. 
 
 It seems to me that we can understand many cases of opacity in this 
way, that is, in terms of drives taking substitute objects. However, it might be 
claimed that although I can explain my examples of opacity in this way, the 
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solution I have presented is nonethless inadequate to account for all cases of 
opacity. But this would require the proponent of that objection to present a case that is 
too complex to be accounted for in this way and explain what that complexity consists 
in. As it stands, I contend that my approach to the opacity of wish-fulfilment is 
sophisticated enough to account for the cases that are central to psychodynamic 
neuroscience, in particular that of anosognosia for hemiplegia.. 
 
4.3. Concluding remarks 
 
 The sub-personal mechanism that can underwrite the sub-intentional 
analysis of wish-fulfilment is now complete, having been sketched out in this 
chapter and the last. That required us to discharge three metapsychological 
commitments: first, show how it is that motivational states could directly cause 
doxastic states; second, specify the circumstances under which this direct 
causation of doxastic states by motivational states would be likely to occur; and 
third, explain the opacity with which wish-fulfilment sometimes occurs. 
 
Indeed, one of the most puzzling things about wish-fulfilment is the 
way in which it sometimes pacifies its precipitating desire in opaque and 
indirect ways. Mr R affords us numerous examples of this phenomenon, but I 
have also provided one from experimental psychology (the homophobia study) 
and one from clinical neuropsychology (anosognosia for hemiplegia). In the 
case of anosognosia for hemiplegia, the motivation for holding the false belief 
would seem to be some kind of desire for bodily integrity, or an aversion 
towards the negative emotion that the awareness of the impairment would 
cause. But the way in which this desire or aversion is pacified is not 
straightforward. On the basis of these states, the false belief is formed to the 
effect that the patient is not impaired. But the patient continues to experience 
negative emotions, and these are directed onto inappropriate objects in the 
environment. 
 
 I have suggested that the way to handle this opacity is to avail ourselves 
of the classical psychodynamic notion of “drive.” On classical drive theory, the 
opacity of pacification is explained in terms of the way that drives can come to 
be attached to substitute objects in cases where its original objects are 
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unavailable. In the case of anosognosia, for example, the impairment becomes 
unavailable as an object for the emotion of SPG because the patient’s belief 
that she is impaired has become “repressed” – or perhaps better, inhibited in 
virtue of its incompatibility with the current dominant model of the causes of 
sensory input. But the drive signals which are usually explained away by SPG 
continue to push for representation in that current dominant model, and so are 
accommodated in such a way that will make it compatible. In our current 
example, that of anosognosia, it results in SPG being expressed towards 
substitute objects, like that of Weinstein and Kahn’s patient “ […] with 
paralysis of the right leg and inability to walk [who] ignored these defects but 
complained bitterly about constipation.” (Weinstein & Kahn 1950: 774) 
 
 Having elaborated the candidates for the sub-personal mechanisms of 
wish-fulfilment, we are now in a position to move on to a discussion of these 
mechanisms in a concrete context. This concrete context is that of anosognosia 
for hemiplegia. This illness is a perfect case to illustrate how psychodynamic 
modes of explanation might find purchase in the contemporary cognitive 
sciences. This is firstly, because patients with this illness exhibit symptoms of 
the kind which have traditionally been explained in terms of psychodynamic 
mechanisms, and secondly, because it is an illness which is clearly precipitated 
by a particular kind of brain damage. It is therefore seems to call out for 
explanation both in the neurocognitive and in the psychodynamic modes.  
185 
 
5. A neuropsychodynamic theory of “anosognosia for hemiplegia” 
 
5.1. A comprehensive overview of the phenomenon to be explained 
 5.1.1. Doxastic features of the condition 
 5.1.2. Affective features of the condition 
5.2. Cognitivist theories of anosognosia: their merits and limitations 
 5.2.1. One-factor and two-factor theories of anosognosia 
 5.2.2. The shortcomings of exclusively cognitive-deficit accounts 
5.3. Psychodynamic theories of anosognosia: their merits and limitations 
 5.3.1. An early psychodynamic account 
 5.3.2. Criticism of the early account 
 5.3.3. A more sophisticated psychodynamic account 
5.4. Removing objections against a neuropsychodynamic theory of 
anosognosia for hemiplegia 
 5.4.1. Wish-fulfilment and its putative psychogenicity 
 5.4.2. Wish-fulfilment and its mechanism of action 
 5.4.3. Wish-fulfilment and neurological features of the illness 
5.5. Concluding remarks 
 
 The condition I will be discussing in this chapter is often referred to as 
“anosognosia for hemiplegia” (AHP). This nomination might be hasty because 
anosognosia for hemiplegia just refers to the denial of paralysis whereas the 
precipitating brain damage can often cause other symptoms that require 
different categorization. For example, some patients with anosognosia 
explicitly deny ownership of the affected limb, while others only seem to 
forget that it is impaired; some patients have peculiar emotional distortions 
towards their body, while others do not. It has become a matter of course now 
that researchers of AHP gesture towards its clinical variability—that is to say, 
its nature as “a heterogeneous and multi-component disorder occurring due to 
lesions affecting a distributed set of brain regions…” (Fotopoulou 2013: 11) In 
view of the fact that the most common designation for this cluster of symptoms 
remains “anosognosia for hemiplegia,” I will just call the condition as a whole 
AHP and use the term “anosognosia” when I want to talk about denial of 
deficit in independence from the other symptoms associated with AHP. 
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 I would also like to give the following caveat at the outset, which 
should clarify exactly what I am arguing for in this chapter. To be clear, I am 
not arguing that every single case of AHP needs to be explained in 
psychodynamic terms – that is, in terms of motivated defense or wish-
fulfilment. The wide clinical variety of AHP makes this an impossible task, and 
most (if not all) contemporary defenders of explanation of AHP in terms of 
motivation make it clear that the psychodynamic theory sets out merely 
sufficient conditions for anosognosia to occur; that is to say that it may come 
about in different ways.70 I will therefore be pitching my own argument along 
the same lines, and arguing that cognitive-deficit theories are insufficient to 
account for all reported cases of AHP. Psychodynamic models of irrationality 
are required in some cases – in particular, those cases that are best interpreted 
as instances of “hot” self-deception, and whose symptoms lend themselves to 
explanation in terms of wish-fulfilment as defined in chapter two. The fact that 
such explanatory resources seem necessary in some cases has general 
consequences for the way the mind must be. 
 
To finish with these preliminary remarks, let me explain why I have 
chosen to discuss AHP in this chapter. The project of making psychodynamic 
theories of irrationality tractable within cognitive neuroscience faces a number 
of conceptual problems to do with the nature of both disciplines. However, it is 
also one of the richest and most powerful accounts of irrationality currently 
available. It is in the treatment of AHP that both of these properties are on 
display. That is firstly because it is an illness which lends itself readily to 
explanation in terms of self-deception—and furthermore, in which patients 
seem to exhibit the “defense mechanisms” which are the bread and butter of 
psychodynamic explanation; and secondly, because it is an illness which is 
quite clearly precipitated by damage to a specific brain region. What that 
means is that it is also an illness that calls out for explanation in the theoretical 
vocabulary of cognitive neuroscience. These two properties of AHP mirror the 
two issues with psychodynamic neuroscience or “neuropsychoanalysis,” and it 
is for this reason that it is a perfect test case for the explanatory power of 
                                                     
70 E.g. “These conditions or their relevantly modified analogues are not intended to be 
necessary for a mental state to count as self-deceptive. There may be other [non-motivated] 
ways to enter self-deception.” (Levy 2009: 234-235) 
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neuropsychodynamic models. 
 
5.1. A comprehensive overview of the phenomenon to be explained 
 
The basic presentation of AHP is as follows. The patient—usually an 
older person who has suffered a stroke—will be admitted to care with some 
degree of paralysis (“hemiplegia”) on the side of their body opposite to the 
brain lesion.71 Usually the lesion is on the right side with the hemiplegia being 
on the left, but there are rare cases in which this localization is reversed. After 
the patient has fully recovered consciousness and is examined they will often 
exhibit hemispatial neglect—an inability to attend to stimuli on the affected 
side of the body—as well as the inability to recognize that they are suffering 
from these deficits. It is just the inability to recognize the deficits that 
constitutes the anosognosia itself; the “anosognosia for hemiplegia.” 
 
 The generation of French physicians that were the first to name and 
write extensively on the condition noted in their patients the peculiar resistance 
with which they met attempts on the part of the clinician to get them to 
acknowledge their illness: 
 
[T]here seems to be more than simple unawareness of paralysis in 
patients with anosognosia; there exists a real obstinacy to not admitting 
it, a resistance to recognition that is really striking and somewhat 
disconcerting when it is found in a subject whose intellectual faculties 
are otherwise well preserved. (Barré, Morin & Kaiser 1923, cited and 
translated in Langer 2009: 398) 
 
One of the things being described here is the fact that this highly specific 
“resistance” is distinguishable from a more general lack of awareness—that is 
to say, the patient seems to have no inability with “recognition” in general, but 
rather a highly specific inability to “recognize” the fact of their impairment. 
The “obstinacy” of this inability is also quite striking. As will be explained, 
                                                     
71 A common misconception upon first hearing about this condition is that the paralysis is not a 
genuine one. But it surely is, and one of the main reasons that AHP is worthy of study is that it 
impedes the long process of rehabilitation with respect to the impairment, because that process 
requires a significant commitment on the part of the patient. 
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this recognition is often actively bolstered by means of supplementary 
delusions, and these emerge as if to preserve the central false belief that the 
patient is not paralysed. This is a theme that runs through case studies of AHP, 
and seems to exceed a passive lack of awareness that could be corrected by 
(say) directing the patient’s attention towards the paralysed part of the body by 
displaying it in the unaffected part of the visual field (e.g., Turnbull 1997). 
From the viewpoint of the interpreter there is an excess – rather than a deficit – 
of mental activity involved. 
 
 It seems to me that the symptoms of anosognosia for hemiplegia – that 
is to say, those which are distinct from the paralysis and neglect – can be 
categorized into pathologies of belief and pathologies of affect, but in this case 
I would want to suggest that this just is a guide to understanding rather than a 
substantive distinction. The pathologies of belief include the anosognosia, 
which is the unawareness of deficit itself; confabulation, which is the 
production of false memories and narratives about the patient’s circumstances, 
and which are produced without the intention to deceive; somatoparaphrenia, 
which is the delusion that the affected part of the body is in fact not part of the 
patient’s self, but belongs to somebody else; and lastly the fact that some of 
these patients seem to have implicit knowledge of their deficit despite all of 
these other symptoms. The pathologies of affect include the anosodiaphoria, 
which is an indifference towards the deficit that often sets in once the patient is 
able to become aware that they are paralysed; misoplegia, which is a hatred and 
disgust that the patient demonstrates towards the affected limb; and a number 
of generally distorted emotional attitudes, which I will discuss in more detail as 
we go on. I should offer a reminder at this point to the effect that not all of 
these symptoms occur in every patient, and not all at once. Some patients will 
be only slightly unaware of their deficit to the point that they need to be 
reminded of it, while some will have florid delusions that the paralysed limb 
belongs to somebody who is hiding in the bed with them. 
 
5.1.1. Doxastic features of the condition 
 
The anosognosia itself usually takes something like the following form. 
The examining doctor will request that the patient move their arm in order to 
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demonstrate the paralysis. Then one of two things will happen. Either the 
patient will not move their arm, but will claim that they have; or they will not 
move their arm and confabulate a reason that excuses them from doing so. 
Ramachandran (1995: 24) reports the following case, in which the patient 
excuses herself from demonstrating that she can move her arm on the basis that 
she just doesn’t want to. But she is paralysed. 
 
Mrs. M, when were you admitted to the hospital? 
I was admitted on April 16 because my daughter felt there was 
something wrong with me. 
What day is it today and what time? 
It is sometime late in the afternoon on Tuesday. (This was an accurate 
response.) 
Mrs. M, can you use your arms? 
Yes. 
Can you use both hands? 
Yes, of course. 
Can you use your right hand? 
Yes. 
Can you use your left hand? 
Yes. 
Are both hands equally strong? 
Yes, they are equally strong. 
Mrs. M, point to my student with your right hand. 
(Patient points.) 
Mrs. M, point to my student with your left hand. 
(Patient remains silent.) 
Mrs. M, why are you not pointing? 
Because I didn’t want to… 
 
The excuse in this case, that the patient didn’t want to move their arm, is one of 
the milder confabulations that the patient might engage in. A confabulation is a 
false narrative that the patient gives without conscious knowledge of its 
falsehood (Fotopoulou 2010: 40). The content of the confabulation can range 
from the mild – like that of the patient not wanting to move their hand – to the 
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outrageous, like that the patient has been out in the morning playing football, 
despite the fact they have been bedbound for days or need to use a wheelchair. 
 
 Sometimes particularly severe patients are subject to a condition called 
somatoparaphrenia. That is a quasi-delusional state with respect to body 
ownership which is linked to the anosognosia. In these cases, the patient will 
be unable to avow ownership over the paralysed limb, and will attribute 
ownership of it to another—sometimes the examining doctor, a family 
member, or sometimes even to somebody who is not present during 
examination at all. In a presentation to the London neuropsychoanalysis group, 
Fotopoulou presented a video recording of one of her cases in which the patient 
attributes ownership of the paralysed arm to her granddaughter, and grows 
increasingly upset and angry since she does not want the granddaughter to be 
in bed with her. However, the granddaughter is not even present in the room at 
the time of the interview. Ramachandran (1995: 24) demonstrates 
somatoparaphrenia in the continuation of his own case report: 
 
The same sequence of questions was repeated the next day with 
identical answers except that towards the end of the session the patient 
looked at me and asked: 
Doctor, whose hand is this (pointing to her own left hand)? 
Whose hand do you think it is? 
Well, it certainly isn’t yours! 
Then whose is it? 
It isn’t mine either. 
Whose hand do you think it is? 
It is my son’s hand, doctor. 
 
It seems as though many of these patients have implicit awareness of their 
deficit, though this is not true for all such patients. (Recall what I said about 
clinical variability.) What is meant by implicit awareness is that the patient acts 
in ways that suggests that they know that their limb is paralysed, although they 
will continue to explicitly deny it. They therefore seem both to know and to not 
know about their deficit. There are two pieces of evidence which compel us to 
think that there may be implicit awareness in some cases. The first is based on 
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clinical observation and the second comes from a more formal experimental 
study. 
 
 The first is from a clinical study by Ramachandran (1996), in which he 
took advantage of the fact that the anosognosia can be made to remit through 
caloric stimulation. That is a medical procedure in which ice water is syringed 
into the patient’s ear. It is thought to stimulate the vestibular system, which is 
associated with balance and spatial orientation (cf., Goldberg et al. 2012). When 
this procedure is applied the anosognosia goes into remission and the patient 
becomes aware of their deficit – that is to say that it becomes reportable by 
them. But the remission is only temporary, and the patient will regress back 
into the illness after some hours. Ramachandran (1996: 355) recounts his 
interview with the patient after the procedure as follows: 
 
VSR:  Do you feel okay? 
BM:  My ear is very cold but other than that I am fine. 
VSR:  Can you use your hands? 
BM:  I can use my right arm but not my left arm. I want to move it but 
it doesn’t move. 
VSR:  Mrs M, how long has your arm been paralyzed? Did it start now 
or earlier? 
BM:  It has been paralyzed continuously for several days now… 
 
About eight hours later, my [Ramachandran’s] assistant tested her. 
 
Assistant:  This morning, two doctors did something to you. Do you 
remember? 
BM:   Yes. They put cold water in my ear; it was very cold.  
Assistant:  Do you remember they asked some questions about your 
arms, and you gave them an answer? Do you remember 
what you said? 
BM:   I said my arms were okay. 
 
There are two features of this case which I think are particularly interesting. 
First, notice that it would be incorrect to characterize what is going on here as 
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the patient gaining a new awareness of the deficit, as though she had no 
awareness before the procedure. Rather, it is as though the patient is now able 
to report an awareness that she has had for the entire duration of their paralysis; 
it seems this way because the patient is able to report that duration: “It has been 
paralyzed continuously for several days now…” Second, notice the manner in 
which the patient regressed back into the anosognosia. She recalls the 
procedure that was performed by the doctors, and she recalls the examination 
afterwards, but her memory of the outcome is that she testified to the doctors 
that her arm was “okay.” So her memory of this event has been retrospectively 
altered – not just forgotten, but altered in quite a specific manner. That’s the 
clinical evidence for implicit knowledge of impairment. 
 
 The experimental evidence for implicit knowledge is just as 
compelling. Fotopoulou and her colleagues tested both for explicit awareness 
and implicit awareness of deficit, and found that there were patients with AHP 
that would score low on explicit awareness of deficit and score high on implicit 
awareness of deficit (Fotopoulou et al. 2010). That means that they report that 
they are healthy while having a non-reportable belief that they are actually 
paralysed. The way in which Fotopoulou and her colleagues tested for implicit 
awareness of deficit was with something called the Hayling sentence 
completion task. In this task the patient is required to complete a sentence with 
a word that is semantically unrelated to the rest of the sentence. That is to say 
that the patient is required to provide an inappropriate word, given a specific 
semantic context. Now, these sentences are constructed such that there will be 
completion words that automatically come to mind. For example, if I am given 
the sentence: “On this fine summer day the sun is…” then I will be prone to 
think of the word “shining” or “hot.” The task of the patient is to inhibit these 
automatic responses and to think of a new one. Patients were given three 
different kinds of sentences: neutrally-valenced (e.g. “A tow truck is often used 
to pull broken-down cars off the…”), negatively-valenced (e.g. “An ambulance 
is often used to take assaulted people to the…”), and deficit-associated (“A 
hoist is often used to lift paralysed patients off the…”). Longer response times 
(“latency”) to the deficit-associated sentences were meant to indicate implicit 
awareness of deficit.  That is because high latency suggests that the patient is 
having to do more mental work (or cognitive processing, or whatever) in order 
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to come up with an inappropriate term; presumably because the automatic 
response is stronger or more overly salient.  
 
The way in which Fotopoulou and her colleagues tested for explicit 
awareness was to use a self-rating measure in which patients were presented 
with sentences of the same three kinds and asked to rate them for self-
relevance. They found that there were patients in which the Hayling task 
showed unusually high latency in contrast with low self-attributed self-
relevance, which means that there were anosognosic patients with implicit 
awareness of deficit. 
 
 There is one more result that needs to be discussed before we move on 
to consider the more peculiar emotional symptoms that are associated with 
AHP. These results demonstrate that anosognosia for hemiplegia can 
sometimes be made to remit through a particular procedure that involves 
getting the patient to view a video replay of a discussion between the doctor 
and that patient (Fotopoulou et al. 2009; Besharati et al. 2014). The 
distinguishing features of this treatment are these: firstly, that the patient 
observes herself from a third-person perspective –  that is to say, from a point 
of view that differs from her own; and secondly, that the observation is “off-
line”; this means that the self-observation is out of sync with the patient’s 
activity, it is “at a time different than the one in which she initiated the 
movement.” (Besharati et al. 2014: 5) This treatment was found to reinstate 
motor awareness: 
 
As soon as the video stopped, LM [the patient] immediately and 
spontaneously commented: “I have not been very realistic”. Examiner 
(AF): “What do you mean?” LM: “I have not been realistic about my 
left-side not being able to move at all.” AF: “What do you think now?” 
“I cannot move at all.” AF: “What made you change your mind?” LM: 
“The video. I did not realize I looked like this.” Her awareness was 
again formally assessed with the same interview, and it was now 
consistent with both her upper and lower limb plegia. (Fotopoulou et al. 
2009: 1258) 
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In a follow up study, Besharati et al. (2014) reported that the remission of 
anosognosia was still in effect for at least a month after this procedure, and 
they demonstrate the general feasibility of the procedure by replicating it in 
two more anosognosic patients. That is an interesting fact about the illness that 
will need to be accounted for. 
 
5.1.2. Affective features of the condition 
 
Anosognosia of the severity we have been discussing will only be present 
during the acute stage after the stroke, and will most often spontaneously go 
into remission after some time. However, there will sometimes be persistent 
problems in recognizing all the consequences of the paralysis. For example, it 
was noted as early as Babinski (1914) that patients with AHP, once they have 
been induced to recognize their illness through intervention (or after 
spontaneous remission) maintain an affective or attitudinal relationship to the 
paretic limb that most people would consider unusual under ordinary 
circumstances. This affective component of the condition is called 
“anosodiaphoria.” Patients with this condition will acknowledge their paralysis 
but will not exhibit the attitudes that would be considered appropriate for a 
person who has a newly discovered paralysis that is likely to be permanent.72 
This most often takes the form of a benign indifference to the deficit—the 
patient will have no problem admitting their paralysis but it will seem to be a 
fact that makes no difference to the things that the patient cares about; it is as 
though it is a fact that is irrelevant to them, something they need not care 
about. They are often unrealistically optimistic about their prognosis, in that 
they seem not to make any inferential link between their paralysis and the 
consequences it might have for their future life and employment prospects. It’s 
for this reason that anosodiaphoria is sometimes characterized as a failure to 
appreciate the consequences of the impairment (e.g., Aimola Davies et al. 
2009: 189). 
                                                     
72 I should address here the issue of what constitutes “inappropriateness,” in order to allay 
suspicions that those ascriptions are made as the result of normative preconceptions of how the 
patient ought to feel. These judgments are not made on a normative basis, but rather in contrast 
to patients who have the hemiplegia but who do not have the anosognosia. Those patients often 
display distress at their condition, and sometimes react “catastrophically” – with “episodes of 
tearfulness and emotional breakdown” (Turnbull, Evans & Owen 2005: 67) That is in stark 
contrast to the indifference of the anosodiaphoric patient. 
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 In more severe cases, however, the emotional distortion may take the 
form of a personification and hatred of the affected part of the body—
sometimes, the patient may even physically abuse the limb. This is called 
“misoplegia,” and it was reported as early as Critchley (1955: 286) in the 
1950s: 
 
Occasionally we find a patient displaying a veritable dislike of the 
paralysed limbs which evoke feelings of disgust, dismay, and even 
horror. The paralysed arm may be kept covered by the bedclothes or a 
shawl so as to conceal it. Or the patient may keep the gaze averted from 
the affected side—an attitude which is not so much an unwilled 
deviation of head and eyes away from the limbs as a deliberate act of 
revulsion: a phenomenon in the realm of psychopathology rather than 
physiology. To direct inquiry the patient may speak of the limbs as 
being horrid, ugly, unnatural, heavy, like a block of wood or a piece of 
dead meat. The patient may even talk as though the physical properties 
of the limb had actually changed, becoming shrunken, discoloured, 
wizened, or corpse-like. 
 
Moss and Turnbull (1996: 210) have reported a more recent case of misoplegia 
in a ten year old boy. It was simultaneous with his anosognosia, but some of 
the boy’s behaviour also suggest at least an implicit awareness of the deficit. 
They describe the case as follows: 
 
In sharp contrast with this denial of deficit, his family, physiotherapist, 
and occupational therapist also reported that he held some unusual 
attitudes towards his left side. He was angry about his left limbs, often 
“hated” them, blamed them, and wanted to get rid of them. In the acute 
period in hospital he once actually threw himself out of his bed, on to 
his left side, in an attempt to injure his left arm and leg. He would often 
bend the fingers of his left hand backwards, attempting to break them. 
Both his mother and his physiotherapist reported him as saying that he 
“would rather destroy it, if he couldn’t use it.” 
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Emotional distortions of this kind are not limited to attitudes towards the 
paretic parts of the body, but also towards the patient’s immediate 
environment. Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000: 163), for example, report that 
one of their patients “[…] treated the left side of his body in just the same way 
as he did  the nursing staff, as if it were merely another piece of external reality 
that was refusing to do his bidding.” 
 
They also sometimes become very upset over such things with an 
emotional intensity that would be appropriate to their impairment – Weinstein 
and Kahn (1950: 774), for example, report that “a woman…with paralysis of 
the right leg and inability to walk ignored these defects but complained bitterly 
about constipation.” Similarly, Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000: 163) report a 
patient who “was frankly hypochondriacal with regard to minor ailments, such 
as a sore back and a difficulty in sleeping.” This kind of intense negative 
reaction towards other things in the environment – occurring simultaneously 
with anosognosia or anosodiaphoria – is not uncommon. Turnbull, Evans, and 
Owen (2005), in a case study involving a patient named IW, report that 
although IW was anosodiaphoric he experienced a higher overall level of 
negative affect than controls. It was just that this affect was not directed 
towards his impairment. 
 
This emotional distortion includes something that might be called 
emotional lability. That is a tendency towards fluctuations in emotional state, 
and a basic fragility of mood in general. Often, for example, these patients give 
the appearance that they are suppressing the experience of some negative 
emotion, and it either gets directed onto other objects – like in the woman who 
was bitterly upset about constipation – or it comes to the surface during 
discussions with the clinician. This is reflected in the case of IW, and in 
Weinstein and Kahn’s (1950) patients. Kaplan-Solms & Solms (2002) recount 
the similar case of Mr C, who was previously a civil engineer but whose 
deficits (including severe hemispatial neglect) meant that it was unlikely that 
he would ever be able to return to work again. Mr. C’s attitude towards the 
paretic side of his body was typically anosodiaphoric—that is, one of 
indifference and mild annoyance. He would downplay and rationalize his 
failure to perform motor tasks during examinations with doctors and sessions 
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with his psychologist. But during these sessions there would sometimes occur 
brief emotional episodes of a peculiar nature. Kaplan-Solms and Solms 
describe it like this: 
 
Mr. C presented in detached, aloof, even imperious fashion. 
Nevertheless, every now and then, and for no apparent reason, his face 
would suddenly crumple, and he would either burst into tears for a brief 
moment, or he would look as if he were about to burst into tears, before 
rapidly finding his composure again. The whole episode would be over 
in a flash, forming a curious incongruous contrast with his more 
pervasive attitude of invulnerable, narcissistic superiority. (Kaplan-
Solms & Solms 2002: 164-165) 
 
These kinds of cases suggest interpretation in terms of defense mechanisms – 
e.g. “displacement” for the negative attitude towards minor complaints; or 
“repression” for the denial of the painful knowledge that one is paralysed – and 
this vocabulary has been drawn upon by those who discuss these symptoms, 
even if they wish to deflate it by giving an overall cognitivist account of the 
mechanisms which underlie that defense (e.g., Ramachandran 1996). 
 
 Now, one might be justified in harbouring some scepticism towards 
these – so far purely anecdotal – reports concerning the emotional 
comportment of anosognosic patients. In order to probe the extent of this 
emotional lability for a particular group of patients, Turnbull, Jones and Reed-
Screen (2002) subjected the original data drawn upon by Kaplan-Solms & 
Solms (2000) to a more thorough analysis. That data is the result of both 
psychiatric and neurological treatment of four patients with paralysis and 
neglect. Two of these patients had right hemisphere lesions and the subsequent 
anosognosia and anosodiaphoria, and the other two patients lacked this 
syndrome. Turnbull and his collaborators notes that these four cases were 
originally reported in Kaplan (1994), where they are accompanied by extensive 
reports on clinical sessions with these patients. 
 
 The method that was employed was to reformat Kaplan’s case material 
into sentences suitable for classification, both by the authors themselves and by 
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neutral assistants who had no prior psychoanalytic experience. The assistants 
were asked to rate this material for the emotional content of the sentences, for 
the object towards which the emotion was expressed, for any instances of 
emotional breakdown, and for the emotion which preceded any instance of 
emotional breakdown. (Turnbull, Jones & Reed-Screen 2002: 79) The 
emotions were classified according to Panksepp’s theory of the emotion 
systems, which was discussed in the previous chapter; the emotions that could 
be chosen by the raters were separation distress (SPG), expectancy 
(SEEKING), anxiety (FEAR), and rage (RAGE). What analysis of Kaplan’s 
case material revealed was as follows. First, there was no significant difference 
in the emotional content of the clinical sessions with the anosognosic patients 
and the sessions with the non-anosognosic patients. That is to say that both 
classes of patient were rated as exhibiting the same emotions, and in roughly 
the same quantities. However, the authors found (as per the second type of 
classification on the part of the assistants) that this emotion was directed by 
anosognosic patients towards objects that were unrelated to their neurological 
deficit, for example, a difficulty in sleeping.  The third finding was that the 
anosognosic patients were much more prone to emotional breakdown than 
were the non-anosognosic patients. As Turnbull and his colleagues note (2002: 
81), this finding would seem to contradict the theory that anosodiaphoric 
patients merely have trouble expressing negative emotion, and it helps 
motivate a psychodynamic interpretation of the illness. Finally, the authors 
found that the emotional content preceding breakdown were overwhelmingly 
those of separation distress, rather than expectancy, anxiety, or anger. I will 
later on be suggesting that this data justifies the posit of psychodynamic 
explanations of anosognosia for hemiplegia to the extent that the philosophical 
objections against them can be satisfactorily addressed. I reproduce the 
visualizations of these results below. 
 
FIGURE 5.1: MEAN FREQUENCY OF EMOTIONAL CLASS EXPRESSED 
PER SESSION (Turnbull, Jones & Reed-Screen 2002: 80)  
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FIGURE 5.2. OBJECT OF EXPRESSED EMOTION FOR THE FOUR 
EMOTION CLASSES (Turnbull, Jones & Reed-Screen 2002: 81) 
 
 
FIGURE 5.3: MEAN NUMBER OF EPISODES OF EMOTIONAL 
BREAKDOWN PER SESSION (Turnbull, Jones & Reed-Screen 2002: 81) 
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FIGURE 5.4: FREQUENCY OF EMOTION CLASS PRECEDING 
EMOTIONAL BREAKDOWN IN ANOSOGNOSIC PATIENTS (Turnbull, 
Jones & Reed-Screen 2002: 82) 
 
 
What we typically have in AHP is a progression that begins with stroke 
and hemiplegia, with anosognosia for the hemiplegia which is sometimes 
bolstered by somatoparaphrenic delusion. That acute state often resolves into 
an anosodiaphoria or misoplegia towards the affected part of the body, and is 
often accompanied over the entire duration by an emotional distortion towards 
other things and people and in the patient’s general mood. There is also 
sometimes implicit awareness of the deficit that is being denied, and which can 
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become reportable by the patient after the anosognosia has passed. These are 
the phenomena which are to be explained. I will be arguing that cognitive-
deficit accounts of the illness are insufficient to explain every case of AHP, and 
that the psychodynamic mode of understanding cognition (and its vicissitudes) 
is well placed to supplement those accounts – but not, of course, replace them. 
 
5.2. Cognitivist theories of anosognosia: their merits and limitations 
 
5.2.1. One-factor and two-factor theories of anosognosia 
 
 Let me rehearse at this point a theoretical distinction in the study of 
anosognosia that I alluded to in the introduction to this thesis. That is the 
distinction between one-factor theories and two-factor theories of anosognosia 
(Davies, Aimola Davies & Coltheart 2005). This distinction has its origin in 
philosophical work on the theorization of delusion in general (e.g., Davies et al. 
2001). In the case of anosognosia, the delusion in question is the delusion of 
wellness; that is to say, the false belief that one’s limbs are not impaired. A 
one-factor theory of anosognosia states that the delusion is an ordinary 
cognitive response to an unusual perceptual experience, where this experience 
may be of the environment or of the body itself. What we need to explain the 
delusion, on this theory, is a specification of the neuropsychological deficit 
which leads to the unusual experience, along with an account of normal 
processes of belief formation which together with the unusual experience 
generate the delusional beliefs. The neuropsychological deficit – the “one 
factor” – is the only pathogenic factor in the explanation. An example of a one-
factor theory of anosognosic delusion is given by Cutting (1978). Cutting’s 
theory states that we can explain the delusion as arising from the patient’s 
neglect, which causes the patient to fail to integrate perceptual information 
from the paralysed limb into judgments about its status. When ordinary 
processes of belief-formation lack this information, then they form the 
delusional beliefs that are characteristic of anosognosia for hemiplegia. 
 
 It might be clear already that one-factor theories of delusion – at least 
as they are applied to anosognosia for hemiplegia – are unlikely to be true. 
There are two reasons for this. The first reason is descriptive, and has to do 
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with the link being made between the neuropsychological deficit and the 
delusion. The problem is that so far all the neuropsychological deficits that 
have been proposed as the pathogenic cause of the delusion turn out to occur in 
the absence of that delusion itself. With reference to Cutting (1978), for 
example, it has been found that there are cases in which these two impairments 
dissociate – that is, in which they are independent (e.g., Jehkonen et al. 2000). 
That means that the neuropsychological deficit itself cannot be sufficient for 
the delusion. Otherwise they would always co-occur. It might be that some 
neuropsychological deficit is a necessary condition for the delusion to occur, 
but this is not at all controversial, and it is not (as I will argue) incompatible 
with a psychodynamic account. 
 
The second reason that one-factor theories of anosognosia are unlikely 
to be true is more normative in its nature. We see in the case of anosognosia 
that the patient is subject to many sources of evidence that contradict their 
delusional belief: they are given testimony by their doctor that their limb is 
paralyzed, they have evidence from other sensory modalities that their limb 
cannot move, they may fall over when they attempt to walk without assistance, 
and so on. But none of this evidence is successful in overturning the delusional 
belief. So it seems as though the persistence of the belief in the face of this 
surfeit of contrary evidence also needs to be explained, and the one-factor 
theory of delusion is inadequate to this task. 
  
Two-factor theories of delusion contrast with one-factor theories in 
their demand that the theory of delusion not only account for the causal origin 
of the delusional belief, but also for the cause of its unusual persistence. This is 
done by including two explanatory factors in the theory. The first factor of the 
theory is meant to account for theway in which the delusion becomes plausible 
enough for acquisition. For example, it may be that the factor involves some 
phenomenological item serving as evidence for a delusional belief. Often, this 
factor is the same as that in the one-factor theory; it is a neuropsychological 
deficit which causes an unusual experience. The unusual experience, combined 
with normal processes of belief formation, generate the delusional belief. The 
second factor is meant to account for the persistence of the delusional belief. 
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That is to say that it is meant to explain why the belief is recalcitrant; why it is 
held in the face of overwhelmingly contradictory evidence. 
 
When it comes to anosognosia for hemiplegia, there is a controversy 
over the nature of the second factor in the two-factor theory (Aimola Davies et 
al. 2009). It has been suggested by some that we are faced with a choice 
between the factor being neurocognitive and the factor being motivation-based. 
We might, for example, say that the first factor is a failure of attention and that 
the second factor is a failure in ordinary processes of belief evaluation. A 
theory of this kind we would call a two-deficit theory, because it posits two 
cognitive deficits rather than one cognitive deficit and one motivation-based 
factor. This might be opposed to a two-factor theory which includes emotional 
or motivational elements in one or both of the factors. Let’s call this latter type 
of two-factor theory a psychodynamic two-factor theory. 
 
An example of a two-deficit theory of anosognosia is presented by 
Aimola Davies and Davies (2009). They suggest that the second factor should 
be construed as a deficit in working memory and/or executive function. They 
have a number of reasons for suggesting this. The most compelling of these is 
that it seems as though a failure in belief evaluation most often occurs after 
damage in particular to the frontal region of the right cerebral hemisphere 
(Aimola Davies & Davies 2009: 295), and that these brain regions are known 
to be associated with those higher cognitive functions (Aimola Davies & 
Davies 2009: 308, drawing upon the results of Goel & Dolan 2003). Their 
suggestion is pitched against the background of the dual-process theory of 
reasoning, which posits that human reasoning processes are dual – one fast, 
automatic, and heuristically driven (system 1); and the other slow, deliberate, 
and roughly optimal (system 2). What Goel & Dolan’s (2003) results 
demonstrate is that the frontal right hemisphere plays a significant role in the 
proper functioning of system 2. Aimola Davies and Davies argue that system 2 
is heavily drawn on in the evaluation of belief, and that the damage to this 
system in anosognosia explains the persistence of its characteristic delusion. In 
summary, their proposal is that “the second factor in the explanation of 
delusions, including anosognosia for motor impairments, is an impairment of 
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working memory or executive function with a neural basis in damage to the 
right frontal region of the brain.” (Aimola Davies & Davies 2009: 314) 
 
5.2.2. The shortcomings of exclusively cognitive-deficit accounts 
 
 It seems to me that there are clinical features of at least some cases of 
AHP that make it a condition best explained in terms of self-deception, where 
that self-deception is of a kind I will call “hot.” What I mean by “hot” is that it 
involves emotion and motivation, rather than just beliefs and belief-formation 
mechanisms.73 That would also mean that cognitive-deficit accounts which 
exclude emotional and motivational factors cannot account for them. Neil Levy 
(2009: 234)74 suggests the following three conditions that AHP would need to 
meet in order for it to count as a motivated self-deception. They are, ad 
verbatim: 
 
1. Subjects believe that their limb is healthy. 
2. Subjects also have the simultaneous belief (or strong suspicion) that 
their limb is significantly impaired and they are profoundly disturbed 
by this belief (suspicion). 
3. Condition 1 is satisfied because condition 2 is satisfied; that is, subjects 
are motivated to form the belief that their limb is healthy because they 
have the concurrent belief (suspicion) that it is significantly impaired 
and they are disturbed by this belief (suspicion). 
 
It seems to me that the conditions for hot self-deception can be reanalysed into 
four conditions, rather than just three. In particular, I would want to split up the 
second condition into two: first, that the implicit belief disturbs or causes 
anxiety in the agent, and secondly, that the fact of this anxiety or disturbing 
                                                     
73 It is a logical possibility that the right theory of anosognosia will be one that includes 
emotional or motivational factors but which does not take it to constitute an variety of self-
deception. In a theory of this kind motivated cognition would play a role but this motivated 
cognition would not satisfy the criteria for self-deception that I enumerate here. It seems to me 
that for the cases in which the anosognosic symptoms satisfy these criteria, a psychodynamic 
theory is more appropriate than the weaker motivation-based one. 
74 Levy’s concern is somewhat different than mine here; rather than wanting to determine the 
best way to explain anosognosia, he wants to demonstrate that anosognosia instantiates a case 
that would contradict Alfred Mele’s (2001) deflationary theory of self-deception. 
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quality causes the explicit (delusional) belief. So let’s re-express the conditions 
for hot self-deception as follows: 
 
1. Subjects believe that their limb is healthy. 
2. Subjects also have the simultaneous belief (or strong suspicion) that 
their limb is significantly impaired. 
3. Subjects are profoundly disturbed by their belief (suspicion) that their 
limb is significantly impaired. 
4. Condition 1 is satisfied because conditions 2 and 3 are satisfied; that is, 
subjects are motivated to form the belief that their limb is healthy 
because they have the concurrent belief (suspicion) that it is 
significantly impaired and they are disturbed by this belief (suspicion). 
 
That the first of these conditions is met in all patients can be initially seen 
through the fact that the illness itself consists in the false belief on the part of 
the patient that their limb is healthy. This has been demonstrated many times 
over. Consider, as a first example, Fotopoulou’s (2010) measure for explicit 
knowledge that we considered earlier in the chapter. In this study, patients were 
presented with sentences (negatively-valenced, neutrally-valenced, and deficit-
related) and were asked to rate each sentence for its self-relevance. 
Anosognosics were found to rate deficit-related sentences quite low for self-
relevance, which suggests that they do not believe that they are paralysed. Levy 
(2009) himself cites an earlier study by Ramachandran (1996), who established 
that hemiplegics with anosognosia and those without select differently when 
given the  choice between performing a unimanual for a small reward or a 
bimanual task for a slightly larger reward. The non-anosognosic hemiplegics in 
Ramachandran’s study always chose the unimanual task, whereas almost all 
anosognosic hemiplegics chose the bimanual task. This strongly suggests that 
the anosognosic patients thought they were capable of completing the task – 
that is to say that it indicates the belief that their left limb is not paralysed. 
 
That the second condition is met is more difficult to establish, but there 
is nonetheless a wealth of evidence that motivates us to accept that it is. Before 
I consider this evidence, however, let me address a point made by Levy (2009: 
235-236) to the effect that it is not enough to demonstrate that there is some 
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representation of the body as paralysed that exists in the mind as a sub-doxastic 
representation. Demonstrating the existence of a sub-doxastic representation of 
this sort would not be sufficient for the second condition, because this would 
not make the cases of anosognosia that I am considering genuine cases of 
motivated self-deception. We must therefore show that there is a bona fide 
personal-level belief on the part of the anosognosiac that he is paralysed, where 
by “bona fide personal-level belief” I mean that it is reportable by the agent 
under the appropriate circumstances. 
 
In order to see this distinction at work, consider Fotopoulou’s (2010) 
study in which she demonstrates the implicit awareness of deficit in at least 
some anosognosics. In this study, she found increased latency in anosognosiacs 
asked to give irrelevant responses to incomplete deficit-related sentences. Does 
this implicit knowledge reach the level required to meet the second condition? 
A compelling case could be given that it does not – the increased response time 
is suggestive of an extra processing step or two, but it does not demonstrate 
that the belief that the patient is paralysed is present in a fully-blown personal 
level sense. We would be much better off referring to the Ramachandran’s 
cases of remission after vestibular stimulation, in which the patient is able to 
acknowledge the temporal duration of her deficit. That is to say that the patient 
has a memory of having been paralysed during the time when she was denying 
it. The same thing occurs after the recovery reported by Fototpoulou brought 
on by the delayed video stream intervention (“I have not been very 
realistic…”). These kinds of cases show us that there are cases of anosognosia 
for hemiplegia in which condition one and condition two are met 
simultaneously. 
 
That brings us to the third condition, which is that the implicit belief 
that the limb is impaired causes disturbing emotions in the patient. As Levy 
(2009: 238) points out, this is quite a plausible thing to assume – the 
impairment in question is often permanent, and will often cause a massive 
change to the patient’s lifestyle and capabilities. But there are two further 
pieces of evidence that should persuade us that this third condition is met. The 
first of these is that patients who are hemiplegic but who are not anosognosic 
often suffer the negative emotions that we would expect to be present in the 
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anosognosic patient if condition three was satisfied. The asymmetry between 
the two types of patient in this case suggests two alternative hypotheses. Either 
the patient does not have this negative emotion, or the patient has this negative 
emotion but it is more difficult to interpret. The findings of Turnbull, Evans 
and Owen (2005) and that of Turnbull, Jones & Reed-Screen strongly motivate 
for the second of these hypotheses. That is because these findings suggest that 
anosognosic patients experience just as much negative emotions as non-
anosognosic hemiplegics do. The second reason to think that the third 
condition is met is – again, as demonstrated by various clinical studies (e.g., 
Kaplan-Solms & Solms 2000; Turnbull, Jones & Reed-Screen 2002; Cocchini 
et al. 2002; Besharati et al. 2014) – that anosognosic patients often experience 
overwhelmingly negative emotions if they are compelled to recognize their 
deficit through clinical intervention. That strongly suggests that condition three 
is met in these patients. 
 
That the fourth condition is satisfied in some anosognosic patients – 
that their delusion is formed because of the disturbing nature of the belief 
(suspicion) of impairment – is harder to establish. Levy (2009: 238) suggests 
that “we are forced to postulate an affective motivation for anosognosia, given 
that none of the other theories are sufficient to explain it, alone or in 
combination.” What Levy is referring to here is the persistent of the delusional 
belief in the face of surplus contrary evidence. This would mean that we should 
accept that some cases of anosognosia for hemiplegia instantiate a motivated 
self-deception because none of the other theories can account for all the 
evidence. I think that this is the right approach to take, but the evidence in 
question is wider than that which Levy mentions. In particular, I think it is the 
problem of giving a unified account of the emotional symptoms of the illness 
and the doxastic symptoms that is the best reason to think that we should adopt 
an at least partly psychodynamic theory of the illness. 
 
 I would like to offer a caveat at this point before I move on to discuss 
psychodynamic theories of AHP and the problems that they face. I think that 
the cognitive two-deficit account of Aimola Davies and Davies (2009) might 
be the right one for a subset of the clinical population with AHP. That is 
because for some of these patients, they appear not to satisfy all of the criteria 
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above. For example, there are some patients with AHP who do not seem to 
exhibit an implicit knowledge of their impairment (Fotopoulou et al. 2010: 
3572). That would mean that their condition is not interpretable in terms of hot 
self-deception. Furthermore, Fotopoulou and her colleagues (2010: 3572) 
specifically state in that study that the anosognosic patients for whom there was 
no implicit knowledge of impairment had damage to “cortical frontal areas,” 
which is roughly the same brain region that Aimola Davies and Davies (2009) 
suggest is subject to the deficit which constitutes their second factor. So I 
would like to suggest that both explanations may be right for different sets of 
patients. I feel that this concession is justified given the wide clinical variation 
that is present for the illness. 
 
5.3. Psychodynamic theories of anosognosia: their merits and limitations 
 
 Let me put the discussion thus far into context. So far I have given a 
comprehensive overview of the illness which I am here concerned to explain, 
and have argued that pure cognitive deficit accounts like the two-deficit 
account of Aimola Davies and Davies (2009) are insufficient to account for the 
full range of symptoms that patients with AHP exhibit. Those symptoms are 
these. First, there is the fact of implicit awareness, which is not well accounted 
for under a two-deficit theory. It is not well accounted for because the two-
deficit account of Aimola Davies and Davies (2009) implies that the patient 
fails to evaluate the false belief that they are well – so why would the patient 
also hold the true belief that they are not well? Secondly, it does not explain 
why it is that the ordinary expression of emotion is distorted in these patients, 
and in a systematic way (they tend to express negative emotion towards other 
things while excluding their impairment from this expression, except during 
brief episodes of motor awareness). Let’s now move to an theorization of the 
illness which takes these symptoms into account. 
 
5.3.1. An early psychodynamic account 
 
 In the second chapter of this thesis I suggested that the basic 
explanatory pattern of wish-fulfilment could be plausibly applied to 
anosognosia for hemiplegia. I cited the work of Weinstein and Kahn as a past 
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example of such application. Let’s again consider their contribution but this 
time with an eye to how it explains the emotional symptoms of AHP, and how 
these are related to its doxastic symptoms. That is to say, let’s not only show 
that it can be applied but go on to demonstrate the explanatory payoff. I will set 
out the theory again for the sake of proximity. 
 
 The first step that Weinstein and Kahn (1950) take is to provide a 
criticism of the contemporaneous localizationist accounts of AHP, and which 
will clear the ground for them to pitch their own theory. These localizationist 
accounts hypothesized that AHP is caused by focal lesion which causes 
damage to a localized representation of the body and its movement: 
 
In the case of anosognosia for left hemiplegia, it has been considered 
that there is disruption or fragmentation [via focal lesion to a particular 
localised faculty] of the “body scheme,” so that awareness of the left 
limbs and/or their paralysis is lost. (Weinstein & Kahn 1950: 787) 
 
The theory that the authors of are attacking here thus has three parts: first, the 
idea that there is a localized representation of the affected part of the body in 
the brain; second, that this representation is damaged in cases of anosognosia; 
and third, that it is this damage which is the cause of the anosognosia. They are 
disputing theories of anosognosia that localize the illness in the brain in this 
fashion.  
 
They attack these kinds of theories of anosognosia on the grounds that 
disturbance of the “body scheme” seems to be insufficient to bring about 
anosognosia. That is to say that there are cases recorded by Weinstein & Kahn 
(1950) and previous researchers (cited in 1950: 787n23) for which disturbance 
of body scheme has occurred through focal lesion but in which there is no 
anosognosia: “We have seen a number of patients with hemiplegia who 
showed disturbance of the ‘body scheme’ with right-left disorientation, finger 
agnosia and sensory displacement and extinction who did not deny the 
hemiplegia.” (Weinstein & Kahn 1950: 787) 
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In contrast to this localized account, Weinstein and Kahn want to 
explain anosognosia as a psychogenic illness which is not caused by but is 
more likely to occur under the circumstances of brain damage. The lesion 
which precipitates the anosognosia determines the deficit which is denied, but 
according to Weinstein and Kahn it is not to be mistaken for the cause of the 
anosognosia itself: 
 
Thus the patterns of anosognosia for hemiplegia and blindness do not 
differ from those in which the fact of an operation or the state of being 
ill is denied. Under the requisite conditions of brain function the patient 
may deny the paralysis of an arm whether it results from a fracture, an 
injury to the brachial plexus, a brain stem or cortical lesion. The effect 
of the brain damage is to provide the milieu of altered function in which 
the patient may deny anything that he feels is wrong with him. 
(Weinstein & Kahn 1955: 123) 
 
Despite the fact that the mechanisms of anosognosia are not to be explained in 
terms of the local deficit, it is not the case that these mechanisms alone are 
sufficient for the gross distortions of reality that are seen in the pathological 
anosognosic patient. There are many different kinds of local deficits that may 
provide a raw material which enable the anosognosic state to occur. 
 
Some motivation to deny illness and incapacity exists in everyone and 
the level of brain function determines the particular perceptual-
symbolic organization, or language, in which it is expressed. (Weinstein 
& Kahn 1955: 123) 
 
There is a continuity between the wishful distortions seen in AHP and those 
seen in ordinary people, in ordinary cases of self-deception. It is just that those 
distortions acquire a unique force in AHP. That is to say that the anosognosia is 
a psychological phenomenon that can be isolated from the deficit, but in which 
the deficit provides the circumstances under which it can become saliently 
pathological. 
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 Though this theory has many flaws – flaws that have been well 
rehearsed in the literature, and which we will presently examine – it is well 
placed to account for some of the more puzzling symptoms that are associated 
with AHP. These symptoms are as follows: 
 
1. Why is it that anosognosic patients exhibit the same levels of negative 
emotion as non-anosognosic patients, but that these emotions are 
directed at objects unrelated to their neurological impairments? 
2. Why is it that anosognosic patients experience more episodes of 
emotional breakdown than non-anosognosic patients, and that these 
episodes typically occur after discussing topics of loss? 
 
The Weinstein and Kahn theory, in virtue of its ability to give a 
psychodynamic account of such symptoms, will be able to link them with the 
doxastic features as follows. The unawareness of deficit is a defensive 
adaptation which is mobilized on account of the disturbing nature of the belief 
(suspicion) that one is impaired. This enables to the patient to avoid 
catastrophic anxiety. This can be glossed according to the basic explanatory 
pattern of wish-fulfilment: the patient’s desire for bodily integrity directly 
forms the doxastic representation that the patient’s bodily integrity is 
preserved. 
 
Of course, such an adaptation is not sustainable given its divergence 
from reality and it will happen that the impairment comes into the patient’s 
awareness in the form of error signal to some extent, and which elicits feelings 
of loss. This error signal can be accommodated into the best current overall 
model by directing that negative emotion onto new objects, which allows the 
patient to express it but which also allows them to continue on with the wish-
fulfilment. That accounts for the way in which negative emotion is experienced 
towards inappropriate objects. Similarly, if the function of the anosognosia is 
to ward off negative affect then this also explains the emotional breakdown that 
often occurs in conjunction with motor awareness. These emotional symptoms 
can be seen as having an intimate link with the doxastic ones, in that they are 
the result of the failure of that adaptation that the doxastic symptoms 
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represents. That is the explanatory power of the Weinstein and Kahn’s (1950) 
account, and of psychodynamic accounts in general. 
 
5.3.2. Criticism of the early account 
 
The Weinstein and Kahn theory of anosognosia has fallen into 
disrepute. This is due to a number of influential criticisms of the theory that 
were published in the 1980s and early 1990s. Bisiach and Geminiani (1991: 
25-26), for example, have criticized (but not decisively, as I will argue) both 
“psychodynamic” theories of anosognosia as well as theories which aim to 
explain the illness in terms of some overall decrease in global function (cf., 
Aimola Davies et al. 2009: 201). They present eight facts about the illness that 
they claim only localized neurocognitive theories of the illness can account for. 
They are as follows: 
 
1. The anosognosia occurs in an acute phase after the brain lesion, and 
often resolves without intervention after some time. If the denial was 
strategic or “goal-directed,” then we should expect a realization of the 
deficit to be followed by the denial, and we would expect it to last for a 
longer period. 
2. If the lesion that precipitates the deficit occurs in regions that do not 
subserve higher cognitive function, then anosognosia will typically not 
occur. That suggests that damage to some localized region is necessary 
for the anosognosia to occur. 
3. Anosognosia is much more common in right hemisphere lesions, and 
typically does not occur after damage to the corresponding region on 
the left hemisphere. This also suggests localization. 
4. Anosognosia is typically selective, which means that it occurs for one 
or two particular deficits. It may occur for hemiplegia and not neglect, 
for instance. If the patient is employing anosognosia as a defense then it 
is unclear why it is not employed globally. 
5. Patients often show implicit awareness of deficit. 
6. Motivation-based theories of anosognosia leave it unclear why 
misoplegia would occur, since misoplegia seems to constitute a hyper-
awareness of the plegia rather than a denial of it. 
213 
 
7. The denial of illness is hard to account for from an evolutionary-
adaptive point of view: why should denial of illness be considered as an 
adaptation on the part of the organism, given that this impedes 
recovery? 
8. Why would squirting cold water into the ear of the patient cause 
remission of anosognosia, if the anosognosia was caused by 
motivational states that the patient is in? A psychological explanation 
like that seems at odds with this strikingly non-psychological fact about 
the illness. 
 
The reader may already have concluded that not all of these eight facts hit the 
target as well as Bisiach and Geminani may like. Indeed, and as Turnbull, 
Jones & Reed-Screen (2002: 71) have noted, many of these objections seem to 
be poorly motivated. For example, I find it difficult to understand why Bisiach 
and Geminiani think that the fact of implicit awareness is in contradiction with 
the psychodynamic account, given that – as we have already established – 
implicit awareness is one of the necessary conditions for the hot self-deception 
that a psychodynamic account explains. In any case, let us make clear the 
philosophical intuition that underlies most if not all of these empirical 
objections. 
 
 It is a general feature of very many of these facts that they have to do 
with precise physiological interventions (e.g., caloric stimulation, which targets 
the vestibular system) and physiological causes and symptoms (e.g., the 
predominance of right hemisphere lesion). The intuition is that the 
psychodynamic theory of Weinstein and Kahn, by virtue of explaining the 
illness in terms that are general to all cases of anosognosia and in terms of 
features that are predicated of the whole organism, is unable to do justice to 
features of the condition that suggest damage to anatomically localized brain 
functions. The most glaring example of such a feature is the fact that 
anosognosia rarely occurs following damage to the left hemisphere, though it 
sometimes does. A global or psychodynamic theory, according to Bisiach and 
Geminiani, cannot account for such an asymmetry. This therefore constitutes a 
critique of the psychogenic feature of global theories, insofar as bona fide 
psychological predicates are ones that apply to the person or the organism as a 
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whole rather than to some part of the organism (e.g. some specific neuronal 
population or brain region). 
 
 Let me elaborate on what I mean here, because cognitive neuroscience 
has recently seen an increased application of psychological predicates to parts 
of the mind, rather than to the mind as a whole. For example, much of my 
discussion of the predictive processing framework has involved talking about 
“prior beliefs” and “inferences,” where these have traditionally been predicated 
of persons rather than parts of organisms. Indeed, the conventional wisdom has 
more or less always been that beliefs, desires, and so on are terms whose only 
appropriate predication is to persons.75 To endorse this view is to make the 
claim that a person can have a belief (or be in a belief-state), but a brain cannot. 
It has been on these grounds that critics like Bennett and Hacker (2003) 
criticize the conceptual foundations of cognitive neuroscience – that is to say, 
they suggest that theories which entail that neuron populations “represent,” 
“think,” and “perceive” are committing a category mistake. 
 
 Now, because these states cannot be attributed to parts of the brain, they 
must be predicated of the whole person – the “mind” as opposed to the brain. 
What comes next is the claim that since this theory is built out of concepts that 
can only rightfully be predicated of the person, then it cannot explain the 
neuroanatomical specificity of the illness – for example, the fact that it most 
often occurs after damage to the right cerebral hemisphere (rather than the left). 
This is because explaining (or accounting for) those specifics require that one 
explain what those neuroanatomical parts of subsystems are doing (or failing to 
do), and this cannot be done with concepts that must be predicated of the whole 
person. I think that this is part of what is meant when critics accuse 
psychodynamic theories of anosognosia as being inappropriately 
“psychogenic.” 
 
 Another interpretation of the intuition that underlies the objection from 
psychogenicity would be this: First, it is supposed that the motivation to avoid 
                                                     
75 The point has most been most forcefully made in recent times by the Wittgenstein of 
Philosophical Investigations (1953), at least as he has been interpreted by some in the 
philosophy of mind (e.g., Dennett 1969). 
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anxiety is a general aetiological factor, rather than one linked to a specific 
functional deficit. Second, if it is true that the delusion is caused by such a 
general factor then it seems right to say that the delusion should occur 
following any functional deficit that is similar to the functional deficit that 
precipitates AHP (i.e., paralysis and neglect of the left-hand side). However, 
we see that AHP tends not to occur following these deficits on the right-hand 
side. Assuming that these deficits are sufficiently similar to the deficits present 
in AHP, then, it would seem that it cannot be caused by a general aetiogical 
factor, and therefore cannot be caused by the motivation to avoid anxiety. It 
seems to me, however, that when we examine this interpretation more closely it 
reduces to the previous interpretation. That is because the assumption that 
motivation must be a general aetiological factor is based upon the assumption 
that it is something that can only be predicated of the whole person; it is this 
supposed semantic rule for its predication that prevents it from being 
anatomically and functionally specific. 
 
 There is another related objection that has been levelled at putatively 
psychogenic theories of anosognosia, and this is that they lack a plausible 
mechanism of action. That has already been discussed in the second chapter of 
this thesis with reference to Ditto (2009), and what it means is that the theorist 
of psychogenic anosognosia owes his critics an account of how emotions and 
motivation-states can interfere with ordinary cognitive processes, of which 
either none is forthcoming or which is redundant in relation to the already 
existing information-processing account of how cognitive processes go awry.  
 
 The cognitive critique of psychodynamic theories of anosognosia can 
therefore be crystallized into three central points. The first of these is 
represented by the “eight facts” given by Bisiach and Geminiani (1991), and 
the underlying point is that psychodynamic theories of anosognosia fail to 
account for neurological facts about the condition. This leads to the second and 
closely related point, which is that these theories are inappropriately 
psychogenic in that they use “thick” psychological concepts, and that this is the 
reason that it fails to account for those neurological facts. By “thick 
psychological concepts,” I mean concepts which are only appropriately 
predicated of the whole person (e.g., the property of being in such-and-such a 
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motivational state) rather than of some part of the cognitive system (e.g., the 
property of deficit in the motor intention system, or the property of 
representing some state of affairs in Dennett’s “attenuated” (2007) sense). The 
third complaint is that psychodynamic theories in general and those of 
anosognosia in particular fail to provide a plausible mechanism of action – and 
even more damningly, that the phenomena to be explained can already be 
accounted for under the existing information-processing framework. This 
means that motivation-based theories should be excluded on grounds of 
parsimony. It is these objections that motivate a shift to cognitive-deficit 
accounts in the explanation of anosognosia for hemiplegia. 
 
 Notice the way in which these objections all seem to be mutually 
supporting to some extent. The critic of the psychodynamic approach to 
anosognosia first points out that the concepts being used are fully blown 
psychological concepts which cannot rightly be predicated of some subsystem 
of the brain. Because of this, the critic claims, there are neuroanatomical 
complexities of the disease which the psychodynamic theorist cannot account 
for. Now, one possible reply that we have available to the critic at this point is 
that these complexities can indeed be accounted for, by specifying the nature of 
the brain mechanisms which subserve the theories which are used to account 
for clinical phenomena – that is, those phenomena which are described using 
psychodynamic concepts like “displacement.” But this reply is blocked by the 
third objection, which states either that there is no plausible mechanism of 
action which can be drawn upon or that any such mechanism is redundant in 
comparison to the options that are already available. This is a powerful series 
of objections, and I will try my hand at addressing them after I have introduced 
the psychodynamic account of Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000). 
 
5.3.3. A more sophisticated psychodynamic account 
 
Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000) present their own theory of 
anosognosia for hemiplegia which is motivated by the problematic emotional 
symptoms that I have already enumerated, and which is meant to deal with 
some of the critical points I have just discussed. It is intended to deal with them 
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by contributing some neurological specificity to an account of the 
psychodynamic mechanisms which putatively underpin the illness. 
 
Their theory draws attention to a change in personality that they claim 
to see in the patients that they have dealt with. I have already discussed the 
tendency towards emotional breakdown, and that of emotionally distorted 
attitudes in general. Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000) further claim that their 
patients exhibit attitudes towards themselves and the world which can be 
characterized as narcissistic. They give detailed descriptions of this trait in 
both of the anosognosic patients for whom the case study was analysed by 
Turnbull, Jones and Reed-Screen (2002). This is a man who is given the name 
of Mr C, and a woman who is given the name of Mrs B. Narcissism is 
characterized by Kaplan-Solms and Solms after the Freudian (1914) fashion as 
a comportment in which the agent is unable to see the world from other points 
of view, and can only interpret the world in terms of his or her own needs. For 
example, with respect to Mr C Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000: 162-163) make 
the following observations: 
 
[…] Mr C presented in an aloof, imperious, and egocentric fashion. He 
seemed almost oblivious to the world around him, except insofar as it 
affected his own well-being and needs, and he appeared quite unable to 
see things from another person’s point of view […] He was also 
extremely intolerant of frustrations of any kind. This was expressed 
most clearly in relation to the nursing staff, whom he treated as if they 
were all combined into one big mother whose only function it was to 
meet his personal needs – and, moreover, to do so immediately […] 
Most important of all, he expected – indeed demanded – to make an 
immediate and total recovery, so that he could return to work forthwith, 
as well as to his previous respected position in society. He seemed to 
harbour an intense need to regress, to be looked after and cared for, and 
yet he consciously abhorred dependence and vulnerability of any kind 
and wanted to be treated as if he were the chairman of a public 
company […] He was, in a word, narcissistic. 
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This narcissistic comportment is claimed by Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000: 
238) to be common to their patients. They offer a particular theory for it which 
they think will also account for the anosognosia, and which is based upon the 
Freudian (1914) theory of narcissism. 
 
The first postulate of that theory is that infantile mental life is of this 
narcissistic kind: the infant can only understand the world in terms of his own 
needs and desires, and comes to understand that there is a world out there 
independent of him through the frustration of these needs and desires. The first 
emotional attitude towards the world is therefore a RAGE which is elicited in 
response to the frustration of SEEKING. The way in which the infant moves 
beyond this hatred towards the external world is to slowly expand its libidinal 
investment in the world, which means slowly increasing the number of things 
in the world that the infant takes to be part of itself to some extent. The first of 
these things to be so invested is the infant’s own body, and this investment 
moves outwards to the first caregiver, the family, and so on. But this “object 
love” is an ambivalent one, because none of these objects – not even its own 
body – conform without exception to the infant’s needs. What comes next is a 
process of maturity, in which the infant learns to accept that the world has an 
existence that is independent of its whims: 
 
Upon the foundations of these early narcissistic cathexes, all our 
libidinal relations with the outside world of objects are ultimately 
established. These subsequent relationships are progressively less 
egocentric, and during the process of development an important shift 
occurs in our whole conception of the world, as we reluctantly come to 
accept that it really is quite separate from us and quite indifferent to our 
own urgent needs. (Kaplan-Solms & Solms 2000: 181) 
 
Kaplan-Solms and Solms suggest that this mature and realistic mode of 
relationship to objects is subserved by structures in the right cerebral 
hemisphere, and that damage to these structures causes a regression to infantile 
narcissism. That would account for the way in which patients with anosognosia 
tend to interpret objects in their environment in terms of their desire – that is to 
say, it would account for the way in which their beliefs are wishfully distorted 
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– and it would also explain the proneness to emotional breakdown as this 
narcissistic mode of understanding the world is disrupted by reality. 
 
Now, it must be said that I have some qualms about the Kaplan-Solms 
and Solms (2000) account of anosognosia as regression to narcissism, to the 
extent that their account seems somewhat underspecified when it comes to the 
mechanism of that narcissism.76 And the hypotheses they present sometimes 
exceed the ability of the clinical material (at least that which they have 
published) to evidentially underwrite them. Indeed, they themselves admit this 
shortcoming: “As can be seen, we have not shied away from pushing our 
formulation to the absolute limits that the clinical evidence will allow, and 
frankly – in some respects – we have pushed it beyond that.” (Kaplan-Solms & 
Solms 2000: 199) But there are at least two valuable things about the account 
that they have given, and which this under-specification does not impugn. The 
first is that it demonstrates to us that the criticisms of Bisiach and Geminiani 
(1991) are not necessarily fatal. It demonstrates to us that the failure of 
Weinstein and Kahn (1950) is a failure of omission, in that they have given no 
account of how anosognosia, if viewed as a psychological defense, can be 
linked to the workings of the brain. But that is an omission which can be 
corrected. The second point of value here is that the in depth interview of their 
patients reveals interesting features of the illness which would otherwise 
remain obscure; more specifically, the narcissistic changes in personality. And 
in what follows I will be arguing that this clinical insight can be given a 
tentative mechanistic underpinning in the notion of complexity reduction as 
introduced by Mathys (2013), and without the questionable developmental 
hypotheses that it seems to imply in its classical psychodynamic formulation. 
 
5.4. A neuropsychodynamic theory of anosognosia for hemiplegia 
 
5.4.1. Wish-fulfilment and its putative psychogenicity 
 
                                                     
76 Another issue here is that the Freudian story which is meant to explain the regression to 
narcissism in terms of developmental stages seems to be contradicted by the results from the 
recent research (Stern 1985: 240-242; Rochat & Hespos 1997; Rochat 2012) that I cited in the 
previous chapter. But that developmental story is incidental to the work that the posits of 
narcissism and regression are doing in the Kaplan-Solms and Solms account, and I will argue 
that it can be replaced by the complexity-reduction story of Mathys (2013). 
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 What would be required to address the criticisms against the 
employment of psychodynamic explanation in a theory of anosognosia? As we 
have seen, there are symptoms of the illness that strongly motivate for an 
explanation in terms of wish-fulfilment. Let’s first consider the objection from 
the putative psychogenicity of psychodynamic accounts. I have already given a 
brief gloss of that objection, but I actually think that there are two different 
ways in which the objection can be interpreted. The first of these 
interpretations takes the objection to consist in the claim that psychodynamic 
theories of anosognosia draw upon concepts that are not apt for use in theories 
of the kind that we would require in order to explain anosognosia. The second 
of these interpretations takes the objection to consist in the claim that 
psychodynamic theories are mistaken in that they give the illness a 
psychological cause where the illness is clearly precipitated by a neurological 
cause. 
 
 The first interpretation of the psychogenicity objection is that 
psychodynamic theories of anosognosia give personal level explanations of the 
illness where what is appropriate is a subpersonal level explanation. (This 
distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of description was 
discussed in sections 1.3.2 and 2.3.2.) There are two reasons why personal 
level description has traditionally been thought to be inappropriate in the 
context of sub-personal theories of mental function. The first of these is that 
personal states have Intentional content – that means that they are about 
something (e.g., a belief that snow is white is a belief about snow and 
whiteness), and it is claimed that this property of having Intentional content is 
not explicable in terms of the (causal and functional) properties that are 
admissible in the natural sciences. The second reason that personal level 
description has been thought to be inappropriate in the context of sub-personal 
theories is that personal level explanations are rationalizing in a way that 
subpersonal level theories are not. This leads to two distinct ways in which the 
psychodynamic explanation of AHP could be called out for its putative 
psychogenicity. 
 
 The first is that by explaining the illness in terms of mental states (like 
the unconscious desire to minimize anxiety, say), the psychodynamic theorist is 
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illicitly assuming that sub-personal states can have Intentional content. That is 
to say that he is attributing that personal level property of Intentionality, where 
the only properties that are admissible in this domain are functional and causal 
properties. But this particular objection fails because Intentional properties are 
in fact widespread in sub-personal theories, via the concept of representation. 
In the first chapter of this thesis, for example, we discussed the Ruth Millikan’s 
(1984) biosemantic theory of representation. That is meant to be a theory 
which demonstrates that the property of representing something is an 
admissible property to draw upon in subpersonal contexts. Indeed, there are 
extant objections against the concept of representation in sub-personal 
contexts, as exemplified by Bennett and Hacker (2003). But this is not an 
objection that can be levelled by the cognitivist against the psychodynamic 
theorist, because those objections apply with just as much force to the posit of 
doxastic representations in cognitive theories as they do to the posit of 
motivational representations in psychodynamic theories. 
 
 The second way to call out psychodynamic theories on their putative 
psychogenicity is this: that wish-fulfilment implies a strategy on the part of the 
patient to form the false belief, a strategy which is made rationally intelligible 
from the point of view of that agent, and which is made so intelligible by 
giving the explanation.77 That would be to say that such rationalizing 
explanation implies a agential subsystem outside of the consciousness of the 
patient who forms an intention to get the patient to accept the delusional belief. 
As I have already noted in section 2.1.2 of this thesis, this is a very old 
criticism of psychodynamic explanation of irrationality that has its early origins 
in Sartre (1982 [1956]). But as I also noted this criticism has been addressed at 
length in the philosophy of psychoanalysis, most explicitly by Gardner (1993). 
The problem is overcome by making the link between the desire and the false 
belief a causal one; the desire causes the false belief in the absence of any 
intention to form the belief. So the psychodynamic explanation of AHP is not 
psychogenic in this way. It does, however, oblige us to give a sub-personal 
account of how desires could cause doxastic representations in this way. But 
that obligation will be addressed in conjunction with the “no plausible 
                                                     
77 Of course, the wish-fulfilment is not thereby made rational – just intelligible from the point 
of view of the agent who is subject to an imperative to minimize anxiety. 
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mechanism” objection. Once that obligation is discharged, we will have dealt 
with this first interpretation of the psychogenicity objection. 
 
 The second interpretation of the psychogenicity objection is that the 
psychodynamic theorist posits psychological causes where the illness is quite 
obviously caused by a neurological event – that is, the brain damage to the 
right cerebral hemisphere. In Weinstein and Kahn (1950), for example, the link 
between that brain damage and the anosognosia itself is left obscure, and it’s 
for this reason that they can’t explain why (for instance) anosognosia occurs so 
frequently after right hemispheric lesion in contrast to the rarity of that illness 
after left hemispheric lesion. But there is no reason – and this is illustrated to 
great effect by Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000) – that we cannot give the 
original brain lesion a causal role in the precipitation of the illness. The very 
fact that we can do so demonstrates that there is no incompatibility between the 
inclusion of both psychological and neurological causes. Indeed, what 
proponents of this objection seem to be committed to is the conflation of the 
inclusion of psychological causes with the exclusion of neurological causes. 
And these are clearly not the same thing. Aimola Davies et al. (2009) have 
recently given a more sophisticated gloss of this insight with reference to the 
two-factor theory of delusion. They show that motivational factors can be 
comfortably accommodated within a two-factor theory of the illness alongside 
neuropsychological-deficit factors, but of course this accommodation would be 
provisional pending evidence that motivational factors do indeed play a 
significant role. 
 
 But this two-factor treatment is still unsatisfactory as a reply to the 
second psychogenicity objection, because it seems to entail that a 
psychological cause (e.g., some motivation) cannot also be a neurological 
cause. That is an inference that is unfortunately often made in the delusions 
literature: Bortolotti (2013), for instance, claims that “According to 
psychodynamic accounts [of delusion], there needs to be no neurobiological 
deficits and delusions are caused by motivational factors alone”; and Aimola 
Davies et al. (2009: 193) similarly state that “The neuropsychological (two-
deficit) version of the two-factor theory of delusions offers no place to 
motivational factors.”  
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One of the great merits of the Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000) account, 
however, is that it demonstrates how neuropsychological-deficit accounts and 
motivation-based accounts need not be in tension. The conceptual innovation 
that allows them to demonstrate this is the Jacksonian theory of neural 
hierarchy (e.g., York 3rd & Steinberg 2011). On this theory, the functions of 
the brain are hierarchically arranged with functions at higher levels inhibiting 
and re-representing functions at lower levels. This hierarchical arrangement 
means that damage to higher functions causes a disinhibition of the lower 
functions that were previously re-represented by those higher functions. One 
consequence of this is that some brain lesions might result in two distinct 
species of symptom. The first would be a negative symptom, which is the 
direct result of the diminution of function caused by the lesion. The second 
would be the positive symptom, which is a result of the removal of that 
function which played a certain modulatory role within a dynamic network; on 
a simple reading of Jackson, it would be an increase in that function which the 
damaged higher function served to inhibit. 
 
 This Jacksonian model of hierarchical function allow us to see that 
there is not necessarily any contradiction between a causal factor being that of 
a neuropsychological deficit and it also being interpretable in terms of  
psychological states. That is because the very same lesion may cause two 
symptoms – one of which seems to be a diminution of function, the other 
which seems to be an excess of it. One example of such excess is the 
narcissism that Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000) claim is apparent in their 
patients. This is the way in which those patients seem to regress into a 
comportment towards the environment in which they have difficulty 
recognizing the world as it is and are prone to understand it exclusively in 
terms of their own needs and wishes. That is an overall change that is caused 
by the lesion, but it is a complex psychological change rather than a local 
deficit in some clearly demarcated function. 
 
5.4.2. Wish-fulfilment and its mechanism of action 
 
224 
 
 Before getting a start on explaining how I think a psychodynamic 
interpretation of AHP can be given a sub-personal underpinning, let me 
rehearse for the sake of proximity the various mechanistic accounts of 
psychodynamic phenomena that have been introduced over chapters three and 
four. The first of these was the predictive processing theory of global brain 
function. On this theory, the brain is conceived as a sophisticated hypothesis 
tester whose overall function is to successfully predict its sensory states on the 
basis of a generative hierarchical model of the causes of those sensory states. It 
does so by updating this hierarchical generative model where the hypotheses 
that are generated encounter prediction error.  
 
 This way of understanding perception has been extended to action in 
the notion of active inference. On this view action is similarly interpreted as a 
process of inference, and which involves the agent selectively sampling the 
environment in order to elicit a particular flow of sensory states that conform 
with prior beliefs. I pointed out in section 3.2.3 of this thesis that this extension 
of free energy minimization to action as well as perception means that we need 
to posit a continuity between motivational and doxastic states; more 
specifically, that it allows us to see that motivational states can exert an 
influence on beliefs in the same way that prior beliefs do within the Bayesian 
machinery that predictive processing framework posits as the primary mental 
activity. That continuity therefore addresses the issue of under-specification 
pointed out both by Ditto (2009) and Pataki (2014), and allows us to see how 
motivational states could be powerful doxastic forces. 
 
 Also surveyed in that section was the mechanism of Bayesian 
inhibition. That mechanism is on stark display in the phenomenon of binocular 
rivalry (Hohwy, Roepstoff & Friston 2008), and Hopkins (2012) has argued 
that it is probably the same mechanism which underlies the psychodynamic 
notion of “repression.” Repression is needed in our account because we are 
required to explain how it is that the desires which wish-fulfilments are meant 
to pacify become frustrated, such that they come to generate those wish-
fulfilments in the first place. Hopkins’s (2012) idea is that repression is a 
process of Bayesian inhibition which excludes mental states that do not fit 
within the agent’s generative hierarchical model of the world. His example of 
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this is that of Mr R: this patient’s hypothesis that his father is a frightening and 
punitive figure that prohibits his enjoyment is incompatible with the more 
recent hypothesis that him and his father are the best of friends, and so the 
former is inhibited in preference of latter. 
 
 However, and as binocular rivalry illustrates, the inhibition of such a 
hypothesis may not be permanent. Data from the environment which conflicts 
with that hypothesis will press for representation in the form of prediction 
error. This prediction error needs to be explained away by finding some place 
for it in the agent’s overall model of the world, and it finds representation of 
this kind through what Freud called “the return of the repressed.” One example 
of such a return in the psychodynamic domain may be that of Mr R’s great 
obsessive fear – this was the obsessive fear that his father was currently being 
subjected to the rat torture, or that he would be if Mr R did not carry out his 
compulsive sanctions. Insofar as these hypotheses persist they require 
representation in the overall model, and the place that they can find in the 
model will often be wish-fulfilling symptoms that only opaquely explain away 
the prediction error that precipitates them. 
 
 The leads to the idea that complexity reduction may also play a role in 
this process. Mathys (2013) argues that one of the circumstances under which 
wish-fulfilment is more likely to occur are those in which the overall 
complexity of the generative model is being reduced. It is thought that 
complexity reduction occurs at least during REM sleep (Hobson & Friston 
2012: 93) and perhaps during certain psychopathologies as a way to 
compensate from overly precise prediction errors (Adams et al. 2013: 13; 
Mathys 2013). These facts partly vindicate the old insight that dreams seem to 
have some similarities to psychopathological states, and if wish-fulfilment 
plays a role in psychopathology then it seems that it would be more likely to 
occur under the circumstances of complexity reduction. 
 
 Of course, emotion also plays a significant role here, and it is primarily 
for the sake of explaining the emotional distortion in anosognosic patients that 
we have introduced the psychodynamic way of explaining irrationality. In 
chapter four I discussed Panksepp’s emotion systems and suggested that they 
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could help us give an account of two features of wish-fulfilment: first, the 
priors in question which tend to influence belief formation; and second, the 
way in which that belief formation proceeds in an indirect and opaque fashion. 
 
 With all this in place, here is how I propose that we understand the 
neuropsychodynamic underpinnings of AHP. The first thing I need to point out 
is that the predictive processing framework has already been applied to AHP in 
a paper by Fotopoulou (2013). In this paper Fotopoulou suggests that with the 
predictive processing framework we can give a range of explanations for 
anosognosia that would show how the illness is unified and simultaneously 
respect the clinical variation of that illness. Her basic proposal is this: 
 
[…] anosognosic phenomena can be linked to an antagonism between 
‘prior beliefs’ (predictive internal models of the world formed on the 
basis of prior learning and genetics) and ‘prediction errors’ 
(discrepancies between expected and actual inputs based on ascending 
interoceptive and exteroceptive signals) at different levels and domains 
of the neurocognitive hierarchy. (Fotopoulou 2013: 12) 
 
Fotopoulou suggests five ways in which this antagonism might lead to 
anosognosic phenomena. The first of these is a deficit in the capacity for active 
inference. What this means is that patients with AHP can no longer sample 
their environment in an active way, that is, that they “can no longer update 
their representation of their affected body parts by actively sampling sensory 
states (i.e., moving their affected limbs).” (Fotopoulou 2013: 13) Notice that 
this draws attention to the way in which (for the predictive processing theorist) 
the movement of the body is essential for veridical perception. This suggests 
that if the ability to move is damaged in a particular way then there may be 
perceptual and cognitive deficits that ensue as a result. I take it that this is 
Fotopoulou’s point with respect to this first kind of deficit. 
 
 The second way in which things can go wrong is through something 
Fotopoulou calls aberrant perceptual inference. This is the inability to update 
the brain’s model of the world in response to prediction error because of a 
weakness or inefficacy on the part of prediction error signals flowing up from 
227 
 
either interoceptive or exteroceptive apparatuses. Such inefficacy could lead to 
“absent, weak, emotionally blunted or neglected prediction errors [that] will be 
incapable of updating motor awareness, particularly in the presence of intact 
motor predictions and other prior beliefs.” (Fotopoulou 2013: 13) In other 
words, it is the failure of bottom-up prediction error signals to be salient 
enough to modulate top-down prediction signals. 
 
 The third kind of deficit is one of perceptual learning. This differs from 
the last point in the idea that it is the general ability to update prediction-
generating models in general that is affected, rather than a weakness in some of 
the information coming from the sensory apparatuses. That is to say that it is 
nothing specific to do with signals of either prediction or prediction error, but 
rather something to do with the mechanism by which these signals interact. 
 
 The fourth possible type of deficit consists in a difficulty with precision 
optimization. Both prediction and prediction error signals in the generative 
model is modulated by a value called precision. In colloquial terms, the 
precision of some given signal is a measure of how reliable that signal is. If a 
prediction or prior belief has a very low precision, then that information will be 
considered unreliable and will carry less weight in its interactions with 
prediction error—this means it is more likely to be updated in the face of error. 
Vice versa: if the prior has a high precision, then the information is reliable and 
carries more weight; it will be more robust in the face of contrary evidence. We 
can therefore see that the optimization of precision is important for the good 
functioning of the generative model; if some prediction has abnormally high 
precision, then it will become recalcitrant in the face of prediction error. It is 
thought that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays an important role in 
modulating precision (Friston et al. 2012), and so Fotopoulou suggests that that 
the realizer of this deficit might be “dopamine-depleting lesions in fronto-
striatal circuits.” (Fotopoulou 2013: 14) 
 
 The fifth and final kind of deficit is the recalcitrance of premorbid 
priors. What this means is that the anosognosiac may have prior beliefs that 
make them more vulnerable to anosognosic and somatoparaphrenic delusions. 
What emerges from these five specified kinds of predictive processing deficit 
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is a single picture wherein AHP consists in prediction-error minimization that 
is pathologically inclined to weight certain prior beliefs over new information, 
but it also shows that there are multiple ways in which this can occur and this 
insight may provide some explanation for the clinical variability of the 
condition. 
 
 I think that we can add some specificity to Fotopoulou’s suggestions by 
bringing in at this point the idea of complexity-reduction as formulated by 
Mathys (2013). First, we know that in complexity reduction the agent’s 
hierarchical generative model is pared down such that it includes fewer 
parameters. In simpler generative models the precision of the model is 
weighted towards prior beliefs, such that these prior beliefs are less likely to be 
updated in response to prediction error. That yields for us what Fotopoulou 
(2013) has already given; that delusional beliefs about the state of the body are 
less likely to be revised in the face of contrary evidence. 
 
 Certainly, given the fact that dopamine dysregulation is likely to follow 
from damage to fronto-striatal circuits, it seems to be plausible that complexity 
reduction would follow in those cases where these circuits are damaged. That 
is because it is thought that dopamine plays a key role in assigning precisions 
within the hierarchical generative model that predictive processing posits, and 
complexity reduction is a response to the failure to assign precisions normally. 
 
 But let’s now notice as well what else Mathys’s notion of complexity 
reduction commits us to; in particular, it is meant to underlie a kind of 
“regression” in the agent’s overall model of the causes of sensory states. This 
regression entails a kind of move towards a more narcissistic worldview as 
described by Freud (1914) and Ferenczi (1952). On this worldview, the agent is 
more prone to see the world in terms of his own needs and desires. This 
constitutes the wish-fulfilment that is described somewhat formally in chapter 
two, and which is described in terms of the narcissism of the patients’ 
worldview by Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000) It is under the conditions of 
narcissism that the patient is prone to viewing the world through the distorted 
lens of his emotional needs; in the case of AHP, the “drive to be well” that is 
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posited by Weinstein and Kahn (1950). It is this complexity reduction that is 
the mechanism that underlies psychodynamic explanation in this case.  
 
5.4.3. Wish-fulfilment and neurological features of the illness 
 
 With this putative mechanism in mind, let us return to the list of facts 
that Bisiach and Geminiani (1991) claim are fatal to psychodynamic theories of 
AHP. We should add to this list the recent findings by Fotopoulou et al. (2009) 
and Besharati et al. (2014) that indicate that anosognosia can be made to remit 
by video replay of an interview between the patient and an examining doctor. 
This fact about AHP doesn’t fit so obviously into what we have considered so 
far, and therefore we are obliged to account for it. 
  
 The first of these putatively problematic facts was the time course of 
the illness. In particular, Bisiach and Geminani think that it is problematic for 
psychodynamic theories that anosognosia naturally resolves once the acute 
phase of the illness has passed, because they ought to predict that the defense 
would be adopted more or less permanently. As Turnbull, Jones & Reed-
Screen (2002: 71) note, this particular objection is less than compelling: 
“Given that many/most neurological disorders recover after sudden-onset 
lesions, and that we do not fully understand the reasons for recovery in any 
such cases, this objection seems inappropriate.” But even if we were to admit it 
as problematic, it could be accounted for within a two-factor (Aimola Davies et 
al. 2009: 202-203) or multiple-factor (Davies & Egan 2013: 693) theory of 
anosognosia. This is particularly plausible if that factor is understood to be a 
global or holistic deficit in the Jacksonian sense – that is to say, the result of a 
diffuse deficit in a functional network – because this Jacksonian view is 
motivated by the observation that the brain as a whole often comes to 
compensate for deficit after lesion. So we might simply suggest that while the 
deficit which leads to the false belief remains extant, the overall functional 
deficit which affects belief maintenance “heals” in some way, or is functionally 
compensated for. 
 
 A similar answer can be given for the problem of remission by 
vestibular stimulation, the selectivity of anosognosia with respect to the 
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illnesses that are denied, and – maybe most importantly – the fact that 
anosognosia is prone to occur after lesion to the right hemisphere but only very 
rarely after lesion to the left hemisphere. (Aimola Davies et al. 2009: 202-205) 
For each of these cases, the supposedly problematic fact can be explained in 
terms of the first factor – that is, in terms of the factor whose task is to explain 
the acquisition of the delusional belief. That is to say, we can explain the 
apparent necessity of right hemisphere lesion to AHP by hypothesizing that it 
is the factor that makes the delusion a candidate for belief, and we can continue 
to maintain that it is the motivation to avoid anxiety that causes the 
mainentance of that belief once it is acquired. Another of the problematic facts 
that we can dispense with is the fact of implicit awareness; as we noted before, 
this in fact seems to motivate for the psychodynamic explanation of AHP, 
rather than against it. That is because implicit awareness is a necessary 
condition of self-deception of this kind. 
 
 This leaves us with two of Bisiach and Geminiani’s (1991) facts that 
remain as problems for us. The first of these is the question of the adaptive 
function of the anosognosia. Here’s how they express the issue: 
 
Anosognosia, sometimes, far from affording the patients a factitious 
peace of mind, creates serious impediments and even danger. 
Unawareness of hemianopia makes the patients unable to foresee and 
avoid obstacles in one side of the environment; unawareness of 
hemiplegia exposes them to disastrous falls […] This attitude, as 
already pointed out by Seneca, undermines recovery from illness at its 
very roots. (Bisiach & Geminiani: 25-26) 
 
I think that the objection which Bisiach and Geminiani mean to be making here 
is that it does not make sense to speak of anosognosic symptoms in terms of 
being an adaptive defense, because it in fact interferes with the patient’s 
recovery. And so from that point of view it seems maladaptive. That may be 
so. But the obvious reply here is to point out that this does not prevent it from 
being adaptive in other ways – for example, adaptive with response to emotion 
regulation. As well, it seems as though it is in fact some adaptive response to 
231 
 
the environment that has gone awry – it is, after all, a psychopathology.78 Not 
all cases of psychological defense (to the extent that it exists) are adaptive, but 
this does not prevent psychological defense from being the result of some 
naturally selected mechanism. 
 
 The second problem which remains is that of misoplegia. The problem 
is this. If we are to think of anosognosic delusion in terms of wish-fulfilment, 
then how does this account for the cases in which the patient hates the limb? 
That seems to a hyper-awareness of the impairment rather than a denial of it: 
“Theories envisaging self-defense mechanisms […] cannot give a satisfactory 
explanation as to why […] there are instances in which utter dislike and even 
aggression is displayed to the offending limbs.” (Bisiach & Geminiani 1991: 
25) 
 
 There are two answers that can be given here. The first is given by 
Turnbull, Jones, and Reed-Screen (2002: 84). They suggest, along the 
Jacksonian lines initially drawn by Kaplan-Solms & Solms (2000), that in 
different patients damage to the function which putatively subserves mature 
object cathexes releases different Pankseppian emotion systems. That would be 
to say that there may be a variation in the positive symptoms that are enabled 
by the negative symptom that the narcissism of the condition represents. The 
variation in this positive symptom could be attributed to pre-morbid differences 
in styles of affect regulation: 
 
[…] disruption of the right hemisphere structures that regulate 
subcortical emotion systems may release a wide range of emotion-based 
responses to paresis. One of these reactions, which we refer to as 
anosognosia, might result from a pattern of emotional experience that is 
especially heavily loaded for loss (or separation-distress […]). Given 
that this is the emotion best avoided, the patient might use cognitive 
resources to distort the available evidence about the paresis (ignore, 
down-play, rationalize …), and thus avoid the negative affective 
                                                     
78 One of the examiners of this dissertation has suggested a simpler response to this objection. 
This is that evolutionary considerations are inappropriate for AHP given the population for 
which the illness commonly occurs. This is an older population for which selection pressures 
are either slight or non-existent. 
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consequences that would follow from full awareness. However, for 
those in whom an anger-mediating architecture is the most dominant 
sub-cortical emotion system released from cortical control, the outcome 
would be one of obsessive hatred (misoplegia). Thus, individual 
differences in basic emotion systems (and their regulation) might form 
the basis for the Weinstein and Kahn finding […] of pre-morbid 
personality effects in anosognosia. (Turnbull, Jones & Reed-Screen 
2002: 84) 
 
This seems like a fine way to deal with the problem of misoplegia in principle, 
but of course it would require further studies on the link between misoplegia 
and the pre-morbid personality of those patients. The second answer that we 
can give is that although it is true that misoplegia constitutes a hyper-awareness 
of the impaired limb, it also constitutes a rejection of it as part of the self. Thus, 
it in fact seems to – by a roundabout path, to be sure – arrange matters in any 
case such that the self is not impaired, since the limb that is impaired is not part 
of the self. That is to say that it seems like a kind of opaque pacification of the 
wish to be well. I would therefore want to endorse the kind of answer that 
Turnbull, Jones and Reed-Screen (2002) give, but supplement it with the 
mechanism of complexity reduction (narcissism) as explicated above and in 
chapter three. 
 
 Last, how are we to account for the fact that video replay can cause 
remission of anosognosia? My tentative suggestion here is again that it has to 
do with the narcissism that Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000) discuss. Let me be 
more specific: in the theory of narcissism the agent’s comportment towards the 
environment implies a radical overvaluation of his own point of view, and an 
inability to see the world from the point of view of others. This in itself implies 
a distinction between the first-person and third-person views on the body and 
on the world, and which has been suggested as an important distinction in the 
explanation of anosognosia.  
 
The clinical interventions with the video replay show us that when 
these patients are made to take a third person perspective that they are more 
able to accurately assess their situation. This suggests that it gives them access 
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to information that allows them to update their beliefs. That would be 
described within the predictive processing framework as prediction error that 
comes from that new information and in response to which the relevant beliefs 
in the hierarchical generative model need to be updated. This is less likely to 
happen in a less complex model, since a less complex model relies to a greater 
extent upon prior beliefs. But one might imagine that if there is enough 
information in order to update the model, then it “flips” in the manner of the 
model alternation in binocular rivalry. I admit that this explanation is 
somewhat unsatisfactory, but I think that this is the way in general that the 
intervention would be explained within the predictive processing framework. 
Certainly, more information about patterns of success with respect to this 
intervention is needed to say anything convincing about it; for example, 
whether it is more likely to work in patients who have implicit awareness of 
impairment, or whether it is more likely to work in patients who are best 
described in terms of a two-deficit theory of delusion. 
 
5.5. Concluding remarks 
 
 There is no good reason to think that psychodynamic accounts of 
anosognosia for hemiplegia are conceptually problematic. I have shown that 
they are not inappropriately psychogenic, and I have also shown that they do 
not necessarily lack for a plausible mechanism of action. Furthermore, they can 
better account for the varied symptoms of AHP than can purely cognitive 
theories, particularly the emotional symptoms of the illness, and they include a 
story about how these emotional symptoms are related to its doxastic 
symptoms. It is on these grounds that I think we should allow for a 
neuropsychodynamic theory of AHP in our explanation of the illness. But with 
that in mind, let me admit some qualifications to this endorsement. 
 
The first qualification is that the clinical variation of anosognosia 
probably means that the theory I have here discussed will not hold true for all 
cases of the illness. Indeed, I have already suggested that there may be a 
significant class of patients for whom the two-deficit theory of Aimola Davies 
and Davies (2009) would be more appropriate. These are patients who 
probably do not have implicit knowledge of their impairment, and so do not 
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meet Levy’s (2009) criteria to be in a state of hot self-deception. This 
conjecture is in part supported by the discovery (Fotopoulou et al. 2010: 3572) 
that patients without implicit awareness have often sustained damage to the 
brain regions that Aimola Davies and Davies (2009) claim subserve the 
functions necessary for normal belief evaluation.  
 
The second qualification I would like to make is that I do not mean to 
lean too heavily upon the hypothesized mechanism of action that I have 
outlined above. Surely the final court of arbitration when it comes to these 
matters is that of clinical and experimental testing, and that is far from what I 
have carried out here. Rather, I mean for it to serve as a kind of proof-of-
concept that is intended to persuade the reader that there is no good reason to 
think that psychodynamic theories of irrationality cannot be given a 
mechanism of action that is plausible within the contemporary sciences of 
mind. This second qualification is therefore just to clarify the role of the 
putative mechanism, and to stress its defeasible nature. 
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6. Conclusion: The very idea of psychodynamic neuroscience 
 
 I would like to finish up my dissertation by saying a little bit about what 
I see as being the overall purpose of bringing psychodynamic theories of 
mental function into conversation with theories in cognate disciplines – in 
particular, those in affective and cognitive neuroscience. One problem with 
engaging in this kind of activity is that it might be seen as a kind of partisan 
justification of psychoanalysis – a cherry picking of the available data in order 
to artificially fit them into psychoanalytic categories and say: “look, Freud was 
right after all!” That is to say that there is the danger of seeing 
neuropsychoanalysis as a practice whose ultimate aim is to justify defunct 
theories by dubious means. But I hope to have shown that the aim of the 
activity is not at all this kind of dodgy pseudo-justification, but rather the 
attempt to shed some genuine light on pathological phenomena that seem to be 
well accounted for by psychodynamic modes of explanation. People who work 
in this field are not generally interested in justifying old theories; they are 
interested in making sense of striking clinical phenomena with the aid of old 
theories, and are generally happy to alter those theories to the extent that they 
need to be altered. 
 
 To put it another way, I hope to have shown in this thesis that there is a 
genuine explanatory problem which psychodynamic accounts of irrationality 
are well placed to address. That problem is explaining the ways in which 
human cognition is systematically distorted by states that are not themselves 
cognitive, and how to make a place for this phenomenon in the contemporary 
cognitive sciences. This explanatory problem has a few different aspects. One 
of these – perhaps the most pressing, but also the most difficult – would be to 
show how the kinds of processes that are postulated by psychodynamic 
theorists can be underwritten by a sub-personal mechanism that is plausible 
against the background of our contemporary knowledge. The approach that I 
have taken to that task in this dissertation is inspired by recent Bayesian 
theories of cognition, but there are philosophers who have suggested that 
evolutionary psychology may yield the right kind of resources, as well (e.g., 
Garvey 2007). 
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 I think that the syndrome of AHP is particularly good at illustrating the 
nature of this problem and the way that theorists might want to come at it. That 
is because of two properties of the illness. The first is that it lends itself quite 
readily to explanation in terms of self-deception and psychodynamic defense. 
There are a number of symptoms which contribute to this, most saliently the 
fact that some anosognosic and anosodiaphoric patients exhibit great feelings 
of loss but which are directed at inappropriate objects, and that these patients 
seem to be implicitly aware of their impairment. These symptoms motivate 
employment of psychodynamic explanatory tools like “defense” and “wish-
fulfilment.” It seems to me that it is these salient features of the syndrome that 
led early researchers of the syndrome to theorize it in terms of psychodynamic 
defense, and as I hope to have persuaded the reader in the last chapter of this 
thesis, it is these features of AHP which make exclusive cognitive-deficit 
explanations of the disorder insufficient to cover all of its cases.  
 
The second property of AHP that makes it particularly illustrative of the 
“very idea” of psychodynamic neuroscience is that there are significant 
philosophical problems with psychodynamic explanations of the illness that 
have been thought fatal to that project. The list of problematic facts that is 
given by Bisiach & Geminiani (1991) is a symptom of those philosophical 
problems, which are much deeper than a mere empirical inadequacy. These 
have to do with the apparently psychogenic nature of psychodynamic 
explanations, which have tended to explain irrationality in terms of adaptive 
(and in classical formulations, quasi-deliberative!) responses to emotional 
conflicts. At a first survey of the prospect of employing psychodynamic 
explanation for anosognosic delusion, it seems as though it might be an absurd 
suggestion. That is because such an explanation seems paradigmatically 
psychological, whereas AHP seems to be an illness that is paradigmatically 
neurological. On this initial and naïve view of the relationship between 
psychodynamic explanation and neurological illness, it seems like something 
of a mistake to suggest that they should go together; indeed, it almost seems 
contradictory. 
 
That is the beauty in taking AHP as our example in this context: one the 
one hand, we have a set of symptoms that are strikingly apt for explanation in 
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psychodynamic terms; on the other hand, we seem to be barred from giving 
this kind of explanation on philosophical grounds. That is a contradiction, and 
an interesting one. As with so many apparent contradictions, however, it comes 
to look less stark under philosophical scrutiny. What was required in our case 
was to demonstrate the following: first, to show that there is no principled 
incompatibility between psychodynamic explanation and ordinary causal 
explanation in neuropsychology; second, to show that psychodynamic 
explanation does not entail unconscious intention on the part of any agential 
subsystems; and third, to show that there is a plausible mechanism of action 
within contemporary cognitive science that could account for psychodynamic 
explanation. 
  
 I can’t pretend to have established the validity of that mechanism 
during the course of this dissertation; as I said in the previous chapter this is a 
proof-of-concept that would require significant experimental and clinical 
testing, and it is entirely defeasible. But what I do take myself to have 
established is that psychodynamic explanations of irrational phenomena ought 
not to be considered theoriae non gratae on a priori grounds. To the extent that 
they can be employed in order to explain puzzling phenomena, they are a 
useful resource, and it is a worthwhile exercise to determine what the mind 
must be like if mental activity includes the distortion of belief on the basis of 
motivational states. This exercise should continue on the basis of two important 
conditions: first, that it is done in cooperation with cognate disciplines that 
have interesting things to say about the same phenomena; and second, that it is 
subject to revision on the basis of clinical and experimental results. 
 
In 2012 I attended a day long workshop which was meant to serve as an 
introduction to Friston’s free energy principle and to the work it could help 
scientists do in theorizing brain function. The last speaker of the day was 
giving a paper on the way in which some of Freud’s ideas about wish-
fulfilment may be helpful in filling out the skeleton of the free energy account. 
After he had finished a man from the audience, his voice quivering with anger, 
put his hand up to ask the following question: “Why do you think that 
neuroscientists like myself tend to view psychoanalysis with indifference, or 
even hostility? I guarantee you that less than ten per cent of the people in this 
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room would have any time for these ideas.” This dissertation has tried to 
provide something of an answer to that man’s question and to show that any 
such reasons are insufficient provided that the psychoanalytic account in 
question is appropriately modest. As someone else said in the ensuing 
discussion: “In science we recycle ideas all the time, and nobody bats an eyelid 
when we discuss Helmholtz or James. Why should Freud be any different?”79 
                                                     
79 Of course, this is paraphrasis. 
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